Overcoming Transaction Cost Impediments to Resolving the Dilemma of Collective Action in the New England Fisheries by Brennan, William J.
The University of Maine
DigitalCommons@UMaine
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Fogler Library
5-2002
Overcoming Transaction Cost Impediments to
Resolving the Dilemma of Collective Action in the
New England Fisheries
William J. Brennan
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/etd
Part of the Aquaculture and Fisheries Commons
This Open-Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UMaine. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UMaine.
Recommended Citation
Brennan, William J., "Overcoming Transaction Cost Impediments to Resolving the Dilemma of Collective Action in the New England
Fisheries" (2002). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 394.
http://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/etd/394
OVERCOMING TRANSACTION COST IMPEDIMENTS TO RESOLVING 
THE DILEMMA OF COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE 
NEW ENGLAND FISHERIES 
BY 
William J. Brennan 
B.S. University of Maine, 1977 
M.A. University of Rhode Island, 1985 
A THESIS 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(in Ecology and Environmental Sciences) 
The Graduate School 
The University of Maine 
May, 2002 
Advisory Committee: 
James Acheson, Professor of Marine Sciences and 
Cooperative Professor of Anthropology, Advisor 
Charles Colgan, Professor of Public Policy & Management, 
University of Southern Maine 
Edward Laverty, Associate Professor of Public Administration 
Robert Steneck, Professor of Marine Sciences 
James Wilson, Professor of Marine Sciences and 
Cooperative Professor of Resource Economics & Policy 
0 2002 William J. Brennan 
All Rights Reserved 
OVERCOMING TRANSACTION COST IMPEDIMENTS TO RESOLVING 
THE DILEMMA OF COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE 
NEW ENGLAND FISHERIES 
By William J. Brennan 
Thesis Advisor: Dr. James Acheson 
An Abstract of the Thesis Presented 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
(in Ecology and Environmental Sciences) 
May 2002 
Management of many global marine fisheries have faltered under science-based 
government-sponsored management regimes. While the result has often been biological 
stock failures and consequent socio-economic problems, there are instances where 
enhanced conservation efforts have led to fishery management success. Studies of New 
England fisheries reveal that the relative success of fishery management can be 
explained in terms of the interaction between the fishing industry and the government, 
the relative power of each in the fishery management exchange, the degree to which 
information and perceptions about the fishery are comparable, the scale and complexity 
of the fishery to be managed, and the ability of the parties bargaining for fisheries 
management to reduce transaction costs that impede efforts to develop control rules. 
In large scale highly complex fisheries where asymmetries in power and 
information exist, the fishery management bargaining process will be marked by high 
transaction costs that will not be easily overcome, leading to institutional failure. Where 
infonnation and perception about the resource is asymmetrical, but where power 
symmetries exist, it is possible to negotiate effective resource conservation rules, 
however, transaction costs will remain high thus the bargaining process will be 
protracted. Where the fishing industry and government have similar understandings of 
resource status and where symmetrical power with respect to decision-making authority 
exists, transaction costs can be more readily overcome leading to more effective 
institutional outcomes. In small scale low complexity fisheries, transaction costs 
involved as parties negotiate for control rules will be relatively low regardless of 
symmetries of information and power. 
Where transaction costs become too high for negotiating parties to overcome, an 
alternative management mechanism is necessary. One alternative that holds promise 
would provide parties to the fishery management bargaining process with equitable 
standing through a devolution of government's management authority. This co- 
management approach would utilize nearly independent 'nested' entities to transmit the 
devolved authority to a more local level of the fishery. Linkages between these entities 
would enable efficient use of infonnation and feedback mechanisms essential to 
overcoming the dilemma of collective action in our fisheries. 
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Part I 
INTRODUCTION AND THEORY 
Chapter 1 
THE PROBLEM OF FISHERY MANAGEMENT 
We are in an era where significant cause for concern exists about the state of 
global ocean resources. Virtually every major fishery of the world is subject to 
excessive harvest levels and global marine resources are threatened with demise. 
Surprisingly, many of these fisheries have been under scientific management by 
governmental entities for decades. This means that we are not just witnessing a loss of 
valuable resources, but a failure of government as well. However, not all management 
efforts have resulted in failure and there are examples of fisheries that have been 
managed quite successfully. This thesis contributes to our understanding of this 
differential by examining the relationship between fishermen and government and 
explaining why their collective efforts to conserve resources succeed or fail. 
A fishery is, by definition, the interaction of fish and fishermen; its management 
is an effort to control exploitation. Control is typically a function the State, thus fishery 
management is a transaction between fishermen and government in the development of 
control rules. Success or failure in fisheries management has two components; the 
manner in which humans establish and enforce controls and the manner in which the 
controls affect fish stocks. The objective of this thesis is to explore the differential 
success of fisheries management by examining three fisheries found within the Gulf of 
Maine: the New England lobster fishery where progress has been achieved in moving 
towards institutional and resource success, the Northeast groundfish fishery which is a 
notorious example of both management and resource failure, and the Maine mahogany 
quahog fishery which exhibits a robust resource despite a failed management institution. 
The differential success achieved in the management of these three fisheries is 
explainable in terms of the various impediments, principally high and asymmetrical 
transaction costs, that must be overcome in developing rules to constrain exploitation. 
The nature and extent of transaction costs are primarily explicable in terms of the 
institutions, the rules of exchange, governing the fishery. With appropriate institutions, 
the costs associated with the fishery management transaction can be relatively low with 
positive resource outcomes. Where high transaction costs cannot be overcome, the 
outcome is institutional and resource failure. It is my hypothesis that the relative 
success of fishery management can be explained in terms of the interaction between 
fishermen and the government: the relative power of each in the fishery management 
exchange; the degree to which information and perceptions about the fishery are 
comparable; the scale and complexity of the fishery to be managed; and the ability of 
the institutions in which they work to reduce the transaction costs that impede efforts to 
develop control rules. Where this industrylgovernment interaction leads to management 
failure, devolving a greater role in the management decision-making process to a more 
local level of the fishery will provide a means of overcoming impediments to success. 
The Status of the Resource 
Maximum sustainable fishery yields have perhaps been reached in much of the 
world's ocean. In a single generation, overfishing and poor management have 
devastated fish stocks in regions around the world. Between 1980 and 1990 the number 
of overexploited stocks increased almost three fold (Alverson and Larkin, 1994). In a 
recent report to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, researchers 
have revealed that such large-scale extractions of fish from the Northwest Atlantic has 
occurred over the past 50 years that the ability of the ocean to sustain W h e r  catches is 
undermined (EES, 2002). 
Much of the yield from fisheries today are from species at progressively lower 
trophic levels (Pauly et al., 2000) and unfortunately this trend will not be easy to reverse 
(Pauly and Christensen, 1995). Major fisheries around the globe are in decline and 
thousands of fishermen worldwide are out of work. Employment in the fisheries 
worldwide is not trivial with approximately 200 million people engaged directly or 
indirectly (Garcia and Newton, 1997). The consequences of overexploitation, therefore, 
are significant, not just from an economic or socio-cultural perspective, but from an 
ecological perspective as well. On a global scale, the condition of the environment and 
its degradation has become a significant societal, cultural and indeed political issue 
(EPAP, 1999). 
Trends observed in several fisheries of the United States would seem to bolster 
arguments that the potential exhaustion of resources is not just theoretical. U.S. fleets 
have harvested in excess of 4.5 million metric tons since 1990. Of the 279 stocks of 
known status, the National Marine Fisheries Service reported in its 1997 Status of the 
Stock Report that 86 are overfished with an additional 10 approaching that status and 
others likely to be included in the near future (NMFS, 1997). In the New England 
region in 1997,59 percent or 30 stocks were considered to be at a low level of 
abundance, 3 1 percent or 16 stocks were at a medium level of abundance, and only 10 
percent or 5 stocks in the region were considered at a high abundance level. 
In 1998, the National Marine Fisheries Service reported that two-thirds of the 
stocks were considered at that time to be overexploited (NMFS, 1998). This report is 
particularly interesting in that the Service admits that the "vast majority of the (New 
England) region's resources have been historically mismanaged" (NMFS, 1 998), a 
significant statement attesting to tragic consequences for this region's fishery. But, are 
all fisheries condemned to play out Hardin's (1 968) commons tragedy? In many 
respects the answer to that questions is an unequivocal yes! 
A Two Dimensional Problem 
As described above, many global fisheries are in a state of crisis. Yet many of 
these fisheries have been under scientific management by governmental entities for 
decades. This means that we are not just witnessing a loss of public resources, but a 
failure of government-sponsored conservation efforts as well. 
While the goal of fisheries management is to affect the biological status of a fish 
stock, in practice fisheries management concerns the regulation of human activities and, 
consequently, it presents a two dimensional problem. One dimension concerns 
fishermen who are in all too many cases motivated to over exploit the resource. The 
second dimension concerns how rules are generated to modify this behavior. 
Rational Self Interest 
There has been much academic attention focused on why individuals are 
motivated to over exploit and our basis of understanding has been refined over the past 
fifty years. Hardin (1968) put into the collective consciences a concern that the end 
result of individual behavior is a detriment to society and that a "tragedy of the 
commons" can only be averted through government intervention. Economists Gordon 
(1 954) and Scott (1955) saw the propensity towards excessive exploitation in terms of a 
lack of property rights to the resource, suggesting that proxies for such rights (i.e. 
licenses or quotas) could overcome economic dissipation. Olsen (1965) advanced the 
understanding of why public "goods" are subject to unbridled use with his theory of 
"free riders" who can not be dissuaded from excessive exploitation of commonly-owned 
resources without selective incentives. More recently, Rational Choice theorists such as 
Elster (1 989), Sugden (1 989), Coleman (1 99O), Ostrom (1 990), Taylor (1 WO), Knight 
(1 992), and others have demonstrated that the basic problem that manifests in the 
fisheries is a communal or "collective action dilemma" where what is rational for the 
individual leads to disaster for society. It is in the short run best interest of fishermen to 
over exploit even though this ultimately leads to the destruction of the breeding stock, 
poor recruitment, lowered catches, and ultimately business failure for many fishermen. 
Changing Individual Incentives 
The second dimension of the fishery management problem is the question of 
what social or institutional circumstances are necessary for the development of 
conservation rules? The propensity to waste resources is not simply a function of 
inherent human behavior, but rather a response to incentives (or lack thereof) that 
emanate from institutions. Institutions can be considered in this context to be sets of 
rules established through a legally constituted process or informal rules and norms of 
behavior. Under some conditions, institutions will be provided that avert the propensity 
towards over exploitation. However, the conditions under which these institutions are 
erected is not well understood. The second dimension of the fishery management 
problem, therefore, can be more precisely stated as a question of how we establish or 
change institutions so as to bring individual incentives in line with societal goals? 
Barpaininp For Solutions 
Much of the work done by the rational choice theorists above focuses upon 
characteristics of communities that have devised informal rules to address collective 
action problems. However, because government is very much involved in devising 
rules for fisheries management, our interest here is in how formal rules or institutions 
come into being in a process that involves the government and industry. The question 
of institutions has been explored extensively by economists such as Coase (1 937), 
Williamson (1 97 I), and North (1 99Ob). Although not directly dealing with the 
collective action dilemma, their work in the field of transaction cost economics provides 
insight into how organizations are generated in response to various kinds of problems 
that occur in the market. In this context, transaction costs refer to the effort, time andlor 
expense to obtain the information necessary to negotiate, make and enforce an exchange 
of goods or services (Dahlman, 1979). Advancing our understanding of the kinds of 
institutions (or governance structures) that evolve in response to market failures 
provides a means of identifying those institutions that may be useful in resolving the 
dilemma of collective action. By evaluating the costs that occur in association with a 
transaction, it may be possible to identify the most efficient or appropriate institution to 
bring individual incentives in line with societal goals for the provision of public goods. 
The linkage between transaction cost economics and collective action problems is 
provided by Taylor and Singleton (1993) who argue that solving these problems 
necessitates devising more adequate rules than the ones in existence and to do so 
necessitates overcoming transaction costs. 
The Basic Premise 
A fish once captured is a private good. A stock of fish fieely swimming is a 
common property resource. Management of this resource is a public service or, in this 
context, the policies, management plans and rules, etc. are public goods (Coase, 1937; 
Samuelson 1954; Olsen 1965). If these management institutions are optimized, then no 
one is excluded from their benefits and any one individual who benefits does not do so 
at the expense of others. We can think of the collective action dilemma, therefore, as a 
'public bad' and that attempts to overcome it by optimizing the public good (policies, 
plans and rules) will incur transaction costs. Taylor and Singleton (1 993 : 196) argue 
that to move an individual, community, or society from an inferior position in policy 
space to a Pareto Superior position necessitates overcoming various transaction costs. 
The more capable an institution is at overcoming or reducing transaction costs, the 
closer it moves towards a Pareto Optimum position. Simply put, by reducing 
transaction costs, the likelihood of reaching a negotiated solution is increased. 
Factors that can increase the costs of transactions according to Williamson 
(1 985) include asymmetrical information between parties to the transaction, infrequent 
use of the good or service to be exchanged or negotiated, and the exchange of assets 
that are of value only within the context of a specific transaction. Other cost increasing 
factors to be considered here include the scale and complexity of the good or service 
subject to the transaction, and the relative power of the parties to the transaction. Power 
here is considered to be that as defined by Knight (1992: 41) - it is the ability to affect 
by some means the alternatives available to others party to the bargaining process. For 
example, the State can foreclose negotiation through the use of fiat, a fishermen's 
association or a conservation organization can seek to overturn agency action through 
congressional intervention or judicial sanction. Scale as used here simply refers to the 
size of the fishery: for example, the number of participants, the spatial distribution of 
the resource, the nature of its market, etc. Scale can have a significant influence upon 
the complexity of the institution to be developed in the bargaining process. 
Access to information, the size or scale of the fishery, and the relative decision- 
making power of parties bargaining for fishery management influences the effort, time 
andlor expense necessary to make, negotiate and enforce an exchange of the policies, 
management plans and rules, etc. required to address the collective action dilemma 
operative within our fisheries. The costs that will be of principal concern here include 
those associated with scale and complexity, those associated with obtaining information 
about the status of the resource and the action and motivations of others, and those 
associated with the relative decision-making power of stakeholders to the fishery, 
including fishermen, managers, and other involved entities. 
Asymmetries 
The factor of most significance with respect to information asymmetry is the 
science that supports the management process. Science in this context is primarily of a 
biological nature and has both technical and legal implications in that the statute 
governing fisheries management in this country, the Magnuson Stevens Fisheries 
Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA), prescribes action based upon 
biological standards. Although current law technically enables the State to discharge its 
public trust responsibility through fiat, in the law's practical application, the 
administrative requirements of the Act puts the federal government in the position of 
bargaining with fishermen and other stakeholders for management rules that will 
conserve the resource. Science thus has a significant influence upon how fishermen, 
managers and other stakeholders perceive the problem and the solution and the time 
necessary to transact an exchange of public goods necessary to optimize solutions to the 
collective action dilemma. Costs can be minimized where parties to the fisheries 
management transaction can bargain with symmetrical information about the status of 
the resource, the measures necessary for its conservation, and the timing of the 
exchange. When information asymmetries exist so as to prevent a shared and consistent 
understanding of the problem, its solution and time horizon, transaction costs can cause 
less desirable fisheries management outcomes. 
The scale and complexity of the fishery and the relative decision-making power 
of the parties to the transaction have an influence upon the bargaining process and the 
degree of success achieved in moving towards a Pareto Optimum position. Fishermen 
operate within a bio-economic system. The size of that system and its spatial 
distribution can create circumstances where information about the status of the resource 
and about the actions of others operating within the system can become limited. 
Government management institutions can also be conceived of as systems organized in 
a hierarchy of roles and functions where complexity affects the flow of information 
necessary to the decision-making process. The nature of the linkages within and 
between fisheries systems and management systems has an influence upon the 
transactions that occur including the flow and use of information necessary for effective 
public policy decision-making. 
Diverse conditions of scale and complexity are manifest in many fisheries. 
Diversity of scale translates into differing levels of access to management institutions 
for different interest groups. Thus the costs of transaction at the industry/government 
interface are not equal for all participants, including fishermen, fisheries managers, and 
other stakeholders. This can be so because the balance of power (including access to 
information) among different parties is asymmetrical. Where power is not symmetrical 
and where the management institution has been designed to function only at one scale 
or where an inappropriate inter-system linkage exists, transaction costs are also 
asymmetrical and thus higher for some parties to the negotiations than for others. This 
is so for several reasons including the inherent difficulty in obtaining unambiguous 
information about the status of the resource, about the actions and motivations of other 
participants in the fishery, and about the actions and motivation of those within the 
management institution. In this situation, the lack of shared verified information 
undermines the conditions necessary for accountability, increasing the costs of 
transactions and this leads to an impaired public decision-making process. 
Information, scale, and power symmetries are important because management of 
fisheries typically leads to the establishment of rules to constrain the way in which 
fishing activities occur. Where these asymmetries exist, the various parties to the 
fishery management negotiation will respond with "self-interested guile" foremost and 
will thus not be entirely forthcoming with their intentions. Williamson (1985) identified 
guile in making the argument that "opportunism" dictates in circumstances where 
information is asy.mmetrica1 and this self-interested behavior increases the costs of the 
transaction. 
In the case of fisheries, fishermen typically respond to constraints by changing 
their exploitive efforts, sometimes through innovation, and at other times by entering 
the political arena to influence public policy. The actions of fishermen can, in turn, lead 
managers to adjust constraints directly via regulation or lead other stakeholders to do so 
indirectly through the legislative process or through the courts. Over time, the 
interaction of the parties to the transaction can spiral upwards towards positive results 
and at lower costs where information and power asymmetries are minimal. This is 
especially so where scale is small and complexity low or where the influence of large 
scalelhigh complexity upon transaction costs is mitigated through some means. In other 
circumstances, however, a downward spiral of perverse countervailing incentives can 
create extraordinary costs for all parties to the negotiation, a dissipation of assets (both 
public and private), and a loss of common property resources. It is possible that 
initially high asymmetries in transaction costs between parties might lead to aggressive 
attempts to equalize bargaining positions. This would lead to strategic responses that, 
depending upon the relative power to affect the alternatives available to other parties, 
would increase transaction costs of the negotiating partners and, in a game of one- 
upmanship, lead to the dissipation spiral. Where low initial transaction costs exist, there 
is less need to resort to countervailing action by negotiating parties and a greater 
likelihood of bargaining success. 
Overcoming Asymmetries 
One means of overcoming complexity induced information limitations, 
including those of science and of the actions and behavior of others, is to partition 
fishery management decision-making authority by scale and location. This is a 
common organizational response to complexity. It is used in government, industry and 
almost all large social institutions (Simon, 1969; 1996; Williamson, 1985; O'Neill, et 
al., 1986; Ostrom, E., 1990; Levin 1992; Ostrom, V., 1994), but is has not been done to 
any significant degree in fisheries. Compared with our current organization of 
management, this would mean the addition of more local decision-making, moving this 
devolved decision-making closer to where the fishery occurs. This devolved authority, 
characterized here as co-management, would enable stakeholders at a more local level 
to develop plans and rules, to impose sanctions for violations, and implement 
accountability features into the management process. 
Given emerging theories about localized stock structure (Hunt von Herbing et 
al., 1998) and the enhanced ability at a more local level to recognize patterns in 
complex adaptive systems like fish stocks, this approach provides a means of 
addressing the limitations of our current principally large scale fisheries science. This 
integration of fishery science, management, and harvest and the use of a more adaptive 
approach is recognized as important to the evolving ecosystem-based management 
system that has been advanced by the federal government (ESAP, 1999). Hennessey 
and Healey (2000: 21 0) make the point that the increasing emphasis "on traditional and 
local knowledge" and its integration with the knowledge of scientists is necessary for 
the adaptive management that is part of the ecosystem-based management evolution. 
The co-management approach has the added benefit in that access to timely 
information concerning the resource and its management as well as the ability to use 
this information to evaluate, debate and reach consensus positions regarding the nature 
* 
of issues of concern to the community can lead to more effective management 
mechanisms (Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1992; Pinkerton and Weinstein, 1995). These 
mechanisms include typical considerations such as rule making, compliance 
monitoring, and enforcement. But other atypical considerations such as an investment 
of the time necessary to address issues and to garner support for institutions. A more 
direct and afirmative role at a local level can develop within a community a 
conservation advocacy that Hall-Arber and Finlayson (1 997) have characterized as a 
linkage between social and ecological systems; a practical understanding of the 
connection between the community and the resource it depends upon. This attitude is 
critically important in promoting a sense of ownership interest in the process and thus in 
its outcome. In essence, a proxy for property is thus established that encourages a sense 
of stewardship. A more formalized acknowledgement of "ownership rights for fishers 
and fishing communities" is thus seen by Hennessey and Healey (2000: 2 10) as having 
"the potential to improve fisheries management and help avoid some of the most 
destructive excesses." 
The establishment of proxyproperty or an ownership interest in the resource 
through the devolved authority to manage the resource at a more local level addresses 
the problem of over exploitation as it was framed by Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955). 
In essence, therefore, the devolved authority serves as a form of selective incentive 
necessary to overcome the free rider problem identified by Olsen (1 965). This selective 
incentive promotes a sense of stewardship which serves as an institution that alters the 
nature of self-interested behavior that Rational Choice theorists argue is responsible for 
the collective action dilemma. Overcoming the dilemma of collective action in this 
fashion, through co-management, can avert a tragedy of the commons without resorting 
to government fiat as advocated by Hardin (1 968). 
The Hv~othesis and Sub-Hypotheses 
Hypothesis. It is my hypothesis that the relative success of fishery management can be 
explained in terms of the interaction between fishermen and the government: the 
relative power of each in the fishery management exchange; the degree to which 
information and perceptions about the fishery are comparable; the scale and complexity 
of the fishery to be managed; and the ability of the institutions in which they work to 
reduce the transaction costs that impede efforts to develop control rules. Where this 
industrylgovernment interaction leads to management failure, devolution of authority in 
the management decision-making process to a more local level of the fishery will 
provide a means of overcoming impediments to successful fisheries management. 
Attendant to this principal hypothesis are the following four sub-hypotheses that will be 
tested in support of the principal. 
Sub-Hypothesis 1. In large scale highly complex fisheries where asymmetries in power 
and information exist, the fishery management bargaining process will be marked by 
high transaction costs that will be overcome only with great difficulty. In this situation, 
there is a high probability that the interaction between parties to the negotiation will 
spiral downward leading to an institutional and resource failure. 
Sub-Hypothesis 2. In large scale highly complex fisheries where information about the 
resource is asymmetrical, but where power symmetries exist, it is possible to negotiate 
effective resource conservation rules, however, transaction costs will remain high thus 
the bargaining process will be protracted. In this circumstance, transaction costs can be 
more easily overcome if the effects of scale are reduced. 
Sub-Hypothesis 3. In large scale highly complex fisheries where the fishing industry 
and government have similar understandings of resource status and where symmetrical 
power with respect to decision-making authority exists, transaction costs can be more 
readily overcome leading to more effective institutional and resource outcomes. 
Sub-Hypothesis 4. In small scale low complexity fisheries, transaction costs involved 
as parties negotiate for control rules will be relatively low regardless of symmetries of 
information and power. 
The Status of Fishery Management 
In the New England region, where fishery management was historically a state- 
level endeavor, it is now principally a federal responsibility as a result of the 1976 
enactment of the Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. The 
federal fisheries management program was designed by its framers to vest stewardship 
responsibility for local resources in the hands of those at the local level. However, the 
manner in which the federal program is currently administered is contrary to the intent 
of its congressional framers due to executive branch interpretation, iterative 
congressional modification, and recent judicial intervention. 
The government-centered approach has proven in some cases to be an 
ineffective means of managing publicly held resources. This is so because a number of 
forces are at play that overwhelm the centralized decision-making process and that the 
extant institutions of governance fail to adequately consider the human element within 
the fisheries thus ignoring the complexity of the combined humanlfisheries system. 
This failure results in a skewed balance of power, where opportunities for mutual 
agreement among participants are not present and where principles of self-responsibility 
and self-governance are lacking (Ostrom, 1997: 4). 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine conditions of success or failure of 
fisheries management in the New England region in relation to the hypothesis that high 
transaction costs can prevent parties bargaining for fisheries management from arriving 
at acceptable solutions. This hypothesis will be tested using case study examination of 
three fisheries found within the Gulf of Maine including the New England lobster 
fishery where an upward spiral of positive incentives has created an enhanced 
management institution, the Northeast groundfish fishery which has spiraled downward 
in response to perverse countervailing incentives, and the Maine mahogany quahog 
fishery which remains relatively consistent despite faulty institutions. 
Success in this context has two separate components: one involves solving the 
collective action dilemma to get rules, the other involves getting rules that positively 
affect fish stocks. Consensus, however, is lacking as to how public policy decision- 
making success or failure is defined in this context because it is difficult to demonstrate 
that any management plan succeeds in positively affecting fish stocks due to the 
masking effects of complex environmental factors. While some see success in terms of 
outcomes that prevent unsustainable exploitation levels, others see success in terms of 
processes that lead those involved in fisheries and management systems to collectively 
solve the collective action dilemma. Singleton (1998: 26) points out that defining 
success only in terms of resource outcomes fails to acknowledge that many factors can 
affect sustainability, including environmental factors, and that sustainability may or 
may not be achieved for reasons "unrelated to institutional design." By way of example, 
Acheson and Steneck (1997) can come to no certain conclusion about the cause of the 
"boom and bust" in the lobster industry and hypothesize that environmental factors such 
as water temperature have had a more pronounced effect upon historic cycles than have 
measures to constrain fishing activity. While it is possible to demonstrate that 
participants in the fisheries management bargaining process have agreed upon rules to 
address the collective action dilemma, it is far more difficult to assess whether the rules 
are effective in conserving the stocks and thus difficult to demonstrate that the rules 
alone are responsible for sustainability. Nevertheless, the outcome-based approach is 
the foundation of current federal law and it colors the way in which stakeholders 
approach the problem. 
This thesis extends the theory of common property governance by extending our 
understanding of how transaction costs effect the public policy decision-making 
process. Success or failure is measured here in terms of processes that lead to 
resolutions of the dilemma of collective action, the basic argument being that the failure 
to resolve this dilemma lies in the relationship between fishermen and government. 
Work done by prior researchers has focused upon questions of why fishermen over 
exploit or why government failures exist. This thesis contributes by drawing a 
relationship between the two, linking these to the theory of institutional formation, and 
thus it adds another dimension to our understanding of why efforts to conserve 
resources succeed or fail. 
The New England fisheries provide a particularly interesting case study of 
resource conservation because, contrary to popular belief, the conservation movement 
in this country did not begin among America's elite class, but in the New England 
region's "petty resource-based economy" (Judd, 1997). A sense of stewardship and a 
commitment to democratic principles led early New Englanders to actively participate 
in the management of shared resources. Over time, however, as authority systems 
shifted from the towns and counties to the state and federal governments, the concept of 
local stewardship and responsibility for local resources yielded to the Progressive Era 
concept of centralized resource policy and its reliance upon scientific expertise (Judd, 
1997). Reviewing the fisheries of this region in the context of an evolution in 
stewardship provides a backdrop against which to illuminate and advance our 
understanding of how fishery management can evolve consistent with evolving societal 
attitudes towards centralized authorities. Through these case studies, this thesis attempts 
to demonstrate that success in bargaining for the public goods necessary to address the 
collective action dilemma requires a devolution of authority to a more local level and 
the development of institutions that foster stewardship anew. 
This case study methodology is supported with research data developed through 
participant observation, a standard and well accepted research technique utilized in 
many social sciences (Bernard, 1988). This research data, in addition to archival 
records, was collected over a period of nearly thirty years of involvement in the U.S. 
fisheries. My personal field observations provide the unique perspective of someone 
who has been a fisherman, a state and federal fishery scientist, a congressional fisheries 
advisor, a fishery regulator, and for the better part of a decade the Commissioner of the 
Maine Department of Marine Resources. 
What follows this introduction are seven chapters that explore the 
interdisciplinary issues (biological, social, economic, legal, and political) attendant to 
fishery management. Chapter 2 raises the question of responsibility, addressing the 
action and behavior of fishermen in the present fishery management context, presents 
the theory of transaction cost economics, and describes significant informational 
asymmetries that exist due to scientific limitations. Chapter 3 introduces the extant 
fishery management program, the role of government and the actions and motivations 
of its agents, and the public policy tools typically utilized to manage marine fisheries. 
Chapter 4 concludes Part I of this thesis with an examination of solutions to the 
collective action dilemma, specifically the institution referred to as co-management and 
how this institution has been successfully applied to fisheries around the globe. 
Part I1 links the theory presented in Part I to the New England fishery situation 
through the examination of three New England fisheries. Chapter 5 presents a broad 
overview of the New England fisheries, their physical and human ecologies to provide a 
context for the detailed examination of their management in Chapter 6 utilizing an 
extended case study method to evaluate where and why fishery management success or 
failure has occurred in the Maine mahogany quahog fishery, the New England lobster 
fishery and the Northeast groundfish fishery. Chapter 7 serves as a conclusion, linking 
theory and case studies in support of the hypothesis that devolving a greater role in the 
management decision-making process to a more local level of a fishery will provide 
incentives that serve to establish a sense of stewardship interest in the resource, altering 
the rational choice behavior that causes the dilemma of collective action in the fisheries. 
Chapter 8 presents the implications of my theory for additional avenues of research and 
develops an alternative national fishery management program, describing how this new 
model would be applied in the New England region, and how existing fisheries would 
be integrated so as to achieve multiple objectives in a complex fisheries environment. 
Chapter 2 
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERFISHING? 
Why is it that we humans seem incapable of utilizing resources, be they terrestrial, 
atmospheric or oceanic, in a fashion that will ensure their sustainability? Are we 
insensitive to the evidence, ignorant of the consequences, is our appetite so rapacious 
that we are incapable of moderation, are we so profligate in our actions as to destroy 
that upon which we depend, are we selfish, naYve or just plain stupid? Perhaps as 
individuals there are those among us who are incapable of moderation. But, can we 
indite whole components of our society in such a fashion? Why do fishermen over fish 
- why does the government let them? These are very simple questions to which the 
only honest response is extremely complex. Yet, as greater public attention is focused 
upon fisheries through the efforts of advocacy groups and the media, the issues are 
being framed in this simplistic rhetorical fashion. Indeed, there are fisheries that have 
not been well managed. Conversely, some have been managed quite well. The question 
of importance here is less a matter of why fishery resources are abused, but under what 
conditions does abuse occur and what conditions are necessary for their conservation? 
Holding fishermen solely accountable for the demise of fishery resources is 
wrong. Conversely, the government alone is not fully culpable either. It is at the 
industrylgovernment interface, in essence the marketplace for the exchange of fishery 
management incentives, that failures occur and where success can be achieved. The 
outcome of the bargaining process depends upon the transaction costs encountered in 
the negotiation and the ability of the parties to negotiate alternatives and devise 
institutions. In this regard, all parties to the fishery management bargaining process 
share responsibility for its success or failure. 
Property Ri~hts,  Public Goods and Collective Action 
"Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best 
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons" (Hardin, 1968: 20). It 
is almost a right of passage for a student in the field of resource management to pay 
homage to Garrett Hardin, if for no other reason than that so much attention has been 
focused upon his parable. More than 30 years after he disparaged the human behavioral 
proclivity towards ruin for all, interdisciplinary research has shown that Hardin's thesis 
contains many flaws. Nevertheless, his work has had a profound effect upon those 
interested in overexploitation, stimulating many to recognize the importance of 
integrating social, political, and biological theory. In fact the rate at which his work is 
cited continues to increase even all these many years after it first appeared in Science 
(Burger and Gochfeld, 1998: 6). 
The circumstance that brings about a resource tragedy is not simply one of 
common property as portrayed in Hardin's pastoral parable, but one of free and open 
access to a resource that has no ownership. Fisheries have played a prominent role in 
the advancement of the theory of common property, which traces its origin to the 
seminal fisheries economics work of Gordon (1 954) and Scott (1 955). Common 
property is not everybody's property because the concept ofproperty has no meaning 
where the possibility of exclusion is not available. Describing unowned resources (res 
nullius) as common property (res communes), therefore, is a contradiction (Ciriacy- 
Wantrup and Bishop 1975). The problem of managing fisheries is that they are fugitive 
resources that freely transit political boundaries. Where appropriate institutions can be 
erected, however, it is possible to provide satisfactory management of common property 
resources (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975: 72 1). Gordon and Scott saw the 
propensity to over exploit in terms of a lack of property rights to the resource, 
suggesting that proxies for such rights (i.e. licenses or quotas) could overcome 
economic dissipation. 
Work done by Olsen (1 965) prior to the appearance of Hardin's "Tragedy" 
argues that the problem inherent in the abusive use of publicly owned "goods" is that 
institutions are lacking that would provide selective incentives necessary to bring about 
moderation in use. It is true that commonly owned common pool resources or Olsen's 
"public goods" are subject to demise, despite the potential benefits from their 
protection, because of rational individual behavior. Collective goods are those for which 
exclusion of use is not possible or for which consumption by one person does not 
exclude use by another. The abuse of such collective goods as rivers, air, and fish, for 
example has been recognized through the ages. Aristotle observed "(t)hat which is 
common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it." (quoted in Ostrom 
and Ostrom 1999: 76). Where these collective goods are available for free and 
unfettered use, the cost minimizing individual will freely exploit them without 
contributing a proportionate share of the costs associated with their supply or 
protection. These "fi-ee riders" as referred to by Olsen will freely take advantage of 
public goods even though their action may ultimately become a detriment to society. 
Olsen demonstrated that moderation in the use of collective goods will not occur even if 
everyone concerned might be better off making the required contribution, that is unless 
certain "selective" incentives to utilize them in moderation are offered or perceived. 
Any one can benefit without realizing the full costs associated with the provision 
of collective goods. Thus in the fisheries it is rational not to harvest with restraint 
despite the possibility that society's goal of a robust resource will not be met. Even 
where agreement exists about the potential benefits associated with self restraint in the 
use of collective goods, there is always the possibility of defection from that position 
given that any fish left by one fisherman today can be harvested by another competitor 
tomorrow. This individual propensity to defect from a position of mutual agreement 
concerning mutual benefits has been modeled as the prisoner 's dilemma. Elster (1 989), 
Sugden (1 989), Coleman (1 WO), Ostrom (1 WO), Taylor (1 990), Knight (1 992), and 
other rational choice theorists advance a more modern way of framing this problem in 
ternls of a collective action dilemma and the fisheries are a classic case. It is in the 
short run best interest of fishermen to over exploit even though this ultimately leads to 
the destruction of the breeding stock, poor recruitment, lowered catches, and ultimately 
business failure for many. What is rational for the individual leads to disaster for 
society. Where the collective action dilemma is operative, social goals and individual 
goals are different. It is rational for fishermen to harvest as much of the available 
resource as possible from the common pool. For an individual fisherman to do 
otherwise in a competitive market place is too costly. 
Extending these concepts to the management of fisheries, we can conceive of 
the conservation of the resource as a form ofpublic good of a kind contemplated by 
Olsen. Public goods in this context are the policies, plans, and regulations, etc. that 
provide a means of securing moderation in the utilization of the collective good (the 
common property resource). When these public goods are provided, the resource can 
be conserved such that those who benefit do not do so at the expense of others. In other 
words, society's goal of a robust resource and the fisherman's profit maximizing goal 
are both met. Where certain conditions exist or where selective incentives are available, 
an individual willingness to contribute to the provision of the public good is possible. 
The process of fisheries management can, therefore, be thought of as a form of 
negotiation or bargaining process, in which rules are produced. Where incentives to 
bargain in earnest exist, rational opportunistic behavior can be overcome and lead to 
more optimum societal outcomes. 
There is not a lot of evidence to suggest that collective action problems are 
easily solved - devising rules to constrain ones self is never easy. Hardin (1968: 29) 
argues that the means of producing responsible utilization of the commons and common 
property resources occurs through the creation of some sort of coercion of a kind that 
can only be exercised through the police powers of the state , variously thought of as 
autocratic control, command and control, or government fiat, etc. The common 
property economists such as Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955) argue that responsible 
utilization can be encouraged through the use of real or simulated property rights. 
Alternatively, anthropologists McCay and Acheson (1987) and Acheson (1 989) have 
pointed out that local level mechanisms, including a variation referred to as co- 
management, have been developed to address common property utilization problems. 
Solutions are available for common pool resource problems under certain 
conditions, however, these conditions are not universal. It is clear, however, that rues of 
behavior or access to property does not need to be dictated solely by the government as 
suggested by Hardin. The social science literature focused on the generation of 
governance structures demonstrates that self-generated rules of organization and 
property rights systems are practical and possible (Ostrom, 1990). Hardin's thesis is 
thus flawed in its assumptions that effective institutions cannot or will not be erected, 
and that only government institutions can arrest a trend towards overexploitation 
(Acheson, 1989: 357-358). 
Much of the work done by the rational choice theorists is focused upon the 
development of informal rules and the characteristics of communities that enable them 
to devise such rules. However, the government is very much involved in devising rules 
for the management of fisheries and our interest here is in the process that occurs 
between the government and the industry to bring about rules in this context. The 
formal management rules are produced by negotiations among stakeholders, thus the 
stakeholders party to the fishery management negotiation are responsible for its 
outcome. Where that outcome is failure, the parties can bargain for solutions provided 
that the transaction costs can be overcome. This is essentially a restatement of the 
Coaseian theorem (Coase, 1937; Williamson and Winter, 1993). Transactions in this 
context refer to the effort, time andlor expense to obtain the information necessary to 
negotiate, make and enforce an exchange of goods or services (Dahlman, 1979). 
Recognizing that all human endeavors incur transaction costs is key to understanding 
the basis for failures of fishery management. Understanding the disparate interests of 
those with a stake in the outcome, particularly the government and the industry, and 
how these interests conflict and overlap is necessary to understanding why the fishery 
management process can sometimes produce failure. Understanding why these failures 
have occurred is fundamentally important to developing successful fishery management 
alternatives for the future. The theories explaining the development of informal rules 
for addressing collective action problems are inadequate to the task of explaining how 
formal rules at the industrylgovernment interface come into being and why they succeed 
or fail. Transaction cost economics, however, can provide the necessary link to bridge 
the gap in our understanding of how to devise potential solutions for collective action 
dilemmas. 
The Costs of Transactions 
Transaction cost economics provides insight into how organizations or 
institutions are generated in response to various kinds of problems that occur in the 
market. It is a field that has increased in interest, particularly to those focused on 
corporate governance, and it is a field of economics that has generated two Nobel 
Laureates within the past decade, the theory's progenitor, Ronald Coase, and his 
disciple, Douglas North. Organizations can be thought of in the conventional sense as 
business firms or government agencies. Institutions can be considered in this context to 
be sets of rules established through a legally constituted process or as informal rules or 
norms of behavior influenced by a set of incentives where motivations are used to 
influence individual actions. That a particular type of organization is chosen depends 
upon the value placed upon the article of interest and what is considered most efficient 
for reducing costs (Williamson, 1975, 1979; North, 1990). Where the article of interest 
is something that society places a high value upon such as the right to harvest a public 
resource or concepts such as property rights, rules of common and acceptable 
understandings (institutions) develop sometimes as a result of "fights" over 
"distribution" (Knight, 1992). Often times, these distribution fights play out in the 
regulatory and legislative arenas incurring high transaction costs. 
From an economic perspective, institutions are generated to compensate for 
problems in the market. If all goods and services required are available at acceptable 
acquisition costs, then institutions or "firms" would be unnecessary (Coase, 1960). 
Institutions, therefore, provide a means of addressing market inefficiencies by lowering 
the cost of transaction between giver and taker, regardless of the specific nature of the 
transaction. This can relate to the acquisition of tangible goods and services available 
in the marketplace as well as intangibles such as information, which has attributes of 
both a good and a service. 
Transaction cost economics can be traced to Coase's classic (1937) article on the 
theory of the firm in dhich he tried to explain hierarchically arranged (business) firms 
in terms of market failures. He questioned the need for finns if Adam Smith's market 
works so well to meet the needs of all consumers and producers alike. The answer 
according to Coase was that markets do not always function well because of the 
differential costs of exchanging (transacting) in the market place. Conversely, Coase 
asked, if hierarchical arrangements within firms have advantages over the market, then 
why is all production not carried on within the firm. The response to this was provided 
by Oliver Williamson (1971 ; 1975; 1985) who pointed out that exchanges in finns 
involve transaction costs too and that it was thus sometimes more efficient to use 
outside firms. The internal workings of the firm, therefore, was seen as more than just a 
production function, but as a governance structure as well. 
Whether or not entrepreneurs use exchanges in markets to get the goods and 
services they need or whether they expand their own firm depends on the balance of 
transaction costs. Transaction cost economics assumes that firms are profit maximizing 
and cost minimizing organizations operated by rational managers. In this regard it falls 
within mainstream economic theory. Where it departs, however, is in stressing that a 
firm's costs are beyond those of production and include all other exchanges that occur 
within the firm to reduce its efficiency. By way of simple example, transaction costs can 
be thought of as friction, which is a force that retards an object as it slides along a 
surface. The total cost in energy necessary to move an object includes that necessary to 
move the mass of the object as well as that necessary to overcome friction. In the 
operation of a firm, total cost is greater than the cost of production alone and includes 
all other sources offiiction that tend to retard progress towards total efficiency. For 
example, lack of information about alternative suppliers or of a customer's 
trustworthiness can lead a firm to pay too much for supplies or to incur additional costs 
to service bad debt. In a fisheries context, lack of information about a competitors 
willingness to fish in moderation or about the declining status of the resource could lead 
an individual fisherman to continue fishing despite a decline in revenue and a loss of 
supply. The goal of an efficient firm is to minimize total cost including those of 
transaction 
Williamson contributes significantly in putting forth the assumed conditions that 
incur transaction costs and the variables that determine what level of organizational (or 
institutional) hierarchy will lower them in various circumstances. He assumes first that 
all actors have "bounded rationality" in that, no matter how knowledgeable they might 
be, they can not consider all possible alternative courses of action. The complexity of 
decision-making in this condition is compounded by the fact that they must account for 
potential reaction by competitors. Metaphorically, bounded rationality can be thought 
of as the obstacles present in the game of checkers. Despite the relative simplicity of 
the game, no one can faultlessly analyze all possible moves, not just because of the 
number of possible permutations the board presents, but also because the actions of the 
opponent are unpredictable (Holland as cited in Wilson, 2001). Williamson also 
assumes that "opportunism" dictates that actors will operate with self-interested "guile" 
foremost and will thus not be entirely honest and truthful about their intentions. He 
does not assume, however, that this behavior will be present all of the time, but that 
because people will act opportunistically some of the time, it is impossible to determine 
in advance whether opportunism is at play. 
In determining whether transaction costs will be lower in a hierarchy (vertical 
organization) or in the market place, Williamson suggests that there would not be a 
situation in which a firm would integrate vertically to bring in-house the provision of a 
good or service it rarely uses, thus ''frequency" of use is one important variable. 
Another important fonn of transaction cost is that of "uncertainty" and the difficulty of 
foreseeing the eventualities that might occur during the course of a transaction. This is 
so not just because of bounded rationality and opportunism, but also because of 
information asymmetries whereby one party to a transaction has less information about 
the transaction than does the other party. A third condition identified by Williamson as 
contributing costs to the transaction is "asset specificity" which occurs in transactions 
that involve assets that are only valuable (or much more so) in the context of a spec@ 
transaction. In this condition the costs will tend to be reduced by vertical integration. 
Douglas North (1 990b) extended the study of transaction costs and governance 
structure beyond the business firm to that of the internal workings of the political 
process and, specifically, its participants. His focus was upon what he referred to as 
"instrumental rationality" causing a failure of informational feedback necessary to 
convey to participants a "correct theory of how their world operates." Instrumental 
rationality affects their decision-making process, the information the process generates, 
and ultimately the outcome of the process (Dixit, 1996: 45). North's work led him to 
conclude that transaction costs are much higher in the political market and that this 
market operates even less efficiently than do economic markets, largely as a result of 
information asymmetries. 
Taxonomically, the basic unit of consideration in transaction cost economics is 
the contract which involves a single exchange between two parties in an economic 
transaction. In a political setting, the contract can be conceived of as a promise of a 
policy or program. The parties to this political transaction are individuals or interest- 
groups on one hand and politicians, elected officials, andfor agency administrators on 
the other. Beyond this simple economic/political contractual parallel, the contrasts 
between transactions in the economic market and in the political market differ 
considerably. For example, political contracts do not occur between two individual 
actors, but rather between multiple parties. Furthermore, the terms of a political 
contract are often vague and leave significant room for interpretation. Consequently, 
contracts in the political market, which are of particular concern in this thesis, are far 
more complex than are those that occur in the economic market. 
To safeguard against factors tending to increase transactions costs (bounded 
rationality, opportunism, and information asymmetry) institutional arrangements are 
selected to mitigate some of the anticipated costs. These institutional arrangements 
vary with respect to their adaptive abilities because of differences in incentives, 
administrative controls, and the legal regime. The movement from the market 
(considered here to be non-governmental communities) to a hierarchy (considered here 
to be vertically arranged institutions of governments and government agencies) involves 
a trade-off of power and autonomy for the added safeguards that a centralized 
coordinating entity is assumed to provide. 
Different modes of governance are supported by differing legal regimes and 
enforcement capabilities, from informal sanctions to contract law to even government 
fiat. This is the avenue through which I intend to explore the transaction costs 
associated with the fishery management process. The feature of transaction cost 
economics that is of particular relevance here is that it provides an explanation of why a 
particular organizational or decision-making structure exists and posits why failures 
occur in some structures. It recognizes that where transaction costs exist, exchange 
agreements must be governed and that some forms of governance are better than others. 
Williamson (1985) says that this perspective can be extended beyond economics into 
non-business related fields including political science, law, and other social sciences, 
although developments in this regard are limited. 
It is used here to address the costs that accrue where scales of complexity are 
mismatched in the decision-making process, the tenet being that complex modes of 
organization are appropriate for complex transactions; simple modes of governance 
suffice for simple transactions. To mismatch complexities of scale using a simple mode 
of governance to manage a complex transaction, for example, can lead to contractual 
failures. On the other hand, costs are incurred without gain where a complex mode of 
governance is used to manage a simple transaction. Both of these outcomes are 
manifest within the New England fisheries. 
Taylor and Singleton (1 993) provide the significant linkage between transaction 
cost economics and collective action problems thus providing a means of leveraging 
possible solutions to the fishery management problems in New England. They argue 
that solving the collective action dilemma necessitates devising more adequate rules 
than the ones in existence and to do so necessitates overcoming transaction costs. That 
moving an individual, community, or society fi-om an inferior position in policy space 
to a Pareto Superior position necessitates overcoming various transaction costs. The 
more capable an institution is at overcoming or reducing transaction costs, the closer it 
moves towards a Pareto Optimum position. Simply put, by reducing transaction costs, 
the likelihood of reaching a negotiated solution is increased. 
The transactions that are of most interest here relate to the costs of obtaining 
information about the status of the resource, the action and motivations of participants 
in the fishery, the action and motivations of other stakeholders, and the actions and 
motivation of those within the government (management) hierarchy. This thesis argues 
that where these transaction costs are high, the lack of shared verified information and 
the absence of conditions necessary for accountability lead to an impaired public 
decision process. 
Rationale for Pursuing an Alternative Management Approach 
Feeny et al. (1996) have critically examined assumptions that a government 
centered management regime is necessary for successful resource management and that 
new arrangements of behavior are impossible to create. New institutions can and have 
been established to better manage many fishery resources. Where obstacles to the 
creation of new institutional arrangements were found, however, it was typically related 
to poor communication between fishermen, managers and biologists (1996: 195). Their 
work provides additional evidence of the costs associated with information asymmetries 
and further demonstrates that government action taken in the social interest does not 
always lead to better outcomes. 
Despite the fact that fisheries were among the first natural resources to be 
brought under governmental control in the late 19th century (1996: 195), history since 
that time is replete with examples of fishery management failures under government 
centered regimes. As discussed in the next chapter, reasons for this are as complex as 
are the institutions themselves and include the nature of the legal/political processes and 
the tenure and commitment of regulatory authorities, including their cultural attitudes 
and value systems. 
It is not a foregone conclusion that a government-centered approach to fisheries 
management is the most effective means of dealing with the very difficult collective 
action dilemma operative within our fisheries today and there are a number of reasons 
why greater fisherman involvement in developing and implementing management in 
this region is necessary. For one, the waters are simply too vast to be either understood 
or managed centrally and fishermen can far too easily undermine management measures 
that they do not support. In this regard, Shelley et al. (1996: 239) state that "managers 
need the fishermen as their eyes and ears on the resource every day, and they need them 
as their partners in meeting the management objectives." 
The command and control form of management characteristic of the 
government-centered approached utilized in the New England region has not proven to 
be an especially successful model for resource conservation. Although there are certain 
public services for which a centralized governmental organization is perhaps 
appropriate (mass transit, sanitation facilities and airports for example), consolidation 
and centralization of services has typically resulted in government failure. Several 
researchers have explored the failings of large centralized government entities in 
responding to the needs of the citizenry in a variety of settings, including the provision 
of services in large metropolitan areas. Perhaps the most critical examination was done 
by Wunsch (1999) who found nearly a "consensus level" of criticism of the 
"centralized, bureaucratic, hierarchical organization strategy." In several studies he 
reviewed, Wunsch found that centralized systems continue and even worsen severe 
asymmetries in power and perpetuate top-down authoritarian approaches to problems 
that require a genuine partnership. Other significant problems he documents include the 
development of projects and programs which poorly fit local needs and conditions, an 
increase in coordination and managerial costs, and a discouragement of local learning 
and innovation (Wunsch, 1999: 243). 
The poor performance of most centralized administrative structures can be 
explained, according to Wunsch, by the "patterns of incentives and disincentives in the 
context of given goods and services" (1999: 263). Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1999: 
41) argue that a "single dominant center of decision making is apt to become a victim of 
the complexity of its own hierarchical or bureaucratic structure. Its complex channel of 
communication may make its administration unresponsive to many more localized 
public interests . . ." Economies of scale are not necessarily always present in large 
government organizations (Ostrom, 1999: 256) and where community control is 
available, communication is enhanced thereby enhancing citizen support of the 
government and increasing the government's responsiveness (Ostrom and Whitaker, 
1999a: 224). Within more localized levels of government jurisdiction, where greater 
communication and responsiveness with the local community exists, more successful 
governmental output is achievable (Ostrom and Whitaker, 1999b: 196). My own 
experience as the head of a cabinet level state agency supports these conclusions, albeit 
only anecdotally, that a dominant center of decision making looses touch with localized 
public interests. 
Power Asymmetries 
When individuals or groups of individuals have similar interests, arrival at a 
commonly agreed upon social principle would seem relatively simple. However, 
observers of the fisheries would come to recognize that there are many competing 
interests at play within the fisheries and, importantly, significant power asymmetries 
exist between individual actors or groups of actors, including fishermen and the 
government. Knight (1 992) provides a general theory that rules develop in a society as 
a result of "fights" over "distribution" of an article of interest such as rights to harvest a 
public resource or any other article that society places a value upon. Institutions come 
about to distribute these articles of interest and, thus, "make life easier" by generating 
common and acceptable understandings about concepts such as space and time, 
property rights, marriage and family, economic production, and politics, etc. 
Institutions, therefore, are sets of rules that structure social interactions; they provide 
rules to guide future actions. But how these social institutions come about is not 
universally agreed upon. In Knight's theory, social institutions are a result of the efforts 
of some to constrain the action of others. Institutions are not explained as a response to 
collective goals or benefits as suggested by several theorists but, rather, they are created 
as a by-product of conflicts over "distributional gains" (1 992: 19). 
Knight's theory of bargaining holds that institutions come into being as a result 
of a "contest" anlong actors, a game of power where strategic decisions are made about 
the relative power of others. Knight argues that the condition necessary for this to occur 
is that the actors are engaged over time in an ongoing relationship; a bargaining process 
of conflicting preferences (1 992: 128). Asymmetries between the actors with respect to 
the credibility of an actor's commitment to a future course of action, how risk averse a 
particular actor is, and the length of the time horizon within which a particular actor can 
operate determines the nature of the contest (1992: 129). Opposing social actors with 
an ongoing relationship (i.e., knowledge of the relative power of the other) know who 
has the edge in terms of resources, time, and commitment and realize who will win the 
contest. Through these power asymmetries, social actors come to realize that, although 
they may not have initially agreed to a particular rule, they can do no better than to 
adhere to the rule established through such a contest. 
Those with more power will attempt to establish rules that advantage them at the 
expense of others. Where rules are forced upon a weak party in the aftermath of a power 
struggle over resources, the result is apt to be constant agitation on the part of the weak 
party to change the rules, to escape fiom the rules, or to raise the costs for the victor. 
This circumstance of social interaction is exactly what drives the fisheries. The 
collective action dilemma attendant to the fisheries is that "fishers cannot or will not 
generate rules to conserve the resources upon which their livelihood depends" 
(Acheson, 1998: 43). That is without some selective incentive to do so, either positive 
or negative. 
Power as used here and as defined by Knight (1992:41) is the ability to affect by 
some means the alternatives available to others party to the bargaining process. In the 
fisheries, significant power asymmetries exist between the industry and government; the 
distribution fights being efforts to devise or change the rules or to escape from the rules 
altogether. For example, fishermen exert power by innovating in their fishing practice 
or by violating rules as a means of circumventing the effect of a control and, in so 
doing, undermine the putative benefits of the rule. These actions affect the alternatives 
available to the government which must either revise the rule or increase enforcement 
as a countervail. Fishermen as well as other stakeholders can affect the alternatives 
available to a government agency by seeking legislative intervention to press for change 
or to overturn agency action via statutory amendment. Of course, all stakeholders have 
available and do pursue judicial intervention to compel government action and, in so 
doing, affect available altematives. 
The government for its part, has significant power via its legislative and rule- 
making authority. Where it has the authority to effect change via fiat, its power to 
influence altematives is significant, especially where it has the necessary enforcement 
capability. But even where it is subject to a protracted administrative process, the 
government still wields significant power in that it controls the administrative 
apparatus. All of these actions by industry, government, and other stakeholders party to 
the fishery management bargaining process raise the costs of the transaction. 
Information Asymmetry 
Among the most significant source of costs in the fisheries management 
transaction context is information asymmetry. This can be a matter of one party to the 
negotiation having less information than another party as suggested by Williamson 
(1 975, 1979). This type of informational asymmetry can be exacerbated by 
complexities of scale and information transfer within large organizations and between 
organizations that are mismatched as to size. Information can also be asymmetrical in 
the way that parties to a negotiation perceive their world and how it operates, an 
informational asymmetry North (1 99Ob) refers to as "instrumental rationality." This 
asymmetry of perception is particularly problematic in the fisheries with respect to the 
definition and assessment of risk, the way in which risk is perceived by stakeholder 
groups, and the response of stakeholders to the assessed risks. Simply put, fishermen 
and scientists have differing perceptions of and understandings about the ocean and its 
resources, thus their respective prescriptions for its managemeit differ. Where these 
differences are significant and can not be resolved in the management process, 
negotiation costs can be high. For the purposes of this thesis and unless indicated 
otherwise, all information-based transaction costs, including those of unequal amounts 
of information, those induced by mismatches of scale, and those of incongruent 
perceptions, are characterized here under the rubric of symmetry. 
In defining risks, fishery managers are compelled by provisions of current law to 
define objective and measurable criteria to indicate a fish stock's well being, whether it 
is overfished or in the process of becoming overfished. To achieve this, criteria such as 
fishing mortality or spawning potential are determined through stock assessments. 
However, biological stock assessments are generally considered imperfect and stock 
assessment scientists must routinely "extrapolate beyond the levels of precision for 
which the science is designed" (Hanna et al., 2000: 13 1-132). The science attendant to 
fisheries management is principally a product of models that treat natural systems 
mathematically. It is theorized that a relationship between fishing and spawning stock 
can be used to describe a relationship between that stock and the number of fish 
predicted to recruit or subsequently become susceptible to a fishery. Developed in the 
middle of the last century, the modeling approach used today treats species of fish as if 
they exist in isolation and that the future size of a fish stock is dependent only upon the 
size of the spawning stock. Typically the models assume that recruitment will continue 
at or about the same level as previously observed, and that a relationship to 
environmental factors does not exist. 
Unfortunately from a fisheries management perspective, this relationship 
between spawning stock and recruitment has proven to be generally unknown except in 
limited cases at very low population sizes and then only over the short run (Myers, et 
al., 1995; Hall 1988). As recently as December 2001, the Scientific and Statistical 
Committee of the New England Fishery Management Council, upon review of the 
scientific basis of stock assessment advice the Council had received through the federal 
stock assessment process, concluded that "the relationship between stock biomass and 
subsequent recruitment is poorly understood and it is difficult to confidently identify 
what biomass would correspond to maximum sustainable yield" (SSC, 2001). 
Maximum sustainable yield is the theoretical level at which a stock of fish can be 
maintained under certain assumed (equilibrium) conditions. 
The fundamental weakness of the model is that it ignores the tendency of the 
oceanic environment towards instability and oversimplifies the differing behavioral 
characteristics of fish stocks. The complexities of species interaction in the marine 
ecosystem is disregarded and the model fails to account for technological innovation 
and human behavior (Symes, 1996). Nevertheless, the fishery science utilized to 
support management in this country is founded upon the theory that population 
sustainability is dependent upon spawning stock biomass. Ecological interactions are 
assumed to be minimal and managers are provided with scientific advice prescribing 
desirable catch rates. This "best science available" is typically subject to error rates of 
30 to 50 percent (Walters, 1998; Hilburn and Walters, 1992) and as Bill Fox, a former 
chief federal scientist explains, "there's a bit of experience involved, not something that 
can be repeated by another scientist. It's not really science; it's like an artist doing it- 
so a large part of your scientific advice comes from art" (Appell, 2001). 
Symes (1 996) draws attention to three notable examples of where resource 
depletions have occurred as a result of natural events coupled with the effects of 
excessive exploitation and casting doubt upon the equilibrium model. In the early 
1970s, Peruvian anchovy catches were dramatically reduced as a result of the combined 
effects of an inherently unstable species, significant fishing pressure, and El Nifio 
induced elevation of water temperature causing a reduction in primary productivity 
(Caviedes and Fik, 1992). In the late 1980s, Barents Sea cod catches declined 
precipitously under heavy fishing pressure when the winter ice front migrated 
southward, disrupting the recruitment of capelin upon which cod depend as its principal 
prey species. During the same period, in the northwest Atlantic a collapse of the cod 
stocks occurred and while a complete explanation has not as yet been developed, water 
temperature effects upon spawning, recruitment, growth or migration coupled with 
intense fishing pressure is implicated. What is particularly interesting about the 
northwest Atlantic cod case is that government scientists wrongly predicted an increase 
in stock abundance contrary to fishermen warnings about poor catches and low growth 
and weights (Finlayson, 1994). 
Despite the fact that most fisheries scientists are aware of the shortcomings of 
their tools and that the scientific community has raised serious questions about the 
Maximum Sustainable Yield principle as a fishery management approach (Larkin, 
1977; Sissenwine, 1978; Cady and Gulland, 1985; Glantz, 1992; Symes, 1 996), the 
Magnuson Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA) codifies 
this principle as the basis of fishery management in this country. Because the 
management measures that have been developed pursuant to this principle typically 
attempt to control catch rates and harvest levels, the fishing community has been 
skeptical of the underlying science. It is not simply that fishermen do not understand 
the science, but the scientific results have not reflected what fishermen have seen on the 
fishing grounds. As a result, a tremendous gulf exists between what fishermen and 
scientists believe they understand about the ocean and how it should be managed. 
The scientific community has discounted the industry's skepticism as merely a 
strategic effort to undermine management. One representative of an environmental 
organization, in defending government scientists as the best available, suggested that 
"(s)tock assessment science is a tricky business that is best left up to the professionals." 
(Fordham, 1996: 126). Faith, however, is not fact and as a society it is our 
responsibility to question the conclusions derived through the science enterprise. The 
noted philosopher scientist J. Bronowski (1956: 5) argues that "(t)here is no more 
threatening and no more degrading doctrine than the fancy that somehow we may 
shelve the responsibility for making the decisions of our society by passing it to a few 
scientists armored with a special magic." 
That a gulf exists between fishermen and stock assessment scientists is 
understandable. Unlike virtually every other sector of the economy involved in natural 
resource utilization, professionals in the field of science or management have not 
typically represented the fishing industry in the management arena during most of the 
history of federal fishery management. The fishery management endeavor has been 
principally the domain of government scientists (Symes, 1996). The development of 
management advice has been controlled by the government and most of those with 
training in the field have, until very recently, been government employees. Fishermen 
and scientists are both convinced that their perspective is correct, yet there is little 
absolute evidence to dispute either given the complex adaptive nature of the resource 
and the masking effects of environmental factors. 
Fishery management has been practiced in this country almost since its 
founding. Today, the rules under which fisheries operate are extremely complex, costly 
and difficult to enforce. The monitoring requirements necessary to measure 
management effectiveness are equally complex, expensive and are difficult 
governmental undertakings. Management objectives are often stated in terms of 
reductions in fishing induced mortality which translates in practical terms into a 
reduction in fishing which is an objective not often embraced by the fishing community. 
Implementation measures tend to focus almost exclusively on controlling the activities 
of fishermen, and the management institutions have not incorporated the fishing 
community, to any meaningful extent, in the development of management measures or 
in monitoring activities. This failure of government has created a general feeling of 
disenfranchisement within the fishing community; a societal attitude that has 
significantly increased the cost of transactions within the fishery management arena. 
To be effective, fishery management measures must be adhered to if not 
embraced by those whose activities are managed and the principles upon which these 
actions are based must be seen as credible. If fishermen are convinced that management 
prescriptions are inefficient, ineffective and costly, they will innovate, evade or seek a 
political means to circumvent them. Unfortunately, government organizations have not 
fostered credibility nor instilled confidence within those whose participation is crucial 
to the success of management efforts. Managers often overestimate the utility of the 
tools that are available and fail to appreciate that the fundamental principle of fishery 
management is not, as the phase implies, the management of fish, but rather, the 
management of people. Our fishery management effort is built upon a scientific and, as 
codified in the Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, a legal 
proposition that, despite the extreme complexity of the oceanic ecosystem, the human 
command and control form of management is sufficient to effectuate significant 
positive change in the environment. The scientific and legal underestimation of oceanic 
complexity and the administrative institutions we have erected to implement these 
concepts greatly compounds the problems caused by the failure of management to 
address rational human behavior within the fishery. The Magnuson Stevens Act is 
designed to be applied broadly, throughout the range of a species for example, and is 
not designed well to enable managers to react to industry's efforts to overcome costs 
imposed by management proscriptions. This has profound implications because the 
remote nature of most fisheries prevents direct observation of fishing activities and the 
incentives to abuse common property resources can be very alluring in today's 
competitive society. 
Our governing institutions are inappropriate to manage complex systems and our 
process of learning about the ocean has been hobbled by our institutional approach to 
scientific uncertainty. This has been extensively studied by Wilson (2001) who argues 
that a redesign of the common pool institutions is necessary to manage these complex 
resources for sustainability. The government-centered top down form of management of 
which the New England region is characteristic has not been successfid in addressing 
the inexorable trend towards overfishing despite years of scientific management. 
Government can not eliminate the transaction costs that cause failures in our fisheries. 
A government-centered solution is only reasonable where transaction costs are lower 
than would be available through alternative institutions. 
Chapter 3 
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN MANAGEMENT 
The objective of this thesis is to explore why humans destroy fisheries resources 
and what conditions are necessary for their conservation. There are two dimensions to 
the problem of fisheries management; the actions of fishermen and the provision of 
rules to modify their behavior. Chapter 2 presented the first dimension; that overfishing 
is traceable to collective action problems in what is rational for the individual fisherman 
leads to disaster for society. Altering this behavior requires that selective incentives be 
changed (perhaps offered in some cases) and this requires a change of institutions. It 
can be very difficult to overcome collective action problems where government has the 
capacity and will to foist rules on an industry that is convinced that the rules are poorly 
conceived. Where a shift in the balance of power with respect to access to information 
and decision-making authority is possible, new institutions with lower transaction costs 
can be erected to overcome the propensity towards a tragedy of the commons and the 
attendant demise of resources. This shift in power asymmetries can come about more 
easily where the costs associated with the time andlor expense obtaining the information 
necessary to negotiate, make and enforce a fishery management bargain are minimal. 
Where these transaction costs are high, particularly in cases of scale imbalances, 
resolution of the collective action dilemma is very difficult. 
The purpose of this thesis is to extend the theory of common property 
governance by extending our understanding of how new management institutions come 
into being; the basic argument being that the failure to resolve this dilemma lies in the 
relationship between fishermen and government, the two most significant stakeholders 
in the fishery management exchange. Extending the Coasian theorem to fisheries, it is 
argued here that stakeholders bargaining for fishery management are responsible for the 
outcome and that where the outcome is failure, the parties can bargain for solutions 
provided that the transaction costs can be overcome. This argument draws upon the 
work of Taylor and Singleton (1993) who see a clear connection between policy and 
transaction costs with respect to the collective action dilemma. Prior research has 
largely focused upon questions of why fishermen over exploit or why government 
failures exist. An attempt is made here to draw a relationship between the two and thus 
add another dimension to our understanding of why efforts to conserve resources 
succeed or fail to resolve the collective action dilemma. 
The purpose of this chapter is to frame the fishery management regulatory 
context and explain the role of government and the actions and motivations of its 
agents. Most importantly, the purpose here is to demonstrate that government is not 
free of transaction costs. That there is in reality a collection of interests at play in all 
government actions and that these sometimes intersect creating costs that are difficult to 
defray in the fishery management context. This serves to support the argument that a 
government-centered approach is not, in all cases, the preferred means of resolving the 
collective action dilemma and that an alternative lower cost approach may be necessary 
to provide successful fishery management outcomes. 
The Context of Federal Fishery Mana~ement 
Federal control over marine fisheries is a relatively recent phenomenon. In 1945 
President Truman unilaterally proclaimed jurisdiction over the continental shelf and a 
Fisheries Conservation Zone. However, the fishery proclamation was imprecise and not 
recognized or enforced (Wenk, 1972). Fisheries management outside the territorial 
jurisdiction and beyond 12 miles of the coast was to be accomplished through 
international agreements. In 1949 the United States entered the International 
Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF), the first multinational 
agreement covering the northwest Atlantic (Mangone, 1988,157). ICNAF, however, 
proved ineffectual as a forum for fishery management, particularly with respect to the 
control of foreign fishing fleets. The failure of this and other multinational agreements 
lead the Congress in 1976 to extend the fisheries jurisdiction of the United States to 200 
nautical miles via the Fishery Conservation and Management Act and, thereafter, to 
withdraw from ICNAF (Hennemuth, 1987). Since that time, the Act has been modified 
several times, including amendments to name the Act for its principal sponsors, 
Senators Warren Magnuson and Ted Stevens. The Act is hereafter referred to as the 
Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA, 1976). 
The Public Trust 
The basis of the management authority for fisheries proclaimed by the 
government through the Magnuson Stevens Act is not simply founded in law, but in the 
philosophy of government as well. It represents a fundamental demonstration by the 
founding fathers of how the new democratic principles would differentiate the United 
States from its European predecessors. Unlike feudal England where access to 
resources such as wildlife was restricted to the privileged class, free access to hunting 
and fishing and the right to bear arms were rights guaranteed to all citizens. The 
resources were not owned by individuals but were held in trust for the people by their 
government (Lund, 1980). Over time, the concept of the public trust has evolved 
significantly in this country. With respect to marine waters, and the resources therein, 
the courts have emphatically affirmed the government's public trust obligation. This 
public trust doctrine constrains both legislative and executive action procedurally and 
substantially; control of resources held in trust is a burden that cannot be abrogated by 
the government: "(t)he control of the state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost 
... or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the 
lands and waters remaining" (Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 1892). 
As exploitation of common property increased, many states have declared a 
trusteeship over resources, including fish and wildlife, for the benefit of the people. 
This movement has led to the adoption of comprehensive schemes for wildlife 
management and, over time, the ancient principle of res nullius, that wildlife is the 
property of no one until captured, has been largely repudiated. In our contemporary 
society, wildlife and fish are the property of the people and held in trust by their 
government (Warner, 1980). Over the past twenty five years, the federal government 
has expanded the public trust doctrine to provide protection of natural resources via the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA, 1976), the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA, 
1972) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, 1976). Under NEPA this 
doctrine of the public trust has been advanced significantly placing a burden upon 
federal agencies to take into account the public interest in resource protection. The 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act brought this concept of 
the public trust to the management of fish off the coasts of the United States, the highly 
migratory species of the high seas, the species which dwell on or in the Continental 
Shelf appertaining to the United States, and the anadromous species which spawn'in the 
United States rivers or estuaries (MSFCMA, 1976). 
The Doctrine of Delevation 
The basic premise of this thesis is that some degree of authority for the 
management of marine fisheries must be shared with stakeholders to reduce transaction 
costs that thwart efforts to overcome the collective action dilemma. It is, therefore, 
appropriate to explore briefly the legal issues attendant to a devolution of authority in 
the context of the public trust doctrine. 
The U.S. Constitution states, "(a)ll legislative powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States ..." (Constitution of the United States). With 
similar intent, the Constitution of Maine states, in pertinent part, that ... "(t)he 
Legislature, ... , shall have full power to make and establish all reasonable laws and 
regulations for the defense and benefit of the people of the state ..." (Constitution of the 
State of Maine). Similar language can be found in the constitutions of all municipal 
states. Clearly, the legislative bodies at both the state and federal levels have been 
imbued through their respective constitutions with authority to make laws for the 
benefit of the people. It is also clear that Congress can delegate certain authorities to the 
executive branch, the courts having held many times that Congress is not prevented 
from seeking assistance from its coordinate branches. However, while it can delegate to 
an administrative agency certain authorities including the ability to make regulations, 
Congress cannot delegate legislative power. Furthermore, in delegating authorities to 
the executive branch, Congress must circumscribe the granted authority through 
enabling statutes that provide guidance to administrative officials. This guidance must 
articulate a certain course of procedure and rules of decision and lay down sufficient 
principles and standards to ensure conformance by the authorized agency with the 
legislative intent of the enabling act (Brown v. O'Connor, 1943; Jeager v. Simrany, 
1950; Trouby v. U.S., 1991). 
Although the actions of an executive branch administrative agency must 
comport with the delegating statutes (U.S. v. Park Motors, 1952), the agency so 
delegated does have a certain level of discretion to interpret the intent of Congress. For 
example, where implementation of a Congressional program necessarily depends upon 
changing conditions, Congress need only state an intelligible principle, delegating 
authority to an agent charged with determining whether and to what extent a factual 
situation requires application of the law (Carroll v. Finch, 1971). 
Generally, this so called delegation doctrine is applicable at the state level as 
well and, like the Congress, the Maine Legislature, for example, has the power to 
delegate proscriptive responsibility to administrative agencies (State v. Boyajian, 1975). 
Although the Legislature may not constitutionally delegate general legislative authority, 
it may delegate authority to a governmental agency charged with the duty to administer 
an act, provided the legislation sets up sufficient standards to guide the administrative 
body in the exercise of its discretionary functions (Opinion of the Justices, 1970). As 
federal case law demonstrates, so too does state case law show that the doctrine of 
delegation requires that legislative authority must declare policy or purpose of law and 
set standards or guides to indicate the extent of and prescribe limits for the discretion 
delegated (State v. Boynton, 1977). 
While it is clear that authority can be delegated to administrative agencies, can 
authority also be delegated to non-executive branch agents and, if so, to whom and to 
what extent? While it is true that the state cannot alienate its public trust obligation, the 
state can share that responsibility where a direct public interest is served (People v. 
Chicago Park District, 1976). But, can local management units comprised of 
representatives of the fishing community be established as agents of the state and be 
legally delegated responsibility to discharge aspects of the state's public trust 
obligation? This question is of critical importance to the establishment of the alternative 
fisheries management institutions. In this respect, the power of delegation to a 
subsidiary of an administrative agency also appears clear and when delegated to such a 
subsidiary or board, the exercise of the power so granted remains within the board's 
discretion (Walling v. McCracken County Peach Growers Asso'n, 1943). Furthermore, 
the courts have ruled that statutes may grant certain authority to those on whom the 
statutes impinge (Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. McGowan, 1940), provided that 
such authority is not delegated to trade or industrial associations or other groups so as to 
empower them to enact measures that are of narrow self interest and without a broader 
beneficent purpose (A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. U.S., 1935). Essentially, 
federal case law with respect to the question demonstrates that, although the legislative 
body cannot delegate to private corporations or anyone else the power to enact laws, it 
may employ them in administrative capacity to carry laws into effect (Crain v. First Nat. 
Bank of Oregon, 1963). Although this issue has not been as extensively tested in Maine 
courts, the general principles applicable at the federal level appear to hold in state courts 
as well and, accordingly, state legislatures appears to have the constitutional power to 
entrust certain responsibilities to instruments of its choosing provided that they are duly 
constituted (Crornrnett v. City of Portland, 1954). 
Public Policy Considerations in the Re~ulation of Fisheries 
Clearly, the biological status of a stock or the economic status of the fishery are 
important in assessing the need for change and in measuring the effectiveness of the 
institution erected to bring about that change. But these metrics fail to characterize the 
status of the management institution itself, whether the institution is functional with 
respect to human interaction, and whether or not the costs of transactions within the 
institution are reasonable costs for society to bear. Too often, we focus upon the 
beginning and the end points and neglect what transactions have taken place in between. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine conditions of success or failure of fisheries 
management in the New England region in relation to the hypothesis that high 
transaction costs can prevent parties bargaining for fisheries management from arriving 
at acceptable solutions. Success in this context has two separate components: one 
involves solving the collective action dilemma to get rules; the other involves getting 
rules that positively affect fish stocks. Consensus, however, is lacking as to how public 
policy decision-making success or failure is defined in this context. While some see 
success only in terms of outcomes that prevent unsustainable exploitation levels, others 
see success in terms of processes that lead those involved in fisheries and management 
systems to collectively solve the collective action dilemma. Singleton (1 998: 26) points 
out that defining success only in terms of outcomes fails to acknowledge that many 
factors can affect sustainability, including environmental factors, and that sustainability 
may or may not be achieved for reasons "unrelated to institutional design." While it is 
possible to demonstrate that participants in the fisheries management bargaining process 
have agreed upon rules to address the collective action dilemma, it is far more difficult 
to assess whether the rules are effective in conserving the stocks and thus difficult to 
demonstrate that the rules alone are responsible for sustainability. Nevertheless, the 
outcome-based approach is the foundation of current federal law and, as such, it effects 
the way in which public goods are exchanged in the fishery management marketplace. 
To provide an understanding of what transactions take place within the fishery 
management arena, this section describes how management institutions are devised 
within the government-centered fishery management arena, how risks are defined, what 
public policy tools are available, and how the public is involved in the decision-making 
process. These are customary measures by which to evaluate the process of establishing 
public policies. 
Institutions 
Fishery management responsibility in the New England region is held by federal 
and state organizations or derivatives of governmental agencies. At the federal level, 
management authority is exercised by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), 
which is a subsidiary of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The Fisheries Service is 
charged with the administration of marine fisheries matters beyond the state 3-nautical 
mile territorial limit, although it can exercise management prerogatives within state 
waters under certain conditions. The development of management strategies for 
fisheries under federal jurisdiction is performed by the New England Fishery 
Management Council. This is a quasi-statelfederallprivate entity that functions in an 
advisory capacity to the Commerce Secretary (MSFCMA, 1976: § 302 & 304) and is 
one of eight regional councils established under the 1976 Act. During the early 
development of the MSFCMA, the Senate version of the bill that eventually became 
law, provided for only seven regional councils and did not provide for a separate New 
England Council. Out of political considerations and because of the complex nature of 
the region's fisheries, the Senate ultimately acceded to the House position and agreed to 
a separate New England council (U.S. Congress, 1 976: 87). 
At the state level, management authority is held typically by a natural resource, 
economic development, or environmental protection agency, many of which were 
created at the turn of the last century (Judd, 1997: 263). In some circumstances, 
management is coordinated with the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Con~mission 
(ASMFC), a compact of eastern seaboard states, created by act of Congress in the 
1940's and ratified thereafter by the states. The purpose of ASMFC, one of three such 
conlmissions nationally, is to encourage better management of transboundary marine 
fisheries occurring within the territorial limits of member states. These commissions 
operate to develop joint programs of fisheries promotion and protection, however, they 
have no enforcement authority other than that exercised through the member states. In 
addition to these federal and state entities, other bodies have conservation and 
management responsibility for U.S. fish stocks that are highly migratory between areas 
under the jurisdiction of two or more councils or move across international boundaries. 
Although the federal government has historically been involved in marine 
fisheries, its role had been primarily non-regulatory and limited to the collection of 
statistics and the provision of services to the industry either directly through loans and 
subsidies or indirectly through tariffs and other forms of import barriers. It was not until 
1976 with the enactment of the 200-mile law that federal management authority over 
marine fisheries was established and vested in the Secretary of Commerce. Thus, prior 
to 1976, management of fisheries in U.S. waters was, for all intents and purposes, 
exclusively the domain of state agencies and enforcement was largely restricted to those 
areas within three miles of the coastal states. As a practical matter, extra-territorial 
enforcement by a state, although permissible, was generally infrequent and limited in 
scope to those citizens licensed by the state. Control upon fishing activities occurring 
beyond state waters was primarily accomplished through the use of landing laws 
developed unilaterally by a state or via a conlrnission's interstate management program 
and adopted by individual states as statute or regulation. 
The Magnuson Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act established 
exclusive authority for the United States over all fish, anadromous species, and living 
resources of the continental shelf within a newly created fishery conservation zone. It 
thus marked a new era for the federal government with respect to marine fisheries, 
expanding the federal role beyond one of service to one that encompasses the 
management and conservation of resources. This was to be accomplished through four 
major features of the MSFCMA including: 1) the extension of jurisdiction over 2 
million square nautical miles of ocean; 2) the promulgation of new national standards 
for managing fisheries; 3) the creation of a complex two-tiered management decision- 
making system; and 4) the elimination of foreign fishing except that which would occur 
under specific bilateral agreements (Cicin-Sain and Knecht, 2000: 78). In 1980 the Act 
was substantially amended, strengthening foreign fishing provisions to encourage the 
expansion of domestic harvesting and processing. Again in 1986 it was amended to 
establish new requirements for habitat conservation and revising the fishery 
management plan decision-making process. And in 1996 it was again amended to 
incorporate significant language changes including key provisions to prevent or end 
overfishing and to rebuild depleted stocks. Cicin-Sain and Knecht (2000) provide a very 
informative table of the numerous amendments to the Act through 1996. 
Adoption of the Magnuson-Stevens Act came about due to a confluence of a 
number of issues, both domestic and international. Little or no progress in the Law of 
the Sea Treaty forum, the global overexploitation of ocean resources and the consequent 
decline of U.S. fisheries caused by foreign harvest adjacent to U.S. shores were the 
paramount impetus for action. These issues provided policy entrepreneurs both within 
govenment and representing interests outside of government with the opportunity to 
bring to closure a debate that had ensured for several years (Cicin-Sain and Knecht, 
2000: 77). 
The management decision-making process established under the Act is found 
within Title I11 and it is here that the federal govenment is placed in a role as trustee of 
fishery resources. It is through this Title that the Act seeks to ensure that fish are 
harvested responsibly according to management plans based upon specified standards. 
It is a complex multi-tiered system of management which delegates initial responsibility 
to eight semi-autonomous regional fishery management councils, functioning in a form 
of partnership with the federal govenment, a partnership that William Rogalski (1 980) 
calls a unique form of federalism. Passage of the Act changed the character of fishery 
policy in this country dramatically, shifting management away from state purview 
toward one more dominated by the federal government. Executive branch interpretation, 
subsequent congressional modification and judicial intervention have tended to 
consolidate more of the fishery management authority at the federal level than intended 
by the Act's framers. Congress envisioned at the time that primary management 
decisions would be lodged in the regions using the best information available and that 
this regional approach would "have the support of the fishermen who are regulated" 
(U.S. Congress, 1976: 455). It is of interest to note that during the debate that presaged 
the 1976 Act, the United States argued the need to wrest greater local control from the 
international community by unilaterally claiming jurisdiction over 2 million square 
miles of what, theretofore, had been international waters. Today the federal government 
appears to oppose the local benejit argument as it would apply domestically. 
Title I11 is the lengthiest portion of the Act and, despite the intent of Congress, it 
is the portion that has caused the most consternation within the industry. Fishermen who 
originally supported enactment of the MSFCMA were primarily interested in 
establishing a 200-mile limit, excluding foreign fishermen from valuable fishery 
resources. Following implementation and a fuller appreciation of what federal control 
of the fisheries would mean to their activities, fishermen quickly began to argue that the 
Act went well beyond its original intent, subjecting them to severe encumbrances 
(Cicin-Sain and Knecht, 2000: 132). The magnitude of the domestic regulatory regime 
was extraordinary to a fishing industry whose harvesting activities had been virtually 
ignored by the federal government for the first 200 years of nationhood. In the New 
England region, where a multi-species multi-gear fishery exists, management problems 
began to manifest almost immediately upon implementation. 
Ultimately, a key question with respect to any institution is the manner in which 
it operates; do decisions emanate from the top of the institution or from bottom? Does 
the institution operate in a cooperative or collaborative fashion and have appropriate 
and necessary authorities been delegated. Beyond formal rules and management tools, 
what is of particular importance is whether management institutions have been 
developed and are functional with respect to the human interaction necessary to bring 
about meaningful controls upon the human endeavor that is a fishery. As we shall see, 
decidedly different institutions have evolved in the three New England fisheries to be 
explored in the following chapters. One of these is the institution of stewardship. 
Beyond the institutions that arise out of the statutory or regulatory process, 
institutions can also arise in the fishery management context as a result of where a 
particular fishery is practiced; specifically if it occurs inshore (within the territorial 
seas) or offshore (within that area considered high seas prior to the Magnuson Stevens 
Act). Although the problems of managing fishery resources in territorial waters as well 
as in the high seas have similarities in that they are fugitive resources, the institutions of 
governance are vastly different (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975: 7 15). There is a 
condition of ownership (res communes) via the public trust to fisheries resources within 
the territorial seas. This is an ownership interest that has been in effect since the 
founding of the nation. Extension of jurisdiction into areas previously considered high 
seas established ownership to resources that, prior to enactment of the Magnuson 
Stevens Act in 1976, had been considered res nullius (owned by no one). Vastly 
different cultures have evolved in our fisheries as a result of where a particular fishery 
has been predominately practiced. Where fisheries have been pursued under the 
doctrine of the public trust, a sense of ownership and indeed stewardship has evolved 
among the practitioners. Where res nullius fisheries have been pursued, ownership did 
not and could not exist until these hgitive resources had been captured and actually 
rendered as property. 
Definition of Risk 
Of the national standards established in the Magnuson Stevens Act, the 
Congress in 1976 considered the first standard to be of particular importance. This 
standard requires that management measures shall prevent overfishing and achieve the 
optimum yield from each fishery (MSFCMA, 1976: fj 301 (a)(l)). Optimum in this 
context is considered to be the amount of fish prescribed on the basis of the maximum 
yield sustainable from the fishery (a biological measure) taking into account relevant 
economic, social, or ecological factors (U.S. Congress, 1976: 86). Although the Act 
stipulates that economic and social factors be taken into account when prescribing an 
optimum yield, these factors are considered only advisory in nature with respect to 
language in the Act's national standards section (Sec. 301) and the Act's required 
provisions section (Sec. 303(a)). Defining risks to a fishery is prescribed by law to be 
according to a biological measure first and foremost. 
In 1996, the Congress underscored the preeminence of the Maximum 
Sustainable Yield (MSY) concept as a means of assessing risks to a fishery when it 
redefined optimum yield, requiring that it must be based upon MSY and only revised 
downward, not upward, by other relevant factors (SFA, 1996). To support this risk 
assessment determination, the Congress stipulated in the second national standard that 
"conservation and management measures shall be based upon the best scientific 
information available" (MSFCMA, 1976: 5 30 1 (a)(2)). 
In 1989 the National Marine Fisheries Service developed guidelines under 
provisions of the Magnuson Stevens Act (1 6 U.S.C. 185 1 (b)) to provide guidance as to 
the Service's interpretation of the national standards and how the Service envisioned 
fishery management plans to be developed (50 C.F.R. fj 602.1-17). These new 
"guidelines" require councils to develop objective and measurable definitions of 
overfishing and to develop comprehensive recovery plans for stocks found to be 
overfished. Each FMP or amendment developed from that point forward is required to 
include a definition of overfishing and a recovery plan for stocks exceeding specified 
thresholds. 
The language in the Act regarding guidelines explicitly states that such 
guidelines shall be "advisory" and shall "not have the force and effect of law". When 
these guidelines (referred to as the 602 Guidelines in reference to the pertinent section 
of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulation) were promulgated as regulation of the agency, 
there were cries of derision from several sectors of the fishery management community 
who argued that the agency had exceeded its authority. Nevertheless, the manner in 
which these guidelines came about became moot when they were incorporated into the 
"required provisions" section of the Magnuson Stevens Act (16 U.S.C. 1853 (10) as part 
of the Sustainable Fisheries Act. 
Public Policy Tools 
From a functional perspective, fishing induced mortality is related to the number 
of units (i.e. fishermen or vessels) participating in the fishery, their catching power, 
their total fishing time, and their spatial distribution. The policy tools available to 
manage biological aspects of marine fisheries are of two types; those that affect fishing 
mortality working through one or more of these four factors and those that reduce the 
impact of fishing by changing the age (and thus size) at which fish become susceptible 
(recruit) to the fishery. Tools that attempt to affect fishing mortality can be those that 
control the number of fishing units, or those that affect the efficiency of the units 
through spatial or temporal restrictions or by affecting the catching power of the gear. 
Also in this category are tools that limit the amount of fish that can be harvested. Tools 
that affect the age and size at which fish recruit to the fishery can also be based upon 
spatial or temporal restrictions (seasonal closures of nursery areas for example) or 
required selectivity of the gear (for example mesh size enabling escapement of fish 
below a certain size). Obviously, there is significant overlap between the tools available 
and the manner in which they are used to achieve management objectives. 
Fishery management in one form or another has been practiced in this country 
almost since its founding, primarily attempting to regulate efficiency in the fishing 
enterprise through restriction on gear and fishing methods. Ostensibly for the purposes 
of conservation, most science-based fishery management controls (the public policy 
tools) are, in reality, politically expedient devices to allocate resources among 
fishermen (Wenk, 1972: 302). Management approaches that have been utilized include 
quotas and other biological controls described above, as well as corrective taxes, limited 
entry, and a variety of transferable allocations. 
A quota system can be an effective means of reducing fishing mortality while 
preserving the common property nature of the fishery. However, quotas can not 
eliminate the propensity to overcapitalize an open access fishery. Furthermore, quota- 
based management becomes very complex in situations where catching power of the 
various fishing units differs and there is always the tendency to increase a quota in 
response to political pressure. Other types of biological controls can also effectively 
address fishing mortality, particularly spatial and temporal closures, however, measures 
that effect the efficiency of the gear are often complex, difficult to enforce and can often 
be ingeniously circumvented. 
Taxes can be used to achieve fishery management objectives and can be applied 
to control inputs (effort) or outputs (landings). Although the same outcomes can be 
demonstrated, as a practical matter, input taxes lead the fisherman to substitute effort 
while output taxes lead to selective landings, both of which lead to waste. More 
problematic, however, is that to effectuate meaningful biological outcomes, the tax 
applied would have to be substantial which is not politically palatable. 
Limited entry programs are used to rationalize a common property fishery by 
placing value on a license to fish (harvester license or boat license for example) and 
thereby create a property right to the fishery. However, these programs have typically 
been applied after the fishery has been over harvested and generally the political will to 
limit the number of licenses has not been sufficient to bring about meaningful 
reductions in effort. Allocating these rights is particularly difficult from a political 
perspective and consequently the time consumed in the political arena attempting to 
allocate rights often comes at the expense of the resource. Furthermore, simply limiting 
the number of participants does not necessarily reduce the overcapitalized condition of 
the fishery or the ability of the participants to increase individual effort. 
To overcome the problems inherent in allocating rights, transferability features 
have been incorporated into limited entry programs. When used in conjunction with 
quotas or shares of the available resource, these programs can address the underlying 
economic inefficiencies in a fishery and the consequent waste of natural resources. 
These individual transferable quotas, however, have not been universally accepted 
because of the concern about consolidation of rights and the consequent impact upon 
the fishing community. 
From a strategic perspective it is reasonable to assume that the correct suite of 
management tools can be selected by targeting the factor to be controlled (growth or 
mortality for example), determining the basis for those controls, the type of regulation 
necessary to effect the control sought, and the appropriate enforcement mechanism to 
ensure compliance. From a practical perspective, however, making a determination 
about which management approach to utilize can be very difficult given the disparate 
goals and aspiration of the people involved, the economics and social forces at play 
within the fisheries, and the extremely complex nature of the fishery resource. The 
three New England fisheries to be examined in chapters to follow clearly demonstrate 
the practical difficulties managers confront in selecting appropriate public policy tools 
in complex fisheries and that strategic policy decision-making often gives way to 
reactive evolutionary choice. 
Involvin~ the Public 
The Magnuson Stevens Act contains very explicit provisions for the 
involvement of the public beyond those appointed to a council as voting members. The 
Act stipulates a procedural means by which councils and their committees are to 
conduct business so as to ensure that the public is aware of and has an opportunity to 
participate in the fishery management process (16 U.S.C. 1852 (I)). In addition, the Act 
requires that each council shall "establish and maintain" a scientific and statistical 
committee and advisory panels as necessary including a fishing industry advisory 
committee to "assist in the development of fishery management plans and amendments 
to such plans" (16 U.S.C. 1852 (g)). However, the Act is quite clear that decisions and 
recommendations made by committees and panels shall be considered to be only 
advisory in nature (16 U.S.C. 1852 (g)(5)). 
Pursuant to these requirements under the Magnuson Stevens Act, the New 
England Fishery Management Council has established a Scientific and Statistical 
Committee to assist in the development, collection, and evaluation of biological 
information relevant to the development of management plans and a separate Social 
Sciences Advisory Committee to provide assistance with respect to social and economic 
information. In addition, the council has established a number of advisory panels 
composed of individuals who are either actually engaged in the harvest of, or are 
knowledgeable and interested in, the conservation and management of the fishery or 
group of fisheries to be managed. 
Beyond these formal provisions for public involvement in the federal 
management process, each state involved in the process as well as the Atlantic States 
Marine Fisheries Commission has its own set of forinally constituted rules of procedure 
and advisory bodies through which members of the public have an opportunity to 
engage in the fishery management process. In addition, there are numerous 
organizations operating within the New England region and nationally that provide the 
public with an opportunity to influence management decisions. But involving the 
public in the management process requires more than just structure (committees, panels, 
organizations, etc.) and administrative procedures to ensure that the public has a 
meaningful opportunity of being heard. Involving the public in the management 
process also requires that the public be adequately and appropriately informed about the 
complex matters at hand. This relates to the type of data collected, the data that is 
actually released, and the format in which it is presented. It also relates to the 
information that accompanies data that makes it usable and understandable. 
Scientific information has a significant influence upon how fishermen, managers 
and other stakeholders perceive the 'problem' and the 'solution' and the 'time' 
necessary to transact an exchange of public goods necessary to optimize solutions to the 
collective action dilemma. Costs can be minimized where parties to the fisheries 
management transaction can bargain with symmetrical information about the status of 
the resources, the measures necessary for its conservation, and the timing of the 
exchange. When information asymmetries exist so as to prevent a shared and consistent 
understanding of the problem, its solution and time horizon, transaction costs can 
become exorbitant while the parties bargain for what often becomes less desirable 
fisheries management outcomes. 
The public referred to throughout much of this thesis is the fishing public, 
however, the public involved in the fisheries now includes a number of other interests 
including environmental organizations, conservation groups, and public policy 
advocates, etc. The broader public is involved - they are stakeholders and have a 
legitimate interest in the outcomes of the management endeavor and, accordingly, the 
government has an obligation to ensure that they are provided with the means of making 
informed decisions. But a thorny question has been raised by fishermen about the 
degree to which these new stakeholders should be involved in the decision-making 
process. Certainly they are involved in the public policy/public choice process and they 
have gained considerable influence in this arena. Traditional participants in the 
management process have viewed the participation of new stakeholder groups as 
adversarial and, unfortunately, in some instances this is not without cause. However, 
there are institutions that can ameliorate the adversarial posture and there are 
stakeholders that have a legitimate and ultimately helpful role to play in the 
management decision-making process. 
The Government . . . 
There has been much academic attention focused upon why individuals are 
motivated to over exploit resources and our understanding has evolved significantly as a 
result of research that has built in sophistication over the past fifty years. In contrast, 
the literature examining the failure of government is quite disparate and does not all 
collate well to advance a concise understanding. The failure of government in the 
fishery management context has received much less emphasis in the fisheries related 
literature than have issues of collective action. Nevertheless, it deserves scrutiny 
considering that many failing fish stocks have been under some form of government- 
sponsored management for decades. The intent here is to describe aspects of 
government, its structure and function, and the actions of its agents responsible for 
transaction costs in the fishery management exchange. Because the attendant theories 
do not all emanate from a single locus but from a variety of disciplines seeking answers 
to unrelated questions, this section is structured to present the government as it is 
variously perceived; as monolith, as a collectivity of individuals, as a culture, as a 
collection of interest groups, and as a political environment. The government, because 
of all of these various personalities, is subject to an institutional inertia that is the cost 
of transaction within the public sector. 
. . . as Monolith 
The government stands in the minds of many as a monolith - the Hobbesian 
Leviathan. The government, however, is not an entity but a collective of individuals 
with a host of individual interests and aspiration, all of which conspire unwittingly to 
influence the business of government, sometimes even to overwhelm it. From outside 
the institution of government, these disparate interests and aspirations are not readily 
discernable and to the individual fisherman the business of government often appears 
abstract. It is understandable, therefore, that government appears to a fisherman and to 
many others in the civil society as a single massive whole exhibiting a solid uniformity 
of action, a Gargantuan (Ostrom et al., 1999) metaphorically conceived of as just The 
Government. 
The purpose of government is not easily determined or described because 
govenments do many things and the relative importance of these functions is a matter 
of debate. To some in our society, government is seen as an opportunity, its purpose is 
to provide goods and services. To others, government is seen merely as an obstacle. 
Our political parties are at least nominally defined by the way in which they perceive 
government, and there are even those in our society who dispute the legitimacy of 
government; any government. This thesis considers the purpose of government to be 
the provision of public goods of the kind necessary to solve the collective action 
dilemma. Public goods in the fishery management context are the policies, laws, 
management plans and rules that facilitate or impose constraints upon the harvest of 
marine resources. Theoretically, the reason for regulation, used here to describe any 
form of government sponsored control, is to make someone better off, the standard 
theory holding that regulations grow out of a need; that regulations are taken for the 
public interest. However, this view has been largely discredited by researchers who 
have demonstrated that many forms of regulation do not help and may actually have 
hurt the general public (Breyer, 1982: 10). 
. . . as a Collectivity of Individuals 
Regulations do not arise as a result of spontaneous generation but out of a 
collection of interests including the self-interest of the regulating community (Crew and 
Rowley, 1989). That these public and private interests intersect is in large measure why 
the government-centered fishery management process often becomes overwhelmed by 
ancillary objectives. Indeed, with respect to regulatory approaches to problem solving, 
many historical, political, administrative, and economic forces are at play. Often times 
this colors the way in which people within the public sector see issues such that some 
directions in the approach taken towards problem solving are pre-ordained. This can 
lead to standard approaches designed to be applied broadly so as to reduce 
administrative burdens, but which actually create other costs. At the federal level, there 
is a propensity "to standardize activities or programs. Federal regulations ... are 
typically designed for the average state or locality, and thus never fit well anywhere" 
(John, 1994: 194). This has led some researchers to conclude that regulation in and of 
itself, is the problem and thus explaining why criticism of regulation has grown apace 
with the growth of regulation (Breyer, 1982). 
In the fishery management arena, the attitude of individual public officials has a 
significant influence upon outcomes, therefore, the interests and aspirations of those 
within the public sector can not be overlooked. Collectively referred to as the 
bureaucracy, public sector employees are the intermediaries that translate legislative 
concept into programmatic action. Laws enacted through the legislative process are 
often vague, therefore, the implementation of measures envisioned in the legislation is 
left in the hands of public employees. Their role is to interpret the intent of the framers, 
to design a practical means of executing the principles articulated in the legislation, and 
to manage programs such that the legislative goals are met. In this fashion, the public 
employee gains considerable power and influence. Although perhaps well intentioned, 
public sector employees are none the less motivated by their own self-interest. There is 
a tendency (perhaps even a "metabolic urge" as claimed by a popular newspaper 
columnist (PPH, 2001)) for bureaucracies to maximize their missions. Some social 
scientists have argued that government agencies and the laws they must interpret have 
been deliberately designed by their framers to be inefficient so as to keep the balance of 
power in check (Moe, 1990) and to ensure that those who are in power, remain in power 
(North, 1990). 
Despite the relish with which the public disparages its public employees, a 
government can not function without a bureaucracy. It serves as the interface between a 
people's aspiration for their government and the government's discharge of its 
responsibility to the people. The bureaucracy also serves to provide continuity in 
government, its tenure generally exceeding that of elected officials. However, because 
government is a collectivity of individuals with a collective decision structure, it is 
unrealistic to view The Government as having no interests of its own; that it is neutral 
and benign. The notion that public employees benevolently serve the public interest, 
passively fulfilling the desires of the electorate and its representative, is wrong. 
Bureaucrats are subject to the same human frailties and self interests as are all others in 
our society and their individual motivations are equally complex. In the worst case, self 
interest can lead to corruption, however, self interested behavior is generally far less 
contemptible and typically motivated by no more profound a human desire than wishing 
to gain favor. Regardless of how mundane the variations of self interested behavior 
might be, several authors believe that it can have a profound effect upon the operation 
of government (Cook and Levi, 1990; Moberg, 1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). 
. . . as a Culture 
William Niskanen (1 968: 197 1) has done seminal work on the decision-making 
environment of the public sector bureaucracy, showing that agents of government tend 
to maximize their agency budgets and their own sphere of influence at the expense of 
society. Later Niskanen (1971) provided some insight about the motivations of 
bureaucrats and their goal orientation, comparing the parameters operative in the public 
sector of the economy to that of the private sector. Whereas the individual in the 
private sector can attempt to advance through the expenditure of effort that leads to 
success of the firm and ultimately to an increase in the individual's remuneration, 
opportunities for monetary gain in the public sector are minimal. Consequently, 
bureaucrats tend to focus on tenure and perquisites of the office including public 
reputation and power. It is not that the people in the bureaucracy are ill motivated, it is 
that the incentives for effort are different. A public sector employee in essence has 
made a trade off, accepting long-term compensation in lieu of high compensation. 
Unfortunately, where there is little reward for effort but penalty for error, there is a 
tendency to be risk adverse. This culture within the bureaucracy tends to foster the 
bureaucratic or lethargic approach to problem solving, using the very deliberate nature 
of the rule-making process as a means of and perhaps as an excuse to delay and even 
thwart change. 
This proclivity of the public sector culture is often disparaged but the factors 
that lead to this behavior are systemic. Both Niskanen in the works cited above and 
Breyer (1 997) have demonstrated that in many circumstances, regulation itself is the 
problem in many governmental programs. Once regulation comes into play, there are 
forces that constrain government agents to a pre-ordained course of action. Sometimes, 
flexibility and common sense must, by dictate, take a back seat to prescriptions of law 
and regulation at the expense of successful accomplishment of programmatic goals. 
As a culture, the bureaucracy can be insular and lacking the feedback systems 
necessary to ensure that its actions are indeed taken in the public interest. This 
asymmetry causes information to become distorted as it is transmitted within the 
organization; sometimes to cover mistakes or incompetence (Miller, 1992; Williamson, 
1970; Tullock, 1965). But regardless of the cause, the effect of asymmetrical 
information is often faulty decision-making. Where the culture has become insular and 
inward looking, bureaucrats tend to think of themselves as being in charge of the 
public's business as opposed to being charged with conducting the public's business. 
Regulators in this environment can behave as autocrats sometimes leading the public to 
accept schemes that it does not comprehend. Carried to the extreme, particularly where 
a breakdown in informational feedback exists, regulators can foist upon a powerless 
public highly modernistic or pseudoscientific schemes that can ultimately lead to 
disaster (Scott, 1998). 
Williamson (1 963) refers to the power asymmetry between the regulator and the 
public as the principal-agent problem. Agents or employees of principals or owners in 
power (for example government bureaucrats who are agents of the electorate), act to 
pursue personal interests that differ from those of their principals. The principal-agent 
problem occurs when bureaucrats have different goals than the legislature on one hand 
and the public on another. The principal-agent problem is operative in the private 
sectors but thought to be most serious in government where ownership of the apparatus 
of government (its agencies and enterprises) can not be transferred and where output is 
largely intangible services that can not be easily quantified (Jordan, 1972; De Alessi, 
1980; Zeckhauser and Horn, 1989). In this circumstance, the electorate has little 
incentive to oversee its agents thus bureaucrats have little incentive to operate 
efficiently. And because government agencies operate essentially as monopolies with 
respect to the services they provide, there is a tendency on the part of bureaucrats to 
maximize their budgets (including their staff as well as their own non-pecuniary 
benefits) which occurs at a net loss to society as demonstrated by Niskanen (1 968). 
Edwards (1 994: 260) reports that a number of studies of natural resource agencies, 
including fisheries agencies in the United States, demonstrate evidence consistent with 
the principal-agent problem and that examples exist of these agencies undercutting 
stakeholders so as to maintain authority. 
. . . as a Confluence of Interest Groups 
The government, however, is not just a bureaucratic endeavor. The process of 
governing, its outcomes and the public choices that result, emerge from a political 
environment. People do government and the business of government is about the goals, 
aspirations, and behavior of the people involved. A democratic society does not 
necessarily make consistent decisions (Arrow, 195 1) and it sometimes makes poor 
decisions because the emphasis of the political apparatus of government is primarily 
focused upon value-based objectives. James Buchanan (1 975) argues that the behavior 
of voters, politicians and political institutions play crucial roles in the fornlulation of 
policy, i.e. in "public choice" decisions. In our society, making public choices is 
complex because the feasibility of unanimity is remote given the disparate needs and 
desires of individuals. 
The process of marine fisheries management in this country aptly demonstrates 
the complexity of a democratic and representative form of society. The groups involved 
in the process include elected officials from both the federal and state level and, to a 
lesser extent, the municipal level, employees of governments, and representatives of 
special interest groups. These special interests can include fishermen organizations be 
they commercial or recreational, the processing sector and other shoreside interests, 
environmental organizations, and other stakeholder groups with a direct or indirect 
interest in marine fisheries matters. Considering that the management of marine 
fisheries has become much more litigious of late, the role of the judiciary can not be 
overlooked nor can the role of the media given its ability to bring issues to public 
attention. It should also be recognized that individuals, participating on their own 
behalf as effected fishermen or as expert in a particular field of relevance for example, 
can exercise significant influence in the aggregate. 
Interest group politics is always prominent in the process of regulating, 
particularly where cohesive groups are able to effectively lobby regulators for 
preferential treatment. In some instances, choices can be advanced by the public for the 
purposes of reducing competition, a situation Stigler (1971) refers to as capturing. That 
is to say those who are within the regulated community in essence become part of the 
regulating mechanism, their interests being to advance regulation for the purpose of 
preventing new entrants into a field of competition. This is a forin of rent seeking 
whereby people use the government to make themselves better off. In its most abusive 
form, an interest group "colonizes a government bureau so that the bureau promotes 
specific interests of the organized group at the expense of the public as a whole" 
(Bickers and Williams, 2001: 194) in an effort to seek or secure rents. 
Rent seeking is an effort to redistribute income through the regulatory process as 
interest groups compete for gains artificially created by the government (Buchanan, 
1980). Efforts to capture such contrived transfers have a social cost (Tullock, 197 1) and 
the process to secure a resource artificially created by the government can result in the 
squandering of scarce resources (Tollison, 1982). Rent seeking can be particularly 
wasteful where rivalry in the political arena is focused on a government-protected 
monopoly or license, for example. Much of what goes on in the public process is 
essentially a form of rent seeking and the fisheries are certainly no exception. 
. . . as a Political Environment 
Should the government lead or should the government follow? This 
philosophical question is at the heart of the fishery management dilemma. The 
government, as monolith, is not a nimble beast yet the ponderous risk adverse nature of 
the government caused by the interplay of forces (individuals, cultures, and interest 
groups) tends to maintain stability. It also tends to ensure that the response of 
government to any issue reflects the preference of the majority of the electorate. 
Although a source of frustration to people on either side of the median, this inertia does, 
in reality, serve the interests of a democratic and representative society. While the 
government does have an obligation to ensure that the resources it holds in trust for the 
people are managed responsibly, the government will sometimes align itself with a 
powerful interest group. However, because the government is risk adverse, it tends to 
err on the side that reflects the preferences of the majority in society. The deliberative 
nature of the rule making process, for example, is designed to ensure that all interests 
are heard. It is this fundamental aspect of a political process manifest within our fishery 
management arena that has become such a source of frustration to all because in many 
instances it clear that more affirmative action must be taken to avert a resource crisis. 
In many respects, a significant effort is expended in the public sector to 
maximize the minimum outcome; a process referred to in our society as red tape. It is 
an institutional inertia that, perhaps vectored in the same direction as the rest of society, 
causes the government to be a few steps behind where some in our society feel it should 
be. This institutional inertia is a cost of transaction in the public sector. Design 
inefficiencies, self interest, risk aversion, information asymmetry, principal-agent 
problems, rent seeking and a host of other inherently bureaucratic aspects of the 
process of individuals making public choices are the costs of transaction that occur 
within the government-centered fishery management system. These are costs that are 
extremely difficult to defray despite well meaning aspirations to "reinvent government." 
Where the government has a monopoly position with respect to the management 
apparatus (data collection, enforcement, and decision-making, for example) gross 
inefficiencies can abound, particularly where vertical integration isolates the decision- 
makers. Where the cost of transaction within the organization becomes too great, new 
institutions must be created to compensate. 
The National Marine Fisheries Service 
The case studies that follow in Part I1 present comparative examples of federal 
management institutions established for three fisheries. Several aspects of these case 
studies relate to the action of the federal government management agency and the 
behavior of its agents, specifically the National Marine Fisheries Service. It is 
appropriate, therefore, to provide a characterization of the agency that New England 
fishermen have come to know as The Government. 
At the advent of the Magnuson Stevens Act, most of the National Marine 
Fisheries Service personnel were fishery biologists and most of the agency's personnel 
resources were located in its regional research centers (Cicin-Sain and Knecht, 2000: 
13 1). Their role was to conduct assessment studies and advance scientific knowledge of 
the fisheries. Cicin-Sain and Knecht (2000: 13 1 - 132) make the point that: "much of the 
challenge of implementing the FCMA thus lay in how to move the agency away from 
its traditional research and service mission to a new management and regulatory role. 
Much of the time would be spent reorganizing the agency - several times - in an 
attempt to achieve this shift. . . . Another major implementation challenge lay in the 
changing relationship between NMFS and its major client group - commercial fishers. 
This relationship, originally very amicable, underwent considerable change after 1976. 
. . . Acrimonious relationships followed in the initial period of implementation as 
commercial fishers strove to control the new decision-making roles established by the 
FCMA" 
Perhaps because of personal interest and the difficulty the agency encountered 
coming to understand its new role, an insular attitude developed within NMFS that 
affects its behavior to this day. An unpublished report prepared for the Assistant 
Administrator of Fisheries in 1978 found that communication and coordination 
problems in the agency were widespread. The agency had taken a very legal posture in 
its dealings with the councils and handed down administrative prescriptions to them 
without adequate consultation. There was a significant disagreement over the authority 
status of the councils and an effort to garner for the federal government a greater role in 
the decision-making process. Consequently, the Service foisted upon the council 
process a number of administrative procedures such that the councils became 
"hamstrung" by unnecessary and irrelevant requirements. This led many to feel that the 
councils had been "sandbagged" and that NMFS was attempting to prove that the 
council process embodied in the Magnuson Stevens Act was a failure (Schoning, 2000). 
The effort to change the decision-making balance in favor of the professional 
biologists continued into the next decade, being most prominently displayed in the 
NOAA Fishery Management Study (NOAA, 1986). This so-called Calio report (named 
such because it was prepared at the request of Dr. Anthony Calio, Administrator of 
NOAA) recommended that fishery management decision-making be separated between 
conservation and allocation with the agency setting biological targets and the councils, 
subject to agency oversight, determining the allocation. The report stated that, "council 
allocations could not exceed an ABC (acceptable biological catch), would be based on a 
redefined optimum yield, and would be the cornerstone of fishery management plans." 
Despite the fact that the framers of the Magnuson Stevens Act intended that fishery 
management be a shared responsibility between the government and a public 
knowledgeable about the fisheries, the agency's attitude was that of being "in charge" 
of the public's business as opposed to being charged with "conducting" the public's 
business. 
In its draft report to the Secretary of Commerce, the federally mandated Marine 
Fisheries Advisory Committee (MAFAC) found evidence that insular behavior still 
exists within the National Marine Fisheries Service today. The Committee reported that 
there is "insufficient external and internal communication and outreach" and that this is 
"the basis for many of the problems faced by NMFS. . . . (that) science is a major 
function of NMFS; however improvements need to be made in fostering cooperation, 
integration and syntheses among data gathering groups, within NOAA and among 
states, universities and other NGO's. . . . (and that) management of living marine 
resource is the most important responsibility and challenge facing (NMFS), yet this 
important function of the agency is being driven by crisis and litigation. By integrating 
stakeholder views; using interdisciplinary science; assessing its performance and 
correcting deficiencies; and valuing people, communications, and education, the 
agency's ability to manage effectively would be enhanced (MAFAC, 2000). 
A Note on Accountability, Costs. and Social Welfare 
Perhaps the most significant deficiency in the national fishery management 
program is a lack of accountability. Managers are not held accountable for the manner 
in which the public trust responsibility is discharged despite the fact that national 
standards exist and must be obliged. Indeed, the Secretary of Commerce is required to 
report annually to Congress on the status of fisheries under each Council's jurisdiction 
(MSFCMA: $ 304(e)), the Secretary can remove jurisdiction of a Council where it fails 
to act (MSFCMA: 5 304(c)(l)), and the Secretary can remove for cause any member of 
a Council (MSFCMA: $ 302(b)(6)). However, the only real accountability for failure to 
manage responsibly is that which is brought about through Congressional rebuke or 
through action in the courts. The Marine Conservation Network claims that it was just 
such a rebuke that led to passage of the Sustainable Fisheries Act (Zeman, 2001). And 
when the Conservation Law Foundation and the Massachusetts Audubon Society sued 
the Secretary of Commerce and other NMFS administrators for what they considered a 
violation of the MSFCMA's national standards, they did so to "provide some judicial 
spine" (Shelley et al., 1996: 227). 
The industry also escapes accountability for what is essentially usufructory 
rights. Yes permit sanctions and penalty schedules are available for fishermen who 
violate management regulations and indeed, in rem action can be taken against fishing 
vessels used in violation of management regulations (MSFCMA: $ 308(d)). However, 
by law (MSFCMA: $304(d)), users of the resource are not assessed fees commensurate 
with the value of the extracted resource and are only minimally burdened with fees for 
permits that can not exceed the administrative costs incurred in their issuance. In this 
regard it is valuable to consider for a moment, the costs of our national fishery 
management program, the principle of cost recovery, and the concept of social welfare. 
It can not be taken for granted that in each case of government intervention the 
public interest is best served because the benefits of any positive outcomes may not 
transcend the cost of their achievement. This may be particularly true where the cost of 
intervention yields failure. Proper and effective management of marine fisheries may 
indeed produce benefits for the whole economy and for society in general, however, to 
the average citizen the potential gain is insufficient to warrant their active involvement 
in the public policy debate about fishery management. 
On a national scale, the commercial fishing industry's contribution to the 
national economy is relatively minor. For example, in 1980 the ex-vessel value of the 
domestic catch equaled $2.24 billion (USDOC, 1981 : 95) or approximately 0.08 percent 
of the $2.79 trillion GDP produced in that year (USDOC, 2001~). The net earnings of 
the EXXON Corporation alone equaled approximately as much as the value of the catch 
in 1980 (Moody's, 1981). In 1983 the ex-vessel value rose to $2.37 billion, however, its 
percentage of the GDP declined to 0.07 percent. In 1983, federal expenditures in 
support of marine fisheries related activities including the National Marine Fisheries 
Service, the fisheries sanitation program of the Food and Drug Administration, marine 
fisheries programs of the Departments of State and Interior, and the fisheries 
enforcement activities of the U.S. Coast Guard was $3 18 million (Buck, 1985), an 
amount equal to 13 percent of the total ex-vessel value of domestic landings in that 
year. By the year 2000, the ex-vessel value of domestic fisheries landings had risen to 
$3.50 billion (USDOC, 2001a), however, the cost of government has risen as well. The 
budget of the National Marine Fisheries Service alone ($41 7 million) was equal to 
approximately 12 percent of the Year 2000 ex-vessel value (USDOC, 2001b) while, as 
a percentage of domestic product, the value of U.S. fisheries has declined to little more 
than 0.03 percent of the $9.87 trillion GDP. 
While the federal costs associated with marine fisheries services and support are 
relatively high as compared with the value of the catch, cost recovery is negligible as a 
function of federal law. The Magnuson Stevens Act stipulates that any fees established 
by the Secretary pursuant to any permits required of fishery management plans may not 
exceed the administrative costs incurred in issuing the permits. Although some regions 
do assess administrative permit fees and fees are assessed for permits to fish for highly 
migratory species such as tuna, no fees are assessed in the New England region for 
permits and logbooks etc. associated with fisheries under management by the New 
England Regional Fishery Management Council or the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries 
Commission. While all states assess a variety of license fees (the Maine lobster license 
fee is $1 18 and fees for other Maine licenses such as groundfish, scallop and mahogany 
quahog are $89 each), these fees are not intended to offset operating expenses of the 
state agencies. During my tenure as Commissioner of the Maine DMR, license revenue 
(which was directed towards the general fund and not the agency) typically generated 
an amount less than 10 percent of the agency's annual operating expense. 
Clearly this is a very contrived examination and intended to be considered in 
only a qualitative sense for the purpose of setting up the following argument. Federal 
expenditures in support of marine fishing related programs should be made in such a 
fashion as to assure efficient utilization of resources, both fiscal and biological. At a 
minimum, the cost of some of these expenditures should be recovered from those who 
utilize the resource including the commercial and recreational harvester as well as the 
processing sector. In the face of continued waste of resources and in the absence of cost 
sharing by the direct beneficiaries, further expenditures of fiscal resources for federal 
intervention in the New England fishery should not occur. The fishery should be 
permitted to operate in response to its own internal market and biological forces, a 
laissez-faire approach. While the former aspect of this argument has merit, particularly 
the importance of assuming and sharing costs related to management, the latter aspect 
does not. Uncontrolled fishing effort will create serious biological consequences 
leading to economic dislocations that may have serious negative ramifications for 
discrete sectors of the economy. 
The fisheries have been declared under the Magnuson Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act to be a valuable resource, contributing to the food 
supply, economy, and health of the nation and thus warranting a national program for 
their conservation and management (MSFCMA, 1976: 5 2). However, it is reasonable 
to question whether the best interest of society is served by federal expenditures in 
support of the Magnuson-based management approach of these public trust resources if 
this approach leads to failure, particularly if one considers the federal monies in support 
of Magnuson-based activities are a form of public resource as well. 
History is replete with examples of governmental failure to effectively discharge 
management responsibilities. In virtually every sector of the U.S. economy and in 
programs as disparate as housing for the poor, petroleum price controls, pesticide 
regulation, and the grading of processed fruits and vegetables, the government has 
failed to meet public expectations (Peirce, 198 1). Traditionally, the government has 
been called upon to intervene so as to avert a resource disaster. However, it is not a 
foregone conclusion that greater governmental intervention and control will lead to 
sustainability and the opposite outcome is perhaps just as likely. The government can 
not simply regulate away externalities. The government can not unilaterally eliminate or 
bargain away the transaction costs that cause failures in our fisheries. A government- 
centered solution is only reasonable where these costs are lower than available 
alternatives. 
Commercial fishing provides a primary source of income for many, it supports a 
variety of ancillary businesses and it is important to local economies in several regions 
of the country. It therefore remains an important consideration of the federal 
government despite its relatively insignificant contribution to the national economy. It 
has become abundantly clear, however, that fisheries like those in the New England 
region can not continue on their present course. Overcapitalization, overfishing and the 
consequent marginal returns on investment have led to a destabilization that does not 
bode well for the industry's future. We have witnessed a failure of the government- 
centered approach to fisheries management. An alternative approach is now required. 
Chapter 4 
SOLVING THE COLLECTIVE ACTION DILEMMA 
Garrett Hardin (1 968) argues that the means of producing responsible utilization 
of resources occurs through the creation of rules reinforced by the police powers of the 
state. However, problems associated with overfishing are not simply a matter of 
appropriate harvest levels as is implicit in Hardin's parable, nor is the human condition 
so devoid of the capacity for self-restraint as he so pessimistically portrays. We as a 
democratic society are certainly capable of managing resources in the public good; and 
fishermen, under some conditions can and do generate rules to constrain their own 
exploitive effort. Furthermore, it is not abundantly clear that the interventionist form of 
government Hardin advances will ensure that common property resources will be 
responsibly utilized. One need look no further than the condition of the North Atlantic 
fisheries to confirm this. 
Successful resolution of the collective action dilemma requires the development 
of rules. In fisheries, these rules will be difficult to negotiate if there is substantial 
disagreement about the science, including information about the status of the resource, 
and about the actions and motivations of other stakeholders. Our current governing 
institutions are inappropriate to manage complex systems because our process of 
learning about the ocean has been hobbled by our institutional approach to scientific 
uncertainty. A redesign of governance institutions is necessary to manage these 
complex resources for sustainability. But how then do we manage complex resources in 
an environment of uncertainty and mistrust? How do we ensure that our publicly 
owned resources will indeed be utilized responsibly? 
Characteristics of Successful Management Svstems 
To control exploitation of natural resources requires groups to develop rules and 
be able to enforce them. But under what conditions will groups devise rules to manage 
resources? What are attributes of successful structures of management, and what are 
the processes that would be used to create new management institutions? These are not 
easy questions to answer. After all, it is not easy for people to agree to willingly 
constrain themselves. 
In a wide variety of tribal, peasant and modern societies, rules have been 
generated at the local level to conserve resources (see, Johannes, 1978, 198 1; Berkes, 
198 1 ; Acheson, 1975; McCay and Acheson, 1987; Pinkerton, 1988; McGoodwin, 1990; 
Albrecht, 1990; Dyer and McGoodwin, 1994; Jentoft and Kristoffersen, 1989; 
economics Bromley, 1989; Klee, 1980; Ruddle and Akimichi, 1984; McEvoy, 1986; 
Ostrom, 1990). These studies demonstrate that alternative management institutions are 
not just theoretical, but practical and possible. 
There is a sizeable body of literature on these successful management systems 
and a number of authors have attempted to list their characteristics. Unfortunately, 
there is not a clear consensus on what those characteristics are. Pinkerton and 
Weinstein (1 995: 18 1) offer common features of sustainably managed fisheries 
including 1) accountability, 2) effective management, 3) equitable representation, and 
4) adaptiveness. Accountability features include access to timely information 
concerning the resource and its management as well as an ability to use this information 
to evaluate, debate and reach consensus positions regarding the nature of issues of 
concern to the community. Effective management mechanisms include typical 
considerations such as rule making, compliance monitoring and enforcement, but 
atypical considerations such as an investment of time necessary to address issues, the 
garnering of support for the institution and the promotion of stewardship for the 
resource. Equitable representation, not surprisingly, refers to that which would be 
provided to various user groups, but it also suggests that members of a larger 
community, those who may have a non-user interest in the resource, be afforded some 
level of representation. Lastly, adaptiveness refers to the transfer of information in the 
form of feedback channels, responsiveness to changing circumstances and, importantly, 
the ability to accumulate knowledge about cause and effects. 
Robert Wade (1 992: 222) presents principles of organizational design which 
include: 1)  need, 2) existing authorities, 3) non-privitizable tasks, 4) core focus, and 5) 
simplicity. The perception of need drives the creation of arrangements, or more 
specifically joint rules or organizations, to address concerns ordered in a hierarchical 
fashion fiom defense of production, to income enhancement, and subordinately to 
issues of education, nutrition, health and civic consciousness for example. Wade's 
second principle suggests that successful generation of authority stems fiom or is built 
upon existing structures of authority, which typically are dominated by the local elite. 
That the organization, dominated by the local power elite, avoids excessive 
consumption is reflected in Wade's third principle which suggests that the scope of the 
arrangement be restricted to only those matters for which benefits or costs cannot be 
privatized. In essence, this principle relates to his fourth which holds that a successful 
arrangement will remain so only to the degree that focus is kept upon essential tasks, or 
that less essential tasks are performed only to the extent that primary functions and 
obligations are adequately discharged. Wade's last principle of organizational design is 
one that should be considered fundamental to any organization, but one that surprisingly 
is not; keep the rules and control techniques simple. 
Similar to Wade, Elinor Ostrom (1990: 90) refers to attributes of successful 
management structures as design principles that have evolved in long-enduring 
Common Pool Resource (CPR) institutions. These principles include: 1) clearly defined 
boundaries; 2) congruence between appropriation and provision of rules and local 
conditions; 3) collective choice arrangements; 4) monitoring; 5) graduated sanctions; 6) 
conflict resolution mechanisms; 7) minimal recognition of rights to organize; and where 
larger systems are in existence; 8) nested enterprises. Defining boundaries is, to 
Ostrom, the first step in organizing to address CPR issues and is almost a self evident 
concept. Collective choice principles would ensure that individuals affected by adopted 
rules or restrictions have the opportunity to participate in forums for rule modification. 
Congruence on the other hand is less evident and suggests that rules or a restriction 
affecting the manner in which extraction of resources occurs should be related to local 
conditions and capabilities. This is particularly important given the need to recognize 
patterns in complex adaptive systems. 
Ostrom considers monitoring and sanctions to be the crux of the problem to be 
addressed through local level institutions in that both activities typically are exercised 
by outside authorities external to the CPR. It is her contention that both activities must 
be undertaken by those who are accountable to the appropriators within the CPR. The 
condition of the CPR and appropriator behavior should be actively monitored and 
sanctions for transgression should be graduated in context to its seriousness. When 
conflict arises, both appropriators and their officials should have access to a resolution 
forum, one that is provided expeditiously and at low cost. 
The final two principles Ostrom puts forward are, to some extent, linked in that 
they refer to the actions of external authorities relative to the CPR. The right to create 
organize or establish mechanisms to address CPR issues should not be impinged upon 
or only minimally so by the external authority and, in larger more complex CPRs, 
enteryrises such as monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution and other governance 
appurtenances should be nested, one level upon another. This is similar in concept to 
Simon's (1 969) loosely-linked nearly decomposable subsystems with boundaries that 
control the rates of interaction in complex adaptive systems, discussed below 
Contrasts and complements between these studies focus attention on elements of 
particular importance in organizing for collective action. Ostrom's "clearly defined 
boundaries" and Wade's "need" principle are both self evident concepts and yet deserve 
attention here. Ostrom states that defining boundaries and those authorized to operate 
within those boundaries is the first step "in organizing for collective action" (Ostrom, 
1990: 91). To ignore boundaries, she implies, is to facilitate free riding and thus, to 
develop interest in the institution that would be created, an exclusionary capability must 
be established through the identification of appropriate boundaries. Wade's principle of 
need is perhaps the most important first step in organizing for collective action. He 
points out that individuals "are likely to follow joint rules and arrangements only to 
achieve intensely felt needs that could not be met by individual responses" (Wade, 
1992: 222). In this, Wade hearkens back to Olsen's (1965) theory that action will be 
taken if the losses or gains from failure to do otherwise (the selective incentives) are 
large enough to justify collective action. A common interest group's recognition of 
need is of first order importance in organizing for collective action. Where there is not 
common agreement on the need for action, there is no basis to assume that rational 
individuals will choose to collaborate to address some issue collectively. Without a 
common understanding of the status of the resource and of the actions and motivations 
of others, this recognition of need may not be possible within a community. Therefore, 
altering conditions that give rise to information asymmetries is of first order importance 
in solving the collective action dilemma. 
Pinkerton and Weinstein, Ostrom, and Wade demonstrate that, under certain 
circumstances, fishermen can and will generate informal rules that lead to resource 
conservation. The problem is to determine what conditions are necessary to generate 
these alternative institutions. Transaction costs associated with negotiating, making and 
enforcing an exchange stands in the way of realizing the gains possible from 
cooperation. The solution to this problem lies at the local level where an agreement on 
need, clearly defined boundaries, and an expectation of the action of others is more 
readily available and it is through this avenue that we find a linkage between rational 
choice, institutional economics and the transaction cost hypothesis. 
Taylor and Singleton (1 993) see a clear connection between individual actors 
and transaction costs with respect to the collective action dilemma. Their hypothesis is 
that failure to resolve collective action problems results from too little "community" 
which they describe as a group of actors that share or "possess certain characteristics . . . 
(that) in a fairly weak sense of the word . . . does not require, inter aha, any particular 
feelings between members, including altruistic feelings of any sort" (1 993 : 199). This 
community concept is analogous to principles put forward by Pinkerton and Weinstein, 
Ostrom, and Wade, particularly, accountability, clearly defined boundaries and need 
and is effected by conditions of scale and complexity. Where community exists, 
characterized by stability of relations, multiplex and direct relations, and by shared 
beliefs and preferences, the uncertainty that causes transaction costs such as "search 
costs," "bargaining costs," "and monitoring and enforcement costs" are reduced (1 993: 
199-200). 
Where the collective action problem is solved, Taylor and Singleton (1993: 202- 
204) see attendant approaches dependent upon five possible conditions of the 
community concept. The first two conditions are those with sufficient community to 
establish endogenous solutions because the transaction costs are low. Where 
community is strong but "larger and more heterogeneous" thus tending to increase 
transaction costs, certain specialized roles for individuals within the community (for 
example "headmen, field guards, monitors," etc.) can facilitate cooperative agreements. 
In conditions where there is insufficient community for the development of "wholly 
endogenous" solutions, a third party "political entrepreneur" can be used to overcome 
transaction costs by facilitating "coercion" thus strengthening the community. Where 
capacities greater than that available through an entrepreneur are needed due to scale or 
complexity for example, "centralized" coercion through the use of an "existing state" in 
a collaborative approach is possible. Finally, in situations with no or very little 
community available in the whole but where "pockets" of community exist, these 
"subgroups" can provide the basis for "hybrid" solutions to the collective action 
problem, also utilizing third party coercion. In this situation, Taylor and Singleton 
(1993: 21 1) point out that the real choice is not between "anarchy and the state but 
between different forms of dual control" of a kind that resembles co-management. This 
condition of co-management exists where some degree of control is devolved from a 
centralized organizational condition to a localized condition and while transactions at 
this lower level are not cost free, the costs as Taylor and Singleton point out are reduced 
and more readily overcome. 
Self Governance: Linka~e Between Informal and Formal Rule-making 
In the social science literature focused on the generation of governance 
structures, self-generated rules of organization and property rights systems are 
demonstrated to be practical and possible (Ostrom, 1990). Applied to fisheries, such an 
approach would integrate the users of the resource directly in management activities 
such as regulation; allocation; data collection; monitoring, control and enforcement; 
habitat protection; and planning and policy making (Bellibeau et al., 1995: 36). Indeed, 
this approach has been applied to situations analogous to the fisheries and, interestingly, 
where this approach has been applied, the resulting institution exhibits features that are 
both public and private in nature (Ostrom, 1990) and characterized by Taylor and 
Singleton (1993) as a hybrid solution or dual control. It is a linkage of informal and 
formal rule-making. The premise which undergirds this approach, and one which is 
specifically applicable to the needs of the fishery, is that stewardship can and will be 
embraced and effectively discharged if it can be delegated and that this is a preferable 
alternative to exclusively state-centered or private market solutions to the commons 
problem. Achieving this condition of stewardship is necessary for resolving the 
collective action dilemma. 
This approach recognizes the necessity of incorporating the fishermen into both 
the decision-making and program implementation aspect of what is, in reality, a social- 
political problem and not solely a technical biological problem as customarily 
approached by government-centered management institutions. Fishermen thus would 
devise rules to motivate fishermen to conserve. Essentially, where a sense of ownership 
interest in the decision-making process (including its outcome) can be established, there 
is less incentive to defect from an agreed upon position to harvest with moderation. The 
promise of this co-management approach is that rules developed by local level units of 
resource users are at a scale more closely reflecting localized conditions of the resource. 
Furthermore, rules developed at this level will be more readily embraced as having 
legitimacy. There will be a tendency on the part of individuals to adhere to rules so 
developed and a greater expectation that others in the local unit will embrace these 
mutually agreed upon rules as well. In this situation of community the transaction costs 
associated with negotiating, making and enforcing an exchange of rules can be reduced 
making it possible to realize the gains possible from cooperation. 
While it is very possible that rules developed at a more local level can resolve 
collective action dilemmas, there are nevertheless transaction costs at the local level that 
must be reduced to achieve success. In some circumstances, these costs can not be 
overcome. Acheson and Taylor (2001) point out that in the literature on fisheries co- 
management four obstacles to success are recorded including: conflict between groups 
within the community, residual opposition of governmental officials, a devolution of 
too little authority, and the inability of prior competitors to embrace a common cause. 
Co-mana~ement: A Definition 
In our fisheries today, there is clearly a recognized need for new and more 
effective rules to conserve resources. This will require more clearly defined 
institutional boundaries which can only be achieved through the development of new 
institutional alternatives to the govenlment-centered approach currently employed. The 
approach advocated here is one conceived of along lines similar to that formulated by 
Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961 ; see Ostrom, 1994: 225) as "polycentricity" with 
many autonomous units formed independent of each other but acting in ways to take 
account of each other through a process of cooperation and conflict resolution (Ostrom, 
1994: 225). Constitutionally, a government can share its public trust responsibility with 
agents of its choosing, provided that these agents are not delegated law-making 
authority and are given sufficient standards to guide them in the exercise of their 
discretionary duty. The legal tools necessary for the adoption of self-governance exists. 
What is lacking, however, are the societal tools, in essence the principles necessary to 
guide the industry and government as they attempt to bring about enlightened and 
restrained self interested resource utilization through a dual industrylgovernment 
approach. 
The term co-management has broad meaning when applied to fisheries and is 
variously used to imply differing degrees of industry involvement in management 
institutions from that of merely consultation, to compliance with generally acceptable 
management measures, to comprehensive participation in policy formation and 
implementation, including formal rule-making. As applied here, co-management is 
considered to be active involvement and occurs when the fishing community not only 
plays a decision-making role, but also has authority to make and implement regulatory 
decisions and establish and enforce accountability measures. A distinction must be 
drawn here, however, relative to the delegation of rule-making authority. While certain 
authorities can be delegated to non-executive branch agents of the government to assist 
in an administrative capacity to c m y  laws into effect, there must remain a nexus 
between the administrative rule-making process and the government. In this regard, 
therefore, agents of the government, such as a fishing community or stakeholder groups, 
can only have penultimate authority to promulgate rules. Nevertheless, stakeholders 
can be thus empowered to manage the resources while the government would maintain 
authority to set the guidelines (Edwards, 1994: 260). 
Participation of stakeholders in this model is more symmetrical with that of the 
government. Whereas current institutional models have faltered at the intersection of 
government and industry, especially where management measures have been imposed 
by government fiat, the co-management model suggests that effective management may 
evolve from a combination of public and private decision-making. Co-management, 
therefore, takes into account the politics of people and society and is not simply a 
technical matter as typically addressed under large-scale government-centered 
management. In essence, the environment as a complex ecological system and our 
uncertainty about our own actions is emphasized, thus the creation of appropriate 
fishing constraints through a public-private cooperative approach rather than handed 
down by technical experts is the preferred alternative (Wilson et al., 1998). The 
creation of these appropriate constraints would occur through a democratic process and, 
thus created, could be characterized as "mutually agreed upon coercion" as 
recommended by Hardin (1 968). 
Instituting a co-management approach to fishery management will not be an 
easy undertaking, there will be many obstacles to overcome and institutional inertia 
dictates that this change will come about slowly. This is particularly so because co- 
management requires a significant commitment by the users of the resource; much more 
so than does the current government-centered approach. It will also require a 
government willing to let fishermen manage and be empowered to participate in the 
process more fully. Implementing a co-management approach will undoubtedly bring 
about a cultural change in the fishing community; it can also change the status of the 
fisheries, making sustainable productivity a practical reality and not just theoretical. 
Overcoming the Uncertainty of Complex Adaptive Systems 
A significant advantage of localizing the management decision-making process 
is that it provides a means of reducing the informational asymmetries associated with 
science-based transaction costs. Customarily, the scientific-based approach to 
management attempts to quantify uncertainty by seeking the smallest confidence 
interval around a parameter estimate. If the governance institution is appropriately 
structured and nimble enough to learn and react rapidly to changing circumstance, this 
statistically based approach to uncertainty is not problematic. However, a fishery is a 
con~plex adaptive system that is influenced by a large number of factors, any one or 
combination of which can influence very different outcomes (Ulanowicz, 1997). It is a 
system that acquires information about its environment and about its own interaction 
with that environment. It models regularities it identifies in those interactions, and it 
adapts to changing circumstance based upon those models (Gell-Mann, 1994). In 
essence a fishery changes in response to the dynamics of its own change and, 
unfortunately, we remain unsure about the causative agents of change in the fisheries. 
The equilibrium condition theorized in conventional fishery science is elusive in this 
complex adaptive system, thus the predictive approach is very difficult if not impossible 
to apply successfully to fisheries. 
Despite this predictive difficulty, there is a basis upon which to build effective 
management institutions. That basis is in the order or patterns exhibited by complex 
adaptive systems over time and at varying scales (Pahl-Wostl, 1995). If we are able to 
discern these patterns and scales and, importantly, if we can perceive the relative 
positions or hierarchies that emerge (Simon, 1969, 1996; Holland, 1998) we have a 
means of overcoming uncertainty; of learning how to generate rules that make it 
possible for people to operate in a chaotic environment. By way of simple example, the 
permutations (complexity) of checker arrangements on the board and the reactive 
(adaptive) behavior of the opponents create in the game of checkers a complex adaptive 
system. John Holland (1998) uses this game as a pedagogical device to explain that the 
learning process used in computers and by humans to address complexity is really 
dependent upon the recognition of patterns. Although the actual configuration of 
checkers on the board at any given time may be unique to the players, patterns of 
configuration experienced during previous play become discernable and facilitate 
hierarchical decision making (yeslno -- betterhest). 
In a similar fashion, the fundamental basis for learning and prediction in 
complex natural environments is the ability to recognize patterns (Wilson, 2001). 
Seasonal patterns, for example, are discernable and within these time steps are events, 
spawning periodicity for example, that are also discernable. Similarly, other patterns 
emerge, changes in salinity or temperature for example, that may be discerned to have 
linkages and perhaps causative relationships. Although the causative relationships may 
not be stable, they may exhibit more or less influence upon outcomes and can thus be 
discerned to exhibit a relative configuration or hierarchical pattern. 
Wilson (200 1 : 17-20) likens the fisherman familiar with the Gulf of Maine 
ecosystem to Holland's checkers player who "has learned to recognize system patterns 
and has some sort of vision of the future including a sense of what effects humans have 
on the system. . . . (However), the complexity of these (fisheries) systems - their size, 
spatial distribution, continuous change, etc. - create circumstances in which no one 
individual or group could hope to adequately address the learning problem." This is in 
essence another facet of the collective action dilemma, that without the ability to learn 
about the effect that others have upon the fisheries system, it is not rational for the 
individual fisherman to unilaterally harvest with restraint. "The problem is a collective 
problem (learning enough to develop a convincing rationale for individual and 
collective restraint) and, as such, is dependent upon social organization and process." 
(Wilson, 2001 : 20). This learning problem contributes to the cost of the fishery 
management transaction. 
A Hierarchv of Roles and Functions 
How complex systems are organized is important to how learning is achieved, 
both about the system and within the system. Herbert Simon (1969, 1996) conceives of 
systems organized in a hierarchy of roles and functions that are loosely linked into 
nearly independent or "decomposable" subsystems with boundaries defined by the rates 
of interaction. Several authors have addressed this concept of hierarchy in a variety of 
natural and social systems; O'Neill, et al. (1986) in terms of ecosystems, Levin (1992) 
in relation to ecological patterns and scales, and Elinor Ostrom (1 990) in social systems 
she refers to as nested enterprises. Oliver Williamson (1 985) addresses linkages within 
business firms and Vincent Ostrom (1994) address the concept as a key element of the 
Federalist system of government, describing his own theoretical formulation as 
polycentricity. In all of these complex systems, the linkages form the basis of efficient 
operation and use of information including the feedback mechanisms essential for 
learning, and for reducing transaction costs. 
These works argue directly and indirectly that the scale of the organization 
should match the scale of the activity in question such that the decision-making is 
delegated to that level of the system (organization) with the most pertinent knowledge. 
Where this has the effect of reducing information asymmetries, it will tend to minimize 
transaction costs. Interestingly, it is exactly this basis upon which the Magnuson- 
Stevens Act is founded. The evolving view at the time was that the international 
community was not sufficiently localized to effect meaningful protection of coastal 
areas. Management of marine resources within 200 miles of a coast, it was argued, 
should be scaled appropriately and delegated to the local (nation-state) because it has 
more pertinent information than does the international community. As pointed out 
previously, the intent of the Act's framers was to extend the localizing benefit further. 
However, that has not occurred as a result of executive interpretations, subsequent 
congressional modifications, and judicial interpretation. A resolution of the collective 
action dilemma necessitates movement away from the administrative constrictions of 
the Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act towards a venue that 
provides greater stakeholder participation. Further delegation of authority to a more 
local level of the system with pertinent knowledge is necessary in the New England 
region to reduce the transaction costs associated with learning within this fishery 
system. 
Practical Applications 
The interdisciplinary studies catalogued by Pinkerton has yielded a general 
theory of institutional design (Pinkerton, 1989, 199 1, 1992, 1994b, 1994c; Berkes et al., 
1 99 1 ; Smith, 1994) including self-management, government-community co- 
management, and multiparty co-management. Self-management or community-based 
systems typically evolve in response to culturally distinctive attitudes regarding access, 
sustainable harvest, habitat, and other norms related to production distribution and 
consumption and include a link to areas that persists over generations where the ability 
to exclude, monitor and regulate is assured. Joint government-community systems are 
those that have typically evolved from local or community-based management systems 
that have become incorporated, essentially unchanged, into a modem institution. 
Multiparty systems are a relatively more recent approach to management. These 
systems recognize different levels of interests that exist among groups of stakeholders 
and come about where goals and equitable standing are agreed upon and where the 
government facilitates the sharing of management resources, including information 
(Pinkerton, 1994a: 2367-2369). 
Given the complexity of the New England fishery, its extant management 
institutions and, importantly, the government's public trust responsibility and ability to 
delegate only penultimate authority to local management units, the multiparty systems 
are of most interest here. If the balance of power can be shifted such that symmetry 
with respect to authorities and responsibilities can be achieved, the industry-government 
interface can bring about positive management outcomes. This is particularly so where 
a closed set of users is defined and, as Townsend (2001) has argued, a joint private- 
public decision-making mechanism may achieve a greater efficiency than can be 
achieved by government-centered command-and-control regulation alone. 
Where success has been achieved in multiparty systems, Pinkerton has found 
that certain logistical issues such as clear boundaries, clear criteria for participation in 
the management unit, units of appropriate scale to the human resource and the ecology 
of the area, and a clear understanding of how benefits accrue, must be resolved as a 
prerequisite. Essentially, the conclusion to be drawn is that management areas need to 
be of a size such that the participants in the management unit interact frequently. In 
addition, the administrative logistics of management must be addressed through the 
establishment of a board or council etc. composed of local stakeholders and a 
coordinating role for a region-wide board must be provided. Pinkerton has also found 
that certain costs related to local management activities must be assumed and shared by 
stakeholders, and that certain political conditions, including a degree of local control 
and a clear definition of local power, must be met in order for success to be achieved 
(Pinkerton, 1994a: 2372-2374). 
A number of examples exist of co-management systems developed to address 
particular fishery resource needs. Acheson has compiled, in a report prepared for the 
State of Maine (Wilson et al., 1998: Appendix E), case studies of co-managed fisheries 
that includes: the Australian Fisheries Management Authority, the Japanese Fisheries 
Cooperative Associations, the Gitskan salmon fishery (Canada), the Lofoten cod fishery 
(Norway), the Mitchell River sea bass fishery (Australia), the San Miguel Bay fishery 
(Philippines) and the Saint Lucia sea urchin fishery. In these cases, four common 
elements were determined to be essential for the generation and maintenance of the 
fishery systems; essentially the same elements identified by Pinkerton above. 
Boundaries must be established around the territory to be managed, the number of 
participants must be relatively small, the fisheries brought under co-management must 
be relatively homogenous, and the central government must be willing to cede some 
degree of management authority to the local level. 
Townsend (2001) has identified six additional fisheries including the 
Northwestern Hawaiian Islands lobster fishery, the Pacific whiting fishery, the North 
Pacific pollock fishery, the Canadian Bay of Fundy purse seine fishery, the Matjes 
herring fishery in the Kattegat, and producer organizations in the United Kingdom as 
ones that exhibit many of these same attributes. In these cases a form of private-public 
decision-making has enabled participants to deal with the inherent inefficiencies of 
fisheries exploitation. In Northwest Russian fisheries, researchers have found that a 
considerable degree of co-management exists (Honneland and Nilssen, 2000) and in the 
Barents Sea Norwegian fisheries, participation in the management process has become a 
part of the fishermen's social life (Honneland, 1999). 
Closer to home, Fegley et al. (In Review) have found that in the New Jersey 
Delaware Bay oyster fishery, oystermen, researchers and state regulatory agencies act 
cooperatively to manage this resource. In New England, an adaptive approach utilized 
by the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission to manage lobster has many co- 
management attributes. The benefit of this approach as a management forum has led 
representatives of the New England scallop industry to attempt emulating many of its 
features in their alternative management strategies. And perhaps the most significant 
example of co-management in the region is the zonal management approach utilized in 
the Maine lobster fishery; a system that exhibits all essential elements necessary for 
continued success including boundaries, a limited set of participants, homogeneity of 
species, and a government willing to cede some control to the local level. 
These New England examples are examined in more detail in the following 
chapters, however, it is appropriate to draw attention here to the Zone Management Law 
for the Maine lobster industry. It has enabled fishermen to successfully generate rules 
to constrain exploitative efforts, but not without the costs of overcoming problems such 
as those of distributional conflicts, constitutional issues, boundary disputes, 
governmental intervention, and scale. Acheson and Taylor (200 1) point out that not all 
of these problems were anticipated and that some have been more successfully 
overcome than others. Co-management is not free of transaction costs - every 
bargaining process entails costs in the exchange of goods or services. However, where 
decision-making authority has been devolved to a more local level as provided in the 
co-management model, transaction costs that are encountered in the exchange can be 
more readily overcome. 
Summation: Theoretical Tools and the Hypotheses 
In the chapters of Part I, four theoretical propositions that are particularly 
valuable in explaining and interpreting the data concerning the industry-government 
interaction are presented. These are: (I) the argument that a singular or large scale 
government-centered management approach fails because it is scaled inappropriately to 
the human and resource ecologies of the fisheries; (2) the idea that power struggles and 
information asymmetries create obstacles in the development of rules to reduce 
excessive exploitation; (3) the idea of transaction costs as a link to the creation of 
policies that solve collective action dilemmas; and (4) the idea of polycentricity and the 
use of co-management principles to reduce transaction costs. 
I present four sub-hypotheses that will be tested using data from the fisheries of 
the Gulf of Maine. These fisheries are of particular importance because existing case 
studies fiom other parts of the world do not have sufficient cross cultural data to 
demonstrate that: 
1) in large scale highly complex fisheries where asymmetries in power and 
information exist, the fishery management bargaining process will be 
marked by high transaction costs that will not be easily overcome, leading to 
institutional and resource failure; 
2) where information about the resource is asymmetrical, but where power 
symmetries exist, it may be possible to negotiate effective resource 
conservation rules, however, transaction costs will remain high thus the 
bargaining process will be protracted; 
3) where the fishing industry and government have similar understandings of 
resource status and where symmetrical power with respect to decision- 
making authority exists, transaction costs can be more readily overcome 
leading to more effective institutional and resource outcomes; and 
4) in small scale low complexity fisheries, transaction costs involved as parties 
negotiate for control rules will be relatively low regardless of symmetries of 
information and power. 
The fisheries examples above demonstrate that alternative decentralized 
management systems are utilized in fisheries around the globe. Some of these systems 
are based upon informal institutions while others are dependent upon a mix of informal 
and formal rules and privatelpublic governance arrangements. How these various 
systems fare with respect to overcoming transaction costs in the fishery management 
bargaining process is unclear. To test my hypothesis, therefore, Part I1 of this thesis 
examines the four propositions or sub-hypotheses presented above in the case of three 
New England fisheries; the New England lobster fishery, the Northeast groundfish 
fishery, and the Maine mahogany quahog fishery. 
Part I1 
CASE STUDIES, SYNTHESIS, AND CONCLUSION 
Chapter 5 
NEW ENGLAND FISHERIES: PHYSICAL AND HUMAN ECOLOGIES 
The causes for failure of management in New England are not simply 
institutional and structural in nature, but are as complex as is the culture and society of 
the region and the environment and ecology of its fishery resources. In order to 
appreciate marine resource management in the region and why alternative institutions 
are advocated for here, one must have some understanding of the fisheries of the region 
and their physical and human ecologies. This chapter presents the New England fishery 
in overview, including a brief historical perspective of its development, and brings 
focus upon three vastly different sectors including the lobster fishery, the groundfish 
fishery, and the mahogany quahog fishery. 
The New England fishery is located in the Gulf of Maine, Georges Bank region 
of the Northwest Atlantic. This sub-arctic region is marked by the convergence of the 
northerly flowing warm waters of the Gulf Stream and the southerly flowing cold 
waters of the Labrador Current. The mixing patterns created by these currents are 
responsible for a high nutrient concentration, a high primary productivity as compared 
to other oceanic ecosystems and, consequently high productivity throughout the food 
chain (NAS, 1979: 2). This productivity accounts for significant diversity in the New 
England commercial fisheries. There are more than 40 edible finfish species of varying 
value, 12 shellfish species of commercial value and 5 commercially important 
crustaceans. The principle species harvested in the region have traditionally been cod, 
mackerel, hakes, flounders, haddock, scallop, and lobster. Other important species 
include herring, whiting, pollock, hard and soft shell clams, menhaden, and more 
recently sea urchin, quahogs, squids, and goosefish. 
The Gulf of Maine / Georges Bank region is essentially a bight bordered on the 
east by the Bay of Fundy and Nova Scotian coast; on the north by the coast of Maine; 
and on the west by the coasts of New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Rhode Island. 
Although the New England fleet operates out of virtually every small port and 
embayment along this coast, the principal fishing ports in the region include: Rockland 
and Portland, Maine; Gloucester and New Bedford, Massachusetts; and Point Judith, 
Rhode Island. Commercial fishery landings in these five ports represented 36 percent 
of the quantity (213.6 million pounds) and 58 percent of the value ($379.3 million) of 
all fish landings in the New England region in 1999 (USDOC, 2000: 6-7). Not 
incidentally, in these same ports are located the major processing facilities in the region. 
Fish landed in one of the smaller ports is generally transported to a principal port for 
processing and distribution. 
Early Development of the Industrv 
The codfish grounds of the Northwest Atlantic were reputedly discovered by 
John Cabot in 1497 although fish curing stations have been found in areas of what is 
now Canada dating well before that time (Kurlansky, 1998). Clearly the region was of 
early importance for its fisheries with evidence of fishing settlements found in what is 
now Maine and New Hampshire that predate the establishment of the Plymouth Colony 
(McFarland, 191 1). Fishing played such an integral economic, political, and social role 
in the development of the New England colonies, that its importance was symbolized by 
the 'sacred' wooden codfish that has hung in the Massachusetts House of 
Representatives since the 1700s. 
By 1630 the fishing industry in the region had become quite profitable. New 
England cod, which was generally salt cured in the winter, was considered a high 
quality product valued on European markets where it commanded a higher price than 
European fish. To protect this industry, the Massachusetts General Court established a 
commission in 1635 to maintain quality control of the product and to manage trade. 
Only the highest quality cod reached Europe. The lower quality product was shipped to 
the West Indies where it was used to feed slaves. Vessels returning from the islands 
brought sugar and molasses that supplied the rum distilleries in Newport and Boston. 
Thus the fish trade between the New England colonies, Europe and the West Indies 
formed the basis of what become know as the 'Golden Triangle' trade route (Jensen, 
1972). 
The fishing industry prospered in New England during the early 1700s. In 
Massachusetts between 1765 and 1775, twenty towns along the coast were devoted to 
fishing with 605 boats, 4,175 fishermen and 9,600 men involved in curing, packaging 
and transporting of fish (McFarland, 191 1 : 124). The industry, however, was 
devastated by the Revolutionary War due to the disruption in the international trade and 
losses of boats, fishermen and shoreside facilities. One of the most important issues to 
be resolved during the treaty negotiations following the war was the right for American 
fishermen to pursue fisheries on the traditional fishing grounds of the Northwest 
Atlantic. These rights were secured and embodied in Article I1 of the Treaty of Paris, 
signed on September 3, 1783 (McFarland, 191 1: 127). Nevertheless, disputes over U.S. 
I Canadian fisheries continued. As recently as 1984 the International Court of Justice 
rendered a decision in a U.S. 1 Canadian fisheries dispute related to the boundary line in 
the Gulf of Maine I Georges Bank region (ICJ, 1984). 
While the New England fishing industry suffered due to the direct effects of the 
Revolutionary War, it also suffered as a result of foreign retaliation following the war. 
Many European nations imposed import duties and other barriers to restrict entry of 
American fishery products while British and French fishermen were paid government 
subsidies in an effort to more fully develop the European industry (McFarland, 191 1 : 
132). In 1789, to assist the New England fisheries, the second act passed by the new 
Congress of the United States provided bounties of five cents for every quintal of dried 
or pickled fish exported to another country. On February 9, 1792, an act was passed 
which provided allowances to be paid to the fishing vessel based on vessel size, amount 
of fish caught and time spent fishing. In 18 19 these allowances were increased under 
the stipulation that a logbook be kept and that, in lieu of wages, fishermen were to be 
compensated by a share of the proceeds from the sale of the catch (McFarland, 191 1 : 
133-162). This was the basis of the lay system that continues today. 
By the 1860s the fisheries in the United States had been stabilized. Salt cod was 
still an important product, however, mackerel (pickled or salted) had increased in value 
and had become a much more important fishery in the region. In 1859 there were 3,036 
vessels and 22,703 fishermen involved in the New England cod and mackerel fisheries. 
The European trade, which was never fully regained, was replaced by demand from the 
expanding western states. Gloucester, Massachusetts became the center for salt cod, 
mackerel and halibut, surpassing landings at all other New England ports (McFarland, 
191 1 : 174). In the State of Maine, the cod and mackerel fisheries were insignificant 
prior to the War of 18 12 and only moderately so until 1840. However, from that time 
through the years of the Civil War, cod and mackerel supported fisheries that became of 
major importance to the State (OYLeary, 1996: 9). 
Cod and mackerel have historically supported the most significant fisheries 
practiced in this region. These are considered the sea-fisheries in that they occur well 
beyond the territorial limit of the states by relatively large vessels generally twenty-ton 
or more in size. By comparison, inshore activities like lobstering were largely 
irrelevant, even in Maine, prior to 1880 with fewer than a half dozen towns having a 
lobster fishery prior to the Civil War. The difference in scale and complexity is 
significant, both in terms of geography and in terms of economics. Whereas the sea 
fisheries were relatively sophisticated in terms of the integration into the economic and 
transportation centers of New England, the inshore activities operated as part of what 
Judd (1 997) refers to as the petty resource-base economy. This situation quickly 
changed at the end of the 19' Century, with the lobster fishery growing from a 
subsistence level activity with fewer than 200 men and 20 vessels at the end of the 
1870s to more than 3,000 men and 130 vessels by the turn of the century (OYLeary, 
1996: 258). 
The turn of the century also brought dramatic change to the sea fisheries. The 
steam engine and the development of the otter trawl enabled a more efficient and 
effective harvest, increasing catches and decreasing the time spent fishing. Most 
important, these developments enabled the landing of fi-esh fish and the consequent 
development of this market. As demand for the fresh product increased, Boston became 
the leading New England fishing port because it was the marketing and transportation 
center of the region. Gloucester, which was dependent on the salt cod fishery, suffered 
from decreased demand and cheaper imports in the 1920s. However, its processing 
industry adapted and flourished, largely due to the development of freezing methods 
and by improving filleting techniques and the ability to process greater quantities of 
imported fish (Boeri and Gibson, 1976). 
The New England fishing industry experienced great hardship during the 
depression that followed the stock market crash in 1929. Landings of fish declined by 
nearly 200 million pounds from 1930 to 193 1 with a decline in value equaling $7 
million. By 1933, only 500 million pounds of fish valued at $1 3 million were landed in 
all of New England. Fishermen who had jobs earned less than employees in virtually 
every other industry; only farm workers made less (USDOC, 1975). Fishermen were 
subject to the same financial difficulties that forced those in other sectors of the 
economy out of business. Consequently, many fishing vessels had to be sold, 
decreasing employment opportunities in the industry. Those that were able to keep their 
vessels fishing were barely able to cover operating expenses (U.S. Congress, 1934: 5- 
20). 
World War I1 significantly changed the conditions influencing the supply and 
demand functions for fishery products. The U.S. Navy appropriated many of the larger 
fishing vessels while material shortages made it difficult for other vessels to operate. In 
addition, because of the number of able-bodied men drafted into the services, it became 
hard to crew those vessels that were still fishing. However, while harvesting became 
more difficult, the demand for fish products increased. The U.S. government purchased 
almost all canned fish available at guaranteed prices thus enabling a great expansion of 
the sardine industry. Furthermore, civilians substituted fish for meat, which had 
become scarce. The net effect was an increase in the demand for the landings of fewer 
vessels that brought about higher prices and incomes throughout all sectors of the 
industry (Dewar, 1983: 14). By 1944 New England landings had increased to 714 
million pounds accompanied by a dramatic increase in value (USDOC, 1975). Yearly 
earnings for many fishermen working on large trawlers were as much as $16,000 
compared to a prewar high of about $2,500 (USFTC, 1945: 36). The shoreside sector of 
the industry also prospered with an expansion in the number of processing plants in the 
region and an increase in earnings for both dealers and processors. 
These trends created great optimism in the industry that prosperity would 
continue. However, after the war contract buying ceased and operating costs rose with 
postwar inflation. In an effort to increase prices, fishermen began to reduce landings, 
however, this forced the more capital intensive processing sector to secure lower cost 
product from Canada and Iceland. Between 193 8 and 1948, imports of fish had 
increased nearly six-fold and by 1953, with the introduction of frozen fish blocks that 
could be processed into fish sticks, a boom in the retail market had been created. 
Because New England fishermen were engaged primarily in supplying fresh fish and 
did not harvest fish that was destined for the frozen block market, virtually all frozen 
fish was imported, leaving New England fishermen restricted to supplying a limited 
market place. 
In 1961 Russian fishing ships began appearing on Georges Bank. By the early 
1970s there were more than 300 large trawlers from as many as ten foreign nations 
fishing off the New England coast (Sedwick, 1977: 16 1 - 165). Although initially, these 
highly efficient vessels harvested only what was considered in New England as non- 
traditional market species, effort was eventually directed towards more traditional 
species such as haddock. This heavy foreign fishing pressure led to a reduction in the 
size of many fish stocks, creating supply problems for the domestic industry, further 
exacerbating economic conditions. As domestic fishermen and foreign fleets continued 
intense fishing pressure, results from research surveys conducted by the National 
Marine Fisheries Service indicated a 90 percent reduction in haddock and a 74 percent 
reduction in finfish biomass generally between 1963 and 1974 (Clark and Brown, 
1977). 
The International Conmission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) had 
management responsibility for fisheries beyond the United States 12-mile contiguous 
zone, however, its management efforts proved to be ineffective largely because it lacked 
an enforcement mechanism. With serious declines in stock levels and an ineffective 
international management regime in place, New England fishermen began a concerted 
drive in 1973 for legislation that would exclude foreign fishermen from access to 
fishery resources within 200 miles of the U.S. shore. On April 13, 1976, this effort 
culminated in the enactment of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 
(FCMA). Through this vehicle, the United States extended its jurisdiction over the 
ocean by more than two million square miles, claiming exclusive management authority 
within what was referred to as a Fishery Conservation Zone (FCZ), a 197 mile wide 
band of ocean extending from the 3-mile territorial sea. Although the U.S. had been 
involved in the management of fisheries as a member of the Pacific Halibut 
Commission, enactment of the FCMA represented the first time in U.S. history that the 
federal government assumed a direct role in the overall management of offshore fishery 
resources (Warner and Finamore, 1980). The scale and complexity of the challenge 
foisted upon the National Marine Fisheries Service in this regard was enormous. It was 
also a challenge the agency was ill prepared to assume at the time. 
The Fisheries at the Time of Extended Jurisdiction 
Participation in the fisheries during the period immediately following enactment 
of the Magnuson Act had been somewhat difficult to determine due to the amount of 
overlap between sectors and the method used to tabulate fisheries data. In the early 
1980s the most comprehensive information available pertaining to fishermen and 
vessels employed in the groundfish and scallop fisheries was compiled by the 
International Trade Commission from unpublished statistics of the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (USITC, 1984). For the lobster fishery at that time, the most 
comprehensive data base was compiled by the New England Fishery Management 
Council as part of the American Lobster Management Plan (NEFMC, 1983). 
The harvesting sector of the industry in the early 1980s included several 
thousand fishermen working aboard hundreds of vessels that ranged in size from small 
outboards to those over one hundred feet in length. The range in size and capability of 
the vessels in the fleet was significant and efforts to categorize them for management 
purposes have proven to be extremely difficult. Generally these vessels are grouped 
into an inshore and offshore fleet, depending upon size, and characterized by the 
tonnage, fishing method and gear type used including mobile gear such as otter trawls 
and dredges, and static gear such as lobster traps. Other gear types include seines, 
weirs, longline, gillnets and a variety of clam rakes. 
The otter trawl is the primary gear used to harvest groundfish or bottom 
dwelling species like cod, haddock and flounder. It is essentially a large bag made of 
netting which is towed behind the vessel. The mouth of the net is held open on a 
horizontal plane by use of doors attached at an angle to each wing of the net. Water 
pressure acting on the doors provides the outward force necessary to spread the month 
opening. The vertical opening is established by the use of floats on the upper edge of 
the mouth opening and a weighted bottom edge. The portion of the net where fish is 
entrapped is referred to as the cod-end. 
The trawling operation on a groundfish vessel is a continuous sequence of 
setting out the gear, towing the net for one or more hours and then hauling it back on 
board, emptying the catch fiom the cod-end and setting out again for the next tow. On 
vessels that work the offshore fishing grounds, where the time spent fishing is generally 
several days, harvested fish are eviscerated and packed on ice below deck. Vessels that 
fish inshore grounds generally make only day trips, therefore, the catch may not need 
packing on ice depending upon species and time of year. When the otter trawl was first 
developed, it was designed to be set and retrieved over the side of the vessel and towed 
fiom a block on the vessel's stem. Although there remain side trawlers in the fleet, 
since the 1950s stern trawlers have become much more popular due to the increased 
stability of the vessel and ease of operation. 
While the otter trawl fishery has long been important to the region, the scallop 
fishery has increased in importance during the years leading up to extended jurisdiction 
and thereafter. The scallop dredge is the principal gear used in this fishery. It consists 
of a steel frame rectangular mouth to which is attached a steel towing arm. To the 
underside of the mouth is attached a heavy tickler chain that scrapes the bottom to lift 
the shellfish. To the mouth and tickler chain is attached a bag of constant width which 
is held out by a steel bar or clubstick. The underside of the bag is made of steel rings 
that can withstand bottom abrasion. The top of the bag is generally made of netting. 
Dredges may vary in width from 5 feet to as much as 16 feet, depending upon the size 
of the vessel and the area in which it is being used. A scallop dredge is towed on a 
single wire cable and is set and retrieved over the side or stern of the vessel depending 
upon the ship's configuration. Some of the larger vessels are capable of towing several 
dredges at the same time. 
Scallops are lifted from the bottom and held in the bag until the dredge is 
brought aboard the vessel. As with otter trawl trawling, scallop fishing is a continuous 
sequence of setting, towing, retrieving and resetting. Once the scallops are brought 
aboard the vessel, the shells are opened or shucked and the meat removed and packed 
on ice or refrigerated below decks. In both the groundfish and scallop fisheries, vessel 
size is similar. The inshore fleet, on average, consists of vessels in the 5 to 50 net ton 
range which are typically operated by one or two fishermen. Offshore vessels are 
generally in the 60 to 125 net ton range. Crew size on offshore groundfish vessels is 
generally between five and seven while scallop vessels generally carry a larger crew 
due to the labor intensive nature of shucking scallops at sea. 
The lobster fishery, now the predominate fishery in terms of value, developed 
relatively late. Lobster was not harvested commercially until 1840 when demand 
increased due to canning technology and flowing sea water smacks made it possible to 
ship lobster to restaurants in cities along the eastern sea board. 
This crustacean is principally harvested by means of traps or pots that lie on the 
sea bed, although there is some offshore harvest of lobster using mobile trawl gear. 
Lobster traps are designed in such a fashion that the lobster can not easily escape once it 
has entered it in pursuit of bait. The lobster is eventually removed when the fisherman 
retrieves the trap. The inshore trap fishery is conducted from vessels ranging in size 
from small outboards to vessels of 30 feet or more in length. One or two fishermen who 
tend several trawl lines strung with one or more traps usually operate these vessels. 
This fishery is very localized given constraints of boundaries, both formal and informal. 
The offshore fishery is a relatively recent phenomenon with rapid expansion 
having occurred following the widespread adoption of the hydraulic trap hauler in the 
1970s. Traps in this fishery are fished in trawl lines from as few as 20 to as many as 
100 traps each. Vessels in the offshore fishery are larger than those used inshore, 
however, generally not as large as those used in the offshore groundfish and scallop 
fisheries. Nevertheless, the diversity of scale and operational complexity is significant 
between the inshore and offshore fisheries. 
Although many of the offshore vessels in the New England fleet in the early 
1980s had the capability to pursue various fisheries during different seasons, for the 
most part, offshore fishermen were engage in one fishery throughout the year. The 
inshore fleet was quite different in this respect with fishermen alternating fisheries on a 
seasonal basis. This flexibility and adaptability has been an extremely important aspect 
of the inshore fishery. It has enabled fishermen to maintain viable economic enterprises 
despite variations in resource availability. 
In 1983 there were 986 vessels utilizing otter trawl gear during at least part of 
the year, 275 of which utilized this gear as the principle gear type. There were 291 
vessel utilizing scallop gear during 1983, 108 of which utilized the scallop dredge as the 
primary gear. Ninety-four percent of the primary-gear scallop fleet in that year were 
vessels in excess of 100 tons. On vessels utilized primarily for scallop fishing in 1983, 
1,086 fishermen were employed, however, on vessels utilized at least part of the year 
for scalloping, there were 2,82 1 fishermen employed (USITC, 1984: 16- 18). 
Participation in the lobster fishery was far greater than that in the groundfish and scallop 
fisheries at that time. As the decade following enactment of the Magnuson Stevens Act 
commenced, there were 1 O,5 13 vessels and 12,484 fishermen engaged in this fishery 
during at least part of the year. The majority of this participation (10,325 vessels and 
1 1,467 fishermen) were employed in the coastal trap fishery (NEFMC, 1983: 12). 
In 1983 the New England region ranked fourth in quantity of fish landed and 
third in value nationally. Landings of mollusks (clams and scallops) and lobster in the 
region equaled 71 1 million pounds with a value of $435 million (USDOC, 1983: 3). 
Vessel owner average income at that time had begun to show a downward trend due to a 
variety of factors including an increase in operational expenses and a decrease in gross 
revenue (USITC, 1983: 32-46). Crew remuneration throughout virtually the entire New 
England fleet in the early 1980s, as it is today, was based on the lay system whereby 
each crewman is paid a share of the value of each trip's landings, minus a certain 
percentage of trip expenses. Because the lay system enables the vessel owner to 
transfer some of the financial risk of fishing to the crew, the crewman's net share also 
exhibited in 1983 a downward trend similar to that of the vessel owner's (USITC, 1983: 
32-46). 
Fish landed in port is generally subjected to two shoreside activities, fish buying 
and fish processing. As with the harvesting sector, the shoreside sector exhibits 
significant diversity of scale and complexity, from enterprises that can be considered 
part-time seasonal or sole proprietor ventures to multi-national corporations. The fish- 
buying sector unloads, sorts, ices, boxes and ships fish to processors or directly to 
markets depending upon species. During the late 1 WOs, Boston and New Bedford, 
Massachusetts utilized an auction system as a means of transferring landings to buyers. 
A display-type auction was established in Portland, Maine in the mid 1980s. Although 
these auctions were not the exclusive outlet for landings, daily auction transactions tend 
to establish the daily price for all fish sold in the region. Other marketing opportunities 
available to fishermen other than direct sales to consumers included cooperatives owned 
and operated by fishermen. 
Fish processing at the time was generally of two types, primary processing or 
filleting of fresh product and secondary processing of frozen product. Fish packed on 
ice is a perishable product thus the length of time a vessel spends on the fishing grounds 
effects the quality of the fish and, consequently, whether the product is channeled to 
primary or secondary processing. Because frozen fillets are of lower demand and 
require packaging and storage which lowers the financial return on the product, the 
fresh fish market was predominate during the period following extended jurisdiction. 
(Hu and Whitaker, 1983 : 6). Although most of the fish handled by primary processors 
came from within the region, a significant amount was imported from other regions and 
countries. 
Secondary processors operate large plants with sophisticated machinery 
handling a raw product in the form of fish slabs and blocks. These processors produce 
frozen portions, sticks and dinners not identified by species name. Due to the proximity 
of the New England fishing grounds and the ready access to the higher priced fresh fish 
market, New England fishermen do not harvest fish for blocks or slabs. Raw product 
utilized by the secondary processors is, therefore, virtually all imported. Other types of 
processing conducted in the region include sardine, industrial and shellfish. 
In 1983 there were 22 1 processing plants of all types in New England which 
employed 6,923 individuals on a yearly basis and as many as 9,427 individuals during 
the seasonal high (USDOC, 1984, 87). This represented a decline of 9 percent in the 
number of plants and a 14 percent decline in the number of employees from the 
previous year. The production of groundfish fillets declined by 1 1 percent, from 73.6 
million pounds in 1979 to 65.3 million pounds in 1983. Production of frozen 
groundfish fillets also declined during this period from 16.6 million pounds in 1979 to 
15.9 million pounds in 1983. 
The Cod and Lobster Fisheries: Comparative Features 
Although codfish is harvested today as part of a mixed groundfish fishery, from 
an historical perspective, the codfish is the most important fish of the Northwest 
Atlantic and a superb representative, for the purposes of this exposition, of the changes 
that have occurred in the New England fishery. Although lobster today is considered to 
be the most valuable marine resource taken in the region, as we will see that has not 
always been the case. Circumstances affecting these resources have changed over the 
past 300 years and the relative importance of these species on a resource basis are 
dramatically different today. Cod have become less abundant as the stocks throughout 
the range of the species have declined. Lobsters stocks on the other hand, which were 
in decline during the earlier part of the 20th Century, are now harvested in record 
volumes with attendant record values. The vastly different scale and complexity of the 
fisheries and the manner in which resources have been utilized, the different 
management approaches that have consequently been applied, and socioeconomic 
diversity have contributed significantly to these shifts. 
Cod and lobster resources are managed differently. One important reason is the 
fundamental physical and behavioral differences between these organisms. Although it 
has mobility, the lobster is a far more sedentary creature than is the codfish and thus it is 
harvested principally by means of fixed trapping gear. While a variety of techniques 
have been used to harvest codfish over the years (Kurlansky, 1997), cod are today 
harvested principally by means of mobile ensnaring trawl gear. 
Technological advances over the years such as the development of refrigeration, 
the steam and internal combustion engines, hydraulics, the invention of plastics, the 
development of and expansion in the field of electronics, etc. have brought about 
changes to all fisheries. Many of these technological developments have changed the 
spatial distribution of both the cod and lobster fisheries. For example, the introduction 
of the steam engine and otter trawl had the effect of virtually eliminating the U.S. salt 
cod fishery on the Grand Banks and supplanting it with a fishery for fresh product in the 
relatively nearby Georges Bank area, reducing the geographic scale of this fishery 
somewhat. The geographic dimension of the lobster fishery, on the other hand, has 
been broadened, particularly over the past twenty years, by the development of the 
hydraulic pot hauler that enabled the expansion of the lobster fishery into deeper 
offshore waters. 
Despite technological advances, the lobster fishery today is still principally a 
'day boat' fishery in which fishermen operate within or relatively close to home 
harbors. The cod fishery, by contrast, is still by and large considered an offshore 
fishery prosecuted at greater distances from home ports and over greater spans of time. 
This spatial difference in operational characteristics is a direct function of the physical 
and behavioral differences between the species pursued in these two fisheries. As we 
shall see, this difference in scale and complexity has had a significant impact upon the 
resource management approaches utilized in these two fisheries. 
Biolopical Features 
There are obvious morphological differences and, although perhaps not as 
obvious, significant biological differences between lobster and cod. Both species are 
affected by a host of environmental factors including water temperature, salinity, and 
ocean currents, for example, and by inter- and intra-species competition for food and 
space, etc. However, the differing reproductive strategies of the organisms are 
considered here the most significant biological differences between cod and lobster. 
While both organisms are relatively fecund or capable of producing significant amounts 
of reproductive material and while in both cases fecundity increases with organism size, 
the fertilization process differs significantly between lobster and cod. The strategy 
employed by lobster ensures a per egg rate of survival that is much greater than that of 
cod. Cod fish spawning occurs in localized areas where reproductive fish concentrate 
seasonally following spawning migrations that can be extensive in range. Reproductive 
material is discharged into the environment and fertilization occurs external to the 
organism. Fertilized eggs and hatching larvae are planktonic for significant periods of 
time and post larval stages remain within the water column. Lobster, on the other hand, 
reproduce through sexual copulation and fertilization occurs within the female. Egg 
development occurs while the egg is attached to the female's abdomen and larval 
release occurs following a relatively significant period as compared with that of cod. 
Although the larval phase is planktonic, post larval lobster development occurs with 
bottom settlement where some degree of protection from predation is afforded (Wahle 
and Steneck, 1992). 
Although seasonality and locational factors play an important role for both 
lobster and cod reproduction, because all reproductive activity in the cod occurs 
external to the organism, environmental conditions can have a far more deterministic 
effect upon the reproductive success of cod. Furthermore, while location is a factor in 
the reproductive strategy of both organisms, spawning aggregations of lobster are not as 
intense and discrete as are those of cod, thus the effects of predation and fishing can be 
far more pronounced if coincident with cod fish spawning. These differences in 
reproductive strategy have a significant bearing upon recruitment into the respective 
fisheries and, consequently, have a bearing upon management strategies and the degree 
of success achieved in management of cod and lobster. Management approaches for 
both fisheries over the years have recognized the importance of maintaining a strong 
spawning stock (Gulland, 1974) however, as will be presented below, it has been easier 
to successfLlly apply techniques to protect reproductive lobster than is has been to 
protect spawning fish such as cod. 
Reproductive differences between cod and lobster is important from a 
conservation perspective as well. One can readily observe the reproductive state of a 
female lobster and this feature has played a large role in management measures. 
However, such can not be easily determined for that of cod fish. Moreover, a lobster 
can be pulled to the surface and then returned to the bottom unharmed due to the nature 
of trapping technology. Cod fish, on the other hand, are generally killed by trawls and 
those that may survive the nets die as a result of pressure change induced rupture of 
swim bladders. 
Brief History of Landin~s 
In the tenth century, Vikings were eating dried codfish harvested fiom the 
waters of the Northwest Atlantic (Kurlansky, 1997: 21). A half a millennium later, 
following Cabot's discovery of these same codfish grounds in 1497 and prior to the 
establishment of the Plymouth Colony, fish curing station were built in what is now 
Maine and New Hampshire. These archeological findings led one historian to credit the 
fishing industry as being largely responsible for the settlement of Maine (McFarland, 
191 1). By 1635, the salt cod industry in the New England colonies had become a 
vitally important component of the region's economy (Jensen, 1972). The economic, 
political and social role played by the fisheries in New England continued to increase 
over the next two centuries, becoming pivotal to certain communities along the coast. 
By way of example, in 1860 the wealth of the town of Castine, which was at that time 
the greatest per capita in the State of Maine, was directly related to fishing and 
principally for cod fish (O'Leary, 1996). 
The lobster industry, on the other hand, was irrelevant in Maine until well into 
the 1 9 ~ ~  century with only about 200 fishermen from a handful of towns engaged in the 
fishery prior to 1876. The status of the lobster industry changed dramatically after 
1880, growth which O'Leary describes as phenomenal and largely due to the simple and 
inexpensive gear requirements, the development of tourism in Maine, and coupled to 
tourism, a significant increase in the price paid for lobster (1996: 258-59). This latter 
point had a significant bearing upon the relationship between the cod and lobster 
fisheries. O'Leary posits that as a result of the price increase, many of the deep sea cod 
fishermen were drawn to the new lobster fishery, explaining much about the decline in 
Maine's sea fisheries towards the end of the last century. By the 1920's and 30's, 
however, the status of the lobster industry changed significantly and, as Acheson and 
Steneck (1997) describe, lobster catches were at such disastrously low levels that 
hundreds of fishermen went out of business. Both the cod and lobster fisheries have 
undergone periodic economic change since the early history of the New World and yet 
there is no period of change more dramatic than that which has occurred since 1950. 
Over the past 50 years the relative importance of these two species as a percentage of 
the total landings of all fisheries products along the Atlantic coast has reversed (Figure 
1). 
28 million pounds 
Figure 1: Landings of cod and lobster as a percentage of total Atlantic coast fish landings from 
1950 to 1997 (source of data: National Marine Fisheries Service). 
Value, which was approximately equal in 1950, had by 1997 diverged more than 90 
percent (Figure 2). The value of lobster landings today ranks this fishery as number one 
in New England and Atlantic Canada. Codfish landings, on the other hand, have 
become a relatively insignificant component of the overall harvest of groundfish. 
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Figure 2: Value of Atlantic coast cod and lobster landings fiom 1950 to 1997 (source of data: 
National Marine Fisheries Service). 
The Maine Mahopany Ouaho~  Fisherv 
The Maine mahogany quahog fishery is without a doubt one of the most 
interesting and yet least known fisheries in the State. It has relatively few participants, 
its geographic scale is very limited, and in comparison to other fisheries of Maine, it is 
contemporary, having been initiated in the early 1970s due solely to the efforts of a 
single individual fiom Buck's Harbor attempting to augment his summer income 
(MAFMC, 1997). 
Mahogany is really a colloquial term for the physical appearance of ocean 
quahogs of the species Arctica islandica, which inhabit the subtidal continental shelf 
waters from Newfoundland to Cape Hatteras. The heavy shelled, oval shaped bivalve 
mollusk has a dark membrane that covers the shell and, in some parts of the country, it 
is called a black clam. To the casual observer, these quahogs look superficially like the 
common hard clam, Mercenaria mercenaria, however, the young, rapidly growing 
ocean quahogs have a golden brown color, hence the name mahogany used exclusively 
in the Maine fishery (Chenoweth and Dennison, 1993). 
Biological Features 
Although there are interesting biological characteristics of the ocean quahog, 
morphological characteristics related to age and growth and the organisms feeding 
behavior are most important here. The ocean quahog, Arctica islandica, is usually 
found in dense beds in sediments ranging from sandy to sandy mud. In eastern Maine, 
these beds are in relatively shallow water where bottom temperatures are cool 
throughout the year. In the more southern range of the species, ocean quahogs are 
found in deeper offshore waters. 
Mahogany quahogs found in eastern Maine waters average in size between 1 ?4 
to 2 ?4 inches and are therefore relatively small as compared with the same species 
found in southern New England and Mid Atlantic waters which average between 3 $4 to 
5 inches in size. The species is unusually slow growing and represents one of the 
longest lived species of clam of commercial value with ages of between 60 and 100 
years typical. The ocean quahogs found in Maine waters are relatively faster growing 
than those found in more southern waters. By way of comparison, whereas quahogs in 
the southern range take 9 to 17 years to reach marketable size of 2 inches, the Maine 
quahog can reach an equivalent size in as little as six to seven years. The Maine quahog 
also appears to be a more robust resource than the southern counterpart in that the 
Maine stock produces regular strong years classes of settled spat and new recruits and 
areas that have been fished down appear to repopulate very quickly (MAFMC, 1997). 
Ocean quahogs are bivalve mollusk filter feeders similar to other species of 
clams. Quahogs settle just below the surface sediment where relatively short siphons 
can extend above the surface to pump water containing food and oxygen through the 
organism's system. Much of the diet of mahogany quahogs consists of unicellular algae 
and it is this diet which poses a potential public health risk. Mahogany quahogs have 
been found to ingest the dinoflagellate Alexandria tamarensis, a marine algae 
responsible for a condition referred to as red tide. These single celled plants contain 
neurotoxins that can concentrate in the gut of the quahog. If ingested in concentrated 
form, this neurotoxin can cause serious illness in mammals including humans. This 
condition, know as paralytic shellfish poisoning (PSP) can even cause paralysis or 
death, consequently, the fishery is subject to very rigorous monitoring requirements and 
regulation under U.S. Food and Drug Administration guidelines. 
Brief Historv of Landinps - 
The differing growth rates between northern and southern quahogs is more than 
interesting from a biological perspective, it is also the basis for market differentiation. 
Furthermore, it has a bearing upon management due to the difference in scale and 
complexity of the distinctly different sectors of the fishery that have evolved. 
The quahogs harvested in the southern range of the species are larger and 
destined for a high volume low value processed chowder market as compared with the 
Maine mahogany quahog which is sold into a low volume high value fiesh halfshell 
market. While size influences market differentiation, the market also has a bearing 
upon how the resource is managed. Chowder quahogs are processed, generally with the 
viscera removed, and cooked before consumption. The Maine mahogany quahog, on 
the other hand, is sold into a half shell market where it is often consumed raw, and thus 
it presents a public health concern due the possibility of contamination by toxic marine 
algae. 
The large so-called chowder clams found in the southern range of the species are 
the raw product of the commercial processed clam chowder market which has 
significant value in this country today. Prior to World War 11, this fishery was 
relatively modest because the clam was difficult to shuck and the meat could develop a 
strong iodine flavor if not handled properly (Chenoweth and Dennison, 1993). 
However, a declining catch of the more popular surf clams and improvements in 
processing technology increased the demand for ocean quahogs. From 1970 to 1990 
landings increased by nearly 95 percent. The fishery in the Mid Atlantic relies upon 
large 70 to 120 foot vessels rigged to tow large hydraulic dredges from which the catch 
is emptied into large metal cages holding 32 bushels. These cages are the industry 
standard that enables processors to handle large volumes of product (MAFMC, 1997). 
These vessels are typically owned by vertically integrated fishing operations and 
employ a number of crew. Vessels in the fishery operate throughout the range of the 
species, but primarily in the coastal and offshore waters of the Mid Atlantic region. 
By contrast, the dramatically different Maine mahogany quahog fishery is 
concentrated in the eastern half of the State of Maine with landings of the quahogs 
exclusively in the 1 % to 2 '/z inch size range. The market for these quahogs is 
primarily raw bars serving clams on the half shell (Chenoweth and Dennison, 1993) 
and, reflecting the interests of consumers in Rhode Island where mahogany quahogs 
were first introduced, restaurants serving clam cakes. At first, mahogany quahogs 
served as a substitute for a dwindling supply of hard clams in the Rhode Island and Mid 
Atlantic half-shell market. Landings through the late 1970s remained relatively modest 
reflecting the entrepreneurial nature of the fishery. However, the success of the few 
participants in the early fishery attracted new entrants such that by 1984, landings 
equaled 130 metric tons of meat and by 1987 landings had increased nearly five-fold to 
580 metric tons (Chenoweth and Dennison, 1993), declining thereafter to a low of 89 
metric tons in 1993 due to market and resource limitations before rebounding to 400 
metric tons in 1996 (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Maine Mahogany Quahog Landings 1984 - 1996: (source of data: Chenoweth and 
Dennison 1993; MAFMC 1997). 
The typical size vessel in the fishery is a lobster-style hull in the 30 to 40 foot 
range. The quahogs are harvested by means of a small modified scallop dredge, 
dumped on deck where they are sorted, washed, bagged in half bushel lots, and placed 
on ice between decks (MAFMC, 1997). Daily landings are highly variable and 
dependent upon the requirements of local dealers to meet immediate market demands. 
Although a good vessel is capable of landing as much as 100 bushels per day, they may 
fish for as little as 20 bushels to meet dealer requirement for that day. In 1996 there 
were 72 fishermen licensed to participate in Maine's mahogany quahog fishery. Value 
has increased in this fishery along with landings fiom as little as $364 in 1984 to $2.3 
million in 1987 whereupon it declined slightly and has averaged $1.7 million annually 
through 1997. Price has also increased over the years, ranking this fishery within the 
top ten to fifteen species landed in Maine in terms of value per pound. 
Chapter 6 
CASE STUDIES: NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT 
The New England fishery is today a highly regulated business. It is a business 
regulated according to a scientific management regime codified by the U.S. Congress in 
the Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. It is also a business 
that, according to some, is being regulated out of existence. Others, however, believe 
that the fisheries have not been regulated enough and that the failure to do so has led to 
the demise of publicly owned resources. The New England fishery is one that many 
consider to be in a state of crisis, its management synonymous with incompetence, "a 
metaphor for management failure." (Shelley et al., 1996). If this is so, then we are not 
just witnessing a failure of fish stocks, but of conservation efforts as well. Yet, despite 
the claims of failed management and failed conservation, fish stocks in the region are 
exhibiting measurable and substantial success towards rebuilding (NEFMC, 2001 b; 
CCT, 2001; Boston Globe, 2001). So then, what is failure - indeed, what is success? 
Against what standard is success or failure of fishery management to be measured? Is it 
enough to count numbers of fish produced or is there another more appropriate metric to 
be used? Singleton (1998: 26) points out that defining success only in terms of 
outcomes fails to acknowledge that many factors affect sustainability including those 
related exclusively to the environment and that sustainability may or may not be 
achieved for reasons "unrelated to institutional design" of a management plan. 
This chapter presents case studies and comparative examples of the management 
institutions established for the Maine mahogany quahog fishery, the New England 
lobster fishery and the Northeast groundfish fishery. These three fisheries are vastly 
different in scale and complexity and so too are their management institutions. Perhaps 
the most significant difference is that the lobster fishery had been subject to regulation 
well prior to the advent of federal management under the Magnuson Stevens Act with 
management measures largely developed by the industry over the course of more than a 
century. Conversely, the management of the groundfish fishery is a relatively recent 
phenomenon ushered in with extended jurisdiction in 1977 while the management of the 
mahogany quahog fishery in Maine did not come about until well after the advent of 
federal control. Consequently, the management of the groundfish and mahogany 
fisheries has occurred primarily within the federal venue and with little or no direct 
involvement of industry in management decision-making. 
Lobster Management 
Regulation came relatively early after the commercial development of the Maine 
lobster fishery in the 1840s with enactment in 1872 of a law prohibiting the taking of 
egg bearing or berried lobster. Acheson (1997) has done an extensive study of the 
development of controls upon the lobster industry finding three periods marked by 
changes in attitude and purpose. The first period is the early development of 
regulations through the 1920s marked primarily by conflict between sectors of the 
industry. Although conservation measures were enacted during this period, the impetus 
for action was often market conservation as opposed to biological conservation. During 
this period, management measures emanated primarily fiom industry, and not fiom the 
state management agency. The second period reported by Acheson commenced in 
response to a serious decline in the resource that threatened the future viability of the 
industry. This period was marked by the enactment in 1933 of the minimum/maximum 
size restrictions (the so-called double gauge) that form the basis of lobster conservation 
measures today. During this period the state conservation agency assumed a leadership 
role in the conservation and management of the resource. The final period documented 
by Acheson commenced in the 1980s when the State of Maine and other New England 
states ceded management control of the lobster fishery to the federal government. 
Although this latter period up through the beginning of the 2 1" Century is of primary 
interest in this thesis, an examination of the early evolution of institutions demonstrates 
differing conditions of management to support elements of my hypotheses. 
Early History of Lobster Mana~ement 
The early development of controls in the Maine lobster fishery came about 
primarily as a result of distribution fights between fishermen and dealers involved in the 
live lobster trade and their counterparts involved in the lobster canning industry. The 
battleground was the legislature -- the conflict was over supply. Competition between 
these rival sectors of the industry largely resulted in statutory controls upon lobster size 
and fishing season. Ultimately the conflict proved costly for the canneries as power 
shifted from them to the live lobstermen and dealers over the course of twenty-five 
years. In that time, both the canning and live-market sectors of the industry worked to 
establish laws assuring preferential access to the resource. However, the laws that were 
established, perhaps unwittingly, were designed to protect juvenile lobsters and egg- 
bearing female lobster and today these measures form the basis of conservation efforts 
focused upon protection of the breeding stock (Acheson , 1997: 8). During this period 
of time the industry, not the government, was the driving force behind the development 
of conservation measures. The industry effectively engaged in the political arena of the 
legislature and, whereas the canning industry initially exhibited significant political 
influence, the live-market fishermen eventually ascended in numbers and political 
influence to a position of dominance. 
The last decade of the 1 9 ~  Century and the first twenty years of the past century 
was marked by a period that Acheson refers to as stagnation. Despite the success 
achieved by the live-market sector of the industry in its ascendancy over the canners, a 
decline in catch during this period presaged troubling developments within the industry 
that lasted for half a century. Lack of unanimity between lobstermen on the need to 
reduce the minimum size and the concern of state biologists about protecting the larger 
sized brood stock paved the way for legislative action that pleased no one. In 1907 the 
minimum size was increased fiom 10 ?4 inches total length (approximately 4 2/3 inch 
total backshelllor carapace length as measured today) to 4 % inches. This was a size 
greater than the majority of the lobster caught yet it was a size that continued to focus 
fishing effort upon the adult brood stock. Lobstermen referred to the new minimum 
size as the "poverty gauge" and biologist Francis Herrick claimed it was unscientific, 
defective and bound to fail (Acheson, 1997:9). The industry ultimately prevailed upon 
the legislature to reduce the poverty gauge to a new minimum size of 3 ?4 inches in 
1919. However, this was still insufficient to placate an industry which had developed a 
total disregard for conservation. Violation of lobster laws including the scrubbing of 
berried lobster, an extensive trade if short lobster, and even the smashing of small 
lobster to use as bait became widespread and contributed to sharp declines in catches 
that continued to the second World War. 
Catch declines of over 50 percent coupled with a price collapse during the 
depression created desperate conditions within the industry forcing many lobstermen 
out of the industry while many of those that remained fished only part time. Acheson 
(1 997: 10) makes the point that there was not agreement (then or now) on the cause of 
the disaster the befell the industry. Lobstermen were convinced it was a function of 
price driven down by imports of low-priced Canadian lobster. The enforcement 
community saw the widespread violation of conservation laws as responsible. Herrick 
and biologist Field maintained that the size regulations did not adequately protect the 
brood stock. Several failed marketing and protectionists efforts ultimately gave way to 
the political entrepreneurship of the State's fisheries commissioner who prevailed upon 
the industry for support, and the legislature for passage in 1933, of the so-called double 
gauge. This established for the first time the use of a slot limit for lobster harvested in 
the size range of a 3 '116 inch minimum and a 4 % inch maximum. The industry was 
essential but played only a supportive role in the development of the double gauge 
which is the lobster management standard today. The industry was unorganized and 
split on the issue. The law was negotiated by the commissioner who had allied himself 
with a powerful faction of fishermen in the western part of the state. Thus he was able 
to assume a leadership role negotiating the establishment of what was, at the time, a 
controversial approach to lobster management (Acheson, 1997: 14). 
The thirty year period between the end of World War I1 and the enactment of the 
Magnuson Stevens Act was a period of resurgence of catch and, importantly, in the 
reestablishment of a conservation ethic within the lobster industry. Wide-scale 
disregard of conservation measures came to an end as the industry became convinced of 
the damage that violators caused the resource (Acheson, 1997: 14). Local sanctions 
kept many would-be violators in check and, during this period, there was little 
distribution-based conflict within the industry to prompt legislative action. In fact, the 
most significant pieces of legislation developed during the period, the V-notch law in 
1947 and the escape vent law in 1979, were motivated by a desire to conserve the 
resource; the former to protect "proven" breeding stock, the latter to protect sub-legal 
juvenile lobster. This is a period during which the industry became better organized and 
reasserted its prerogative to a leadership role in the management of the lobster resource. 
This early history of lobster management demonstrates the influence of powerful 
factions within the industry in supporting rules which benefited them. Fortunately these 
rules had conservation benefits as well. Moreover, there was little or no serious 
opposition from state biologists with a perspective on management that departed 
significantly from the majority in the industry. In fact, dominant factions of the 
industry aligned with the commissioner and biologists to gamer legislative support for 
the adoption of several measures including the maximum size limit and the escape vent. 
Although there were costs associated with arriving at agreement upon control measures, 
fisheries management during the first 130 years of the Maine lobster industry worked 
reasonable well because most of the measures emanated from the industry and 
information asymmetries between lobstermen and the scientific community were 
minimal. In 1985, however, action at the state level set in motion events that were to 
have profound and costly effect upon lobster management and indeed upon the regional 
fishery political scene for several years. These events were a matter of a coincidence of 
interests between government fishery managers and leaders in the lobster industry and 
related to the legal size of lobster, the exclusive practice in the State of Maine of 
protecting egg producing lobsters, and the international trade in lobster. 
State - Federal Partnership 
Since 1972, the states along the Eastern U.S. seaboard have cooperated to 
coordinate lobster management research and the regulation of individual state lobster 
fisheries. This occurred under the auspices of the National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS) State-Federal Partnership Management Program (Lobster Sub Board, 1978) 
and the Interstate Fishery Management Program of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries 
Commission (NMFS 1998). 
In 1977, shortly after implementation of the Magnuson Stevens Act 
management program, both the Mid Atlantic and New England Fishery Management 
Councils agreed, pursuant to a recommendation of a policy board established under the 
State-Federal Management Program, to prepare a fishery management plan for 
American lobster. In 1983, the New England Fishery Management Council's American 
Lobster Fishery Management Plan (FMP) was implemented in federal waters and, for 
the first time in the history of this country, the harvesting activities of lobster vessels 
became subject to federal management provisions. 
During the time period between the initiation of the Federal-State coordinated 
lobster management Program in 1972 and the implementation of the New England 
Council's Lobster FMP in 1983, the lobster industry had little or no involvement in 
management activities beyond the state level. The activities of the Federal-State 
Program were focused upon coordination and the Program per se had no authority to 
implement management measures or research initiatives directly. Its purpose was to 
provide a forum for cooperation and information transfer and any management or 
research measures it deemed appropriate were put forward as recommendations for state 
level action to be accomplished through regulatory or statutory change at the individual 
state level. This process accommodated the interstate variation in lobster fishing 
activities and management practices while acknowledging a broader regional 
relationship. 
The Federal-State Program was a forum that was exclusively the domain of 
governmental agencies with no industry involvement. The lobster industry in Maine 
had ample opportunity to influence the direction of management initiatives in state level 
venues and clearly took advantage of that opportunity (see Acheson and Knight, 1998). 
Consequently, the industry had no reason to be involved in the State-Federal Program. 
The industry had even less reason to be involved in the activities of the Atlantic States 
Marine Fisheries Commission which was, by and large, unknown to the industry. 
Although the Commission did deliberate on matters related to the lobster resource and 
had a lobster management plan, as a body involved with the coordination of 
transboundary intra-coastal water resources, its focus was perceived to be upon those 
species considered of recreational use only such as stripped bass. 
The Magnuson Stevens Act had declared as federal waters, those beyond the 
territorial limit of a state and referred to the new management area as the Fishery 
Conservation Zone; now referred to as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In the late 
1970's when the Act was first enacted, the offshore lobster fishery was a relatively new 
development that few Maine fishermen participated in. Although many, if not all Maine 
lobsterinen fished in the new federal waters, it was only seasonally during times of 
inshoreloffshore lobster migration and their fishing activities extended little more than 
12 to 15 miles offshore. To most Maine lobstermen the federal waters were considered 
remote, both in terms of geography and technology, and few if any lobstermen even 
sought the newly required permit to fish in federal waters. In fact, federal and state 
authorities did not enforce federal permit requirements upon Maine lobstermen. 
Despite the fact that the Magnuson Stevens Act had initiated federal regulatory 
authority over fisheries in waters frequented by Maine lobsterinen, the lobster industry 
remained relatively disinterested in extra-state fisheries forums. Although the lobster 
market was clearly of regional interest to lobstermen, management and fishing practices 
were strictly a state and local concern. In fact the Maine lobster industry had little or no 
role or even involvement in the development of the New England Council's Lobster 
FMP. To the Maine lobster industry, the Council's FMP merely codified in federal 
regulation the salient lobster conservation measures already in force at the state level 
including a minimum carapace length of 3 3/16 inches, prohibition on possession of egg- 
bearing lobsters, and provisions for escape vents to be fitted in lobster traps. As late as 
1986, when the first amendment to the FMP was approved, the Maine lobster industry 
still had little involvement in the process, nor reason to become involved. Amendment 
1 related to issues of no direct relevance to Maine (NMFS, 1998: 4). However, the 
industry's interest in extra-state management activities quickly changed thereafter. 
Federalization 
For a number of years, and certainly since the report of the Federal-State 
Program's Lobster Board in 1978 (LSB 1978), lobster biologists had called for an 
increase in the minimum size of lobster to enhance the reproductive potential of the 
resource. In the face of escalating pressure on the stock, the Lobster Board called for an 
increase in the minimum size to 3 ?4 inches as the only practical means to address 
perceived excessive fishing mortality rates. State and federal biologists argued that too 
much of the harvest was upon female lobster that had not had sufficient opportunity to 
reproduce and that an increase in the minimum size would enable a greater portion of 
the population to survive the fishery long enough to procreate. This strategy was 
embraced by Maine's Department of Marine Resources which commenced efforts to 
bring about a change in state law to that effect. 
Coincident at the time, the Maine lobster industry had become increasingly 
concerned about apparent efforts at the regional level to overturn conservation measures 
which had long standing popular support among Maine lobsterinen (Acheson and 
Knight, 1998: 18). The State-Federal Lobster Board had reported that it considered the 
maximum size restriction, a provision exclusive to Maine, to be ineffective as a means 
of maintaining brood stock abundance. The Board also felt that the practice of cutting a 
notch in the tail a lobster's flipper, the so-called V-notch law exclusive to the State of 
Maine, created a source of infection and increased mortality. Several states had 
removed prohibitions on the landing of these notched lobsters (LSB, 1978: 77-78). The 
Maine lobster industry's concern about these developments was heightened by concerns 
that its competitive position in the market was slipping as a result of a recent and rapid 
increases in imported lobster from Canada; lobster which could legally be brought into 
this country at a size less than Maine's legal minimum. The potential demise of laws 
considered important to the Maine lobster industry coupled with the industry's concern 
about competition was to set the stage for fifteen years of conflict, high transaction 
costs and failed management institutions. 
In 1985, with the support of leaders in the lobster industry, the Maine State 
Legislature increased to 3 5/16 inches the minimum size of lobster via a schedule of four 
'/32-inch increments to occur over a five year period (Laws of Maine: 12 M.R.S.A. 5 
643 1). As a mechanism to trigger the commencement of these increases, the legislation 
included a certification provision, which called for the state's Attorney General to 
certify that federal law had been modified in a similar fashion. Although not stated 
explicitly in the statutory language, the Maine industry believed that changes would be 
ushered in at the federal level to secure the V-notch and maximum size measures 
throughout the biological range of the resource and that efforts to address the 
importation of undersize Canadian lobster would also be taken. 
In 1987, Amendment 2 to the New England Fishery Management Council's 
Lobster FMP was implemented. Commencing in 1988, the minimum size requirements 
were to increase via a schedule similar to that enacted in Maine. This amendment 
moved through the Council process rather expeditiously aided to a significant extent by 
industry leaders from Maine who had become engaged in the Council proceedings 
largely in an effort to secure provisions to protect if not expand the range of the V-notch 
and maximum size measures. The provisions adopted by the Council in this regard 
provided that no sanction would be imposed if notched and oversize lobsters were 
released when obtained in federal waters, a much less restrictive measure than that 
advocated by the Maine industry, but a compromise which enabled adoption of the 
amendment. To address the Canadian import issue, Maine Congressman John R. 
McKernan, Jr., introduced a bill in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1985. This 
legislation was designed to amend the Magnuson Stevens Act so as to make it illegal to 
import live lobster of a size less than that established in U.S. federal regulation. This 
measure was ultimately enacted in 1989 under the sponsorship of Senator George 
Mitchell (MSFCMA, 1976: $307 (J)). 
Coincident to the commencement of lobster minimum size increases in 1988, the 
regional and national economy began to decline and head towards recession. By the 
time of the first scheduled '132-inch increase, the lobster industry, along with many other 
sectors of the economy, had begun to feel the negative effects of the worsening 
economic conditions. By 1989, following the second '132-inch increase, industry leaders 
from both Maine and Massachusetts called for the Council to consider delaying further 
increases due to concern about the market and lobster availability (NEFMC, 1987, May 
1989: 15). The concerns of U.S. lobstermen were heightened when Canadian 
government efforts to bring about an increase in the minimum size of lobster in that 
country failed in June of 1989. At about this same time, a paper prepared by a 
University of Maine researcher challenging the validity of minimum size increases as a 
management tool was circulated among and embraced by industry as further reason to 
delay (Steneck, 1989). At its June 1989 meeting, the Council was called upon by 
industry leaders from the New England states to delay the next scheduled increase for 
three years so as to provide time to evaluate market and biological conditions (NEFMC, 
1987, June 1989: 7). By August of 1989, the first formal motion to delay was offered at 
a Council meeting. 
This effort to delay further increases was defeated and it would be another year 
and a half before the Council would act favorably on the industry's request. To an 
industry which had often demonstrated its effectiveness at influencing management 
decisions at the state level, the federal regional management structure proved a much 
more ponderous and complex institution in which to effect change. Because the 
economic downturn effected all sectors of the industry throughout the region and 
because the industry held the minimum size increase responsible, the prospect of further 
so-called gauge increases became an issue around which the region's industry rallied. 
The formation of coalitions between various sectors of the New England-wide lobster 
industry proved essential, not just due to the logistical needs of the effort to delay the 
gauge, but because the industry had unwittingly begun to change the very basis of 
lobster management. Lobster management was to become truly a regional effort, one 
that required the direct participation of industry on a regional basis. It was at this time 
that the scale of the regional lobster industry became truly apparent to managers. It 
would be some time, however, before managers fully appreciated the diversity and 
regional differences to scale that existed within the industry. 
The industry's approach to the gauge issue was three-pronged. At the regional 
level, industry leaders commenced lobbying efforts in their respective states for 
legislation to halt or delay gauge increases. They also became actively involved in the 
Council process as members of the Council's newly created industry advisory 
committee, as participants at the Council's Lobster Committee meetings and at plenary 
meetings of the Council. At the national level, industry leaders became very familiar 
visitors in the Washington officers of their regional Congressional delegations. They 
also spent a considerable amount of time fostering relationships with government 
officials in leadership positions at the National Marine Fisheries Service and, its parent 
agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Furthermore, industry 
leaders began to familiarize themselves with other fisheries management organizations, 
such as the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, and they developed 
relationships with various conservation organizations. 
While industry leaders continued to prevail upon the Council to delay further 
increase in the gauge, they were also engaged at the international level working with 
their Canadian counterparts. United States legislation had been adopted in 1989 that 
effectively prohibited the importation of undersize live lobster and the Canadian 
government moved swiftly to petition for the establishment of a dispute settlement 
panel under provisions of the U.S./Canadian Free Trade Agreement. By June of 1990, 
the arbitration panel had found in favor of the U.S. and ultimately, the gauge delay 
became cast as a USICanada free trade issue. During 1990, a considerable effort was 
devoted to joint meetings between U.S. and Canadian industry representatives. In 
August, at the urging of industry, a motion was offered during the Council meeting to 
request the implementation of an emergency amendment to delay gauge increases due 
to the implications for "international trade and benefits derived through a bettering of 
international cooperation" (NEFMC, 1987, August 1990: 8). 
While a delay in further gauge increases was the original impetus for industry 
involvement in regional management forums, the focus began to change and ultimately 
a new direction in lobster management began to emerge. The transition was marked by 
four events at the New England Fishery Management Council. The first event was a 
statement made by the Council's Lobster Committee Chairman during the Council's 
January 1990 meeting that signaled for the first time a shift in sentiment towards 
support for a delay and for the possibility of managing the resource through a means 
other than minimum size increases (NEFMC, 1987, January 10, 1990: 1 1). Second, the 
industry's rationale for a gauge delay was recast as a necessary and responsible pause to 
provide time to develop a new and more comprehensive approach to lobster 
management. This rationale ultimately swayed the Council which, during its January 
1991 meeting, voted to delay further gauge increases and to develop a comprehensive 
amendment utilizing alternative management (NEFMC, 1987, January 199 1 : 8). 
The third significant development occurred during the April 1991 Council 
meeting when the Lobster Committee Chairman indicated that the industry would be 
requested to develop a consensus position concerning measures to include in a 
comprehensive amendment (NEFMC, 1987, April 199 1 : 4). This was significant 
because the Committee leadership had agreed that the most appropriate approach 
towards the development of a comprehensive amendment was to delegate responsibility 
to the industry directly. At the October 1991 Council meeting, it was agreed that an 
industry group would be formalized for the purposes of developing a comprehensive 
lobster amendment (NEFMC, 1987, October 199 1 : 10). 
The last, and particularly significant development ushering in change in lobster 
management occurred in June 1992 when the State Directors of the three largest lobster 
producing states (Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island) mapped out a strategy for 
regional lobster management that provided for industry's direct involvement in the 
development of management measures, federal withdrawal from the lobster . 
management arena, and a shift in lobster management jurisdiction back towards state 
primacy. 
The sought after temporary gauge delay occurred on January 3, 1992, when the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration announced in the Federal Register 
the final rule implementing Amendment 4 to the Fishery Management Plan for 
American Lobster. This amendment in essence froze the legal minimum size of lobster 
at 3 !A inches, delaying for two years, until December 27, 1993, further scheduled 
increases in the gauge. In the interim, the New England Fishery Management Council 
was to develop a comprehensive amendment (Amendment 5 )  providing an alternative 
approach to management of the resource throughout the range of the species to reduce 
the risk of overfishing. The formal impetus for this alternative approach, one involving 
the industry directly in its development, was a May 16, 1991 Council motion that: 
"the Council approve the development of an amendment to the Lobster 
Management Plan which would comprehensively address management 
throughout the range of the resource. To initiate the amendment development 
process, the Council shall request that the U.S. lobster industry provide the 
Council with a consensus position as to what conservation and management 
measures its wants to see incorporated into this amendment.. ." (NEFMC, 1987, 
May 1991: 8). 
Using the Council's Lobster Industry Advisory Committee as its base and other 
industry representatives who expressed interest in participating, an initial working 
group was established at a meeting on August 1 5, 1 99 1 (Marshall, 199 1 a). This group 
was ultimately to grow and formalize as the Lobster Industry Working Group. Meetings 
of the LIWG, facilitated by the University of New Hampshire's Cooperative Extension 
service, were conducted in various New England ports through the balance of 1991 and 
throughout 1992. In December of 1992 the National Marine Fisheries Service agreed to 
provide financial support for the development of the industry's proposal for 
Amendment 5. A contract was let with Drs. Acheson, Steneck and Wilson of the 
University of Maine for that purpose (CFN, 1993a: 17A) and on May 17, 1993 the 
Council received a draft of the LIWG's Amendment 5 (Russell, 1993a). In addition to 
maintaining existing lobster management measures, the industry proposed a four-zone 
regional approach to management including a framework for developing an overfishing 
definition and the creation of an Effort Management Team to develop long-term 
management strategies within each zone. The industry approach also proposed 
mandatory reporting, controlled access to the fishery with a two-year moratorium on 
new entry and a limit on the harvest of lobsters by vessels rigged for dragging 
(NEFMC, 1993a). 
The 10 Percent Solution 
The protocol developed by the Council for the finalization of Amendment 5 
called for joint participation by the Council and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries 
Commission, their respective lobster committees, and their technical advisory bodies 
(Marshall, 199 1 b). On May 18, 1993 the Council's Plan Development Team (PDT) 
conducted a review of the industry's draft Amendment 5. This review uncovered a 
number of substantive policy issues, the most significant of which related to the 
proposal's means of translating the calculated level of fishing mortality (F) to satisfy a 
10 percent maximum Egg Per Recruit (EPR) threshold criteria required under 
guidelines developed by the National Marine Fisheries Service. In the PDT's view, the 
industry's proposal was deficient in providing increases in lobster spawning potential 
equivalent to that which would have been achieved by the gauge increases that would 
otherwise had been implemented. This related both to the means by which this 
equivalent would be achieved and its timing (Russell, 1993a; 1993b). The overfishing 
definition and the status of the resource with respect to that definition proved to be an 
extremely vexing issue, causing delay in finalization of Amendment 5 and ultimately 
playing a part in the federal /state conflict over lobster management jurisdiction. The 
Lobster Industry Working Group suggested in its draft amendment that effort reductions 
(to be accomplished through the use of the proposed Effort Management Teams) would 
be appropriate to reduce overfishing. However, neither the industry nor the joint 
NEFMCIASMFC lobster committees had achieved progress in developing specific 
necessary measures to this end (Brancaleone, 1993). 
Although risk assessment was not initially required under the Magnuson Stevens 
Act, in 1989 the NMFS promulgated guidelines requiring such assessments in the form 
of overfishing definitions (50 CFR 5 602.1-17). Prior to these 602 guidelines, therefore, 
a risk definition was not included in the Lobster Fishery Management Plan. However, 
as Amendment 4 (providing a temporary delay in gauge increases for two years) was 
developed following this promulgation, it was required to include a definition of 
overfishing. The definition included in Amendment 4 was considered by the NMFS to 
be "a provisional definition pending more complete analyses of lobster population 
dynamics" (Roe, 1991). It had been developed by the NMFS for purposes of a 
proposed Secretarial amendment and was made available to the Council during the 
development of Amendment 4 (Peterson, 1992). The scientific basis for the definition 
was a new growth and egg production model developed by NMFS scientists Fogarty 
and Idoine (1 988) building on work done by Canadian federal scientists that 
incorporates molt increments, molt frequency and fecundity information. These are 
used to model egg production per recruit, considered to be analogous to spawning stock 
biomass per recruit. The definition states that the American lobster resource is 
considered to be overfished when, based on information concerning the status of the 
resource throughout its range, it is harvested at a fishing mortality rate (F) and 
minimum size combination that results in a calculated egg production per recruit of less 
than 10 percent of a non fished population. The selection of 10 percent (as opposed to 5 
or 15 for example) was based upon life history studies and was the NMFS scientists' 
best estimate of the lower level at which egg production might be inadequate to support 
the population. 
Scientific confidence in the definition was not universal because a stock 
recruitment relationship had not been demonstrated and the model relied upon data from 
the offshore fishery only, thus it had little application for inshore populations (Howell, 
1992). The industry, reacting to dire predictions of collapse in the face of years of 
steady increases, were also skeptical of the definition developed by the federal scientists 
(Allen, 199 1). The Council requested on several occasions that NMFS review the 
definition prior to development of the comprehensive amendment called for in 
Amendment 4. In April 1991 the Service responded that "(n)ot withstanding the lack of 
precise information, the provisional reference point of 10 % attempts to address the 
underlying overfishing of the parental stock, and the potential long-term ramifications 
for fishery yield" (Pearce, 1991). In 1992 the Service again registered support for the 
definition, stating that it was "satisfied that it is the best available given our current 
scientific knowledge. In addition, it meets the criteria for rate-based definitions called 
for under (the 602 Guidelines)" (Peterson, 1992). The Industry Working Group forged 
ahead to develop Amendment 5. Although it proposed to retain the 10 percent 
maximum spawning potential definition initially, the industry draft amendment also 
proposed that eventually the provisional definition would be used in concert with 
several other criteria for determining the status of the stock. 
Given the growing complexity of the situation caused by the difficulty 
addressing overfishing goals and that the regulatory processes for state and federal 
waters are different, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission decided to defer 
action on a complimentary management plan until the Council's amendment had been 
completed. The Council's committee, however, was hoisted somewhat upon the petard 
of the timeframe established in Amendment 4 mandating an alternative strategy to 
forestall further gauge increases. Developing specific measures to address overfishing 
proved to be too difficult a task to accomplish prior to the December 27, 1993 
Amendment 4 deadline, therefore, the committee opted to postpone that task for a year 
and to forge ahead with other necessary components of an amendment. 
Seeds of Chan~e: The Regional Approach 
The approach that the Council and ultimately the federal government was to take 
with respect to lobster management was laid out in a June 23, 1992 memo from the 
Maine state director to state directors Borden of Rhode Island and Coates of 
Massachusetts. I was at the time Maine's state director and had been the chairman of 
the Council's Lobster Oversight Committee. This memo presented my observation 
about the management situation and recommended a strategy for dealing with the 
number of difficult issues thwarting development of an alternative management 
approach, including the extensive federalization of the lobster fishery. This strategy 
contained four elements: 
" 1. That the Lobster Industry Working Group proposal submitted on June 17 
be used as the fundamental elements of a revised management approach. 
These provisions would be applicable throughout all areas of 
management. 
2. That the revised management approach also provide for separate 
management 'units' which describe inshoreloffshore and regional 
variations in lobster fisheries. Within these management units, different 
management measures may be utilized beyond those considered to be 
fundamental elements common to all management units. 
3. That we will explore the possibility, under Magnuson but not necessarily 
through a plan amendment, to delegate management authority for lobster 
to some other non-NEFMC entity (i.e. geopolitical sections of ASMFC). 
4. That we will move forthwith to identify the most expeditious means of 
extending the deadlines established under the last amendment. 
The principal purpose of the proposal is to utilize a 'Striped Bass Act' approach 
to lobster management. An approach which utilizes common elements, and yet 
allows for regional variations and state level enforcement in the inshore fishery. 
The contemplated approach would also empower the non-NEFMC entity to 
develop management measures for the offshore fishery and provide a federal 
enforcement mechanism" (Brennan, 1992). 
This strategy set the stage for the significant change that was to take place in lobster 
management. A change that accommodated the scale and complexity of the regional 
lobster fishery and enabled complementary involvement of industry in the management 
decision-making process. 
The lobster committee agreed to use the Lobster Industry Working Group's 
proposal to serve as the base for Amendment 5, thereby endorsing the concept of 
regional lobster management. In November 1993, the Council conducted a series of 
hearings on an amendment that would maintain the minimum size of lobster at 3 !A 
inches, limit entry into the fishery, establish four lobster management zones (three 
zones along the eastern seaboard plus one offshore zone), and create a mechanism to 
enable differing management within each zone. Fundamentally, Amendment 5 
proposed to shift the basis of lobster management away from reliance upon the gauge to 
reliance upon effort reduction. Although many in the industry were reluctant to see this 
change, it was acknowledged that effort was too high, that there were too many traps on 
the bottom and too many people trying to catch lobster (CFN, 1993b: 1B). 
At its December 8-9, 1993 meeting, the New England Fishery Management 
Council voted 13-2 in favor of Amendment 5 to the American Lobster Fishery 
Management Plan. Although the Council had met the required time frame to forestall 
further gauge increases, the National Marine Fisheries Service needed time to review 
the amendment and announced on December 28, 1993 a 146-day delay in further 
increases while it did so. Although the Service had previously signaled its concerns that 
the amendment was deficient, at the January 1994 Council meeting the Services' 
Regional Director made it clear that, if the deficiencies could not be adequately 
addressed, responsibility for the lobster fishery could default to the Secretary of 
Commerce. But it was also at this time that the federal government indicated its 
reluctance to get mired in the "politics of the gauge" because lobster management is 
"largely an issue of the states" (CFN, 1994b: 12A). One option available to the federal 
government was to withdraw the federal lobster FMP and thus remove the lobster 
fishery from federal control, a proposition the Regional Director had earlier made clear 
to the Council (NEFMC, January 1993: 2-14). 
The logistical possibilities of this option became more real in December of 1993 
with passage of the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act 
(ACFCMA, 1993 : 16 U.S.C. 5 10 1-5 109) which was modeled on the Atlantic Striped 
Bass Conservation Act (16 U.S.C. 185 1) mentioned in the state director's memo above. 
The "interjurisdictional bill" as ACFCMA was commonly referred, authorizes financial 
assistance to the coastal states and ASMFC to adopt and implement fishery 
management plans. The Act also provides a federal means of ensuring that coastal 
states comply with fisheries management plans developed by ASMFC. Most 
importantly, however, ACFCMA provides a means of federally enforcing state 
(ASMFC) developed management measures in federal waters. The Atlantic Coastal 
Fisheries Cooperative Management Act enables the federal government to leverage 
control over coastal state resources without having direct responsibility for their 
management. The passage of ACFCMA, therefore, provided the federal government 
with a means of distancing itself from lobster management without having to abandon a 
resource it argued was overfished. 
On May 1 1, 1994 the National Marine Fisheries service informed the Council 
that it had partially disapproved Amendment 5 (Peterson, 1994). Although the gauge 
freeze, regional management approach, moratorium on entry, permitting requirements, 
and framework provisions were preserved, the Service was opposed to elements of 
Amendment 5 that would have divided the fleet into vessel permit categories and 
imposed a landings quota upon the trawl sector. This would, in the Service's view, 
violate National Standard 4 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act that management measures 
not discriminate against residents of different states. Despite this, the Council had 
already begun work on framework refinements to Amendment 5 by formally 
establishing the Effort Management Teams that would develop specific management 
measures for the four lobster management zones originally proposed and an additional 
zone in the Outer Cape Cod area added after public hearings. Coincident to this, the 
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission began preparation of Amendment 2 to its 
obsolete lobster plan to bring it into conformity with existing federal standards. These 
standards were the 3 % minimum carapace size, a requirement for escape vents, and a 
prohibition on possession of berried and scrubbed lobster, lobster meat and lobster parts 
(ASMFC, 1995). 
The Battle For Primacv 
With passage of ACFCMA and the Effort Management Teams working to 
develop area specific management strategies, the stage was set for federal withdrawal of 
the lobster FMP. This, however, would not happen quickly, smoothly, or without 
conflict. Under Amendment 5, the Effort Management Teams worked to develop 
proposals to address overfishing and establish criteria to be used to assess reductions in 
fishing induced mortality. These included existing measures in some areas and trap 
reductions in others. What the industry hoped to achieve with respect to existing 
measures was a quantified acknowledgement by the fisheries service of the 
conservation value associated with measures such as V-notch protection and the 5 inch 
maximum size. The service steadfastly refused to oblige, however, and this created 
significant conflict between factions of the regional industry and between the Maine 
industry and federal scientists. 
The EMT's continued to work through the balance of 1994 with an ambitious 
deadline of January 20, 1995 to submit proposals for the five areas including the Gulf of 
Maine (Area I), Southern New England Inshore (Area 2), Outer Cape Cod Area, 
Offshore (Area 3), and the Mid Atlantic (Area 4). Each EMT was comprised of a core 
group of technical members as well as industry members appointed on an area basis. 
The EMT process proved to be extraordinary in that several disparate factions of a 
regional fishery were able to reach consensus on a management strategy within an 18 
month period. Their success is further demonstration of the benefits associated with 
reducing scale complexities through area management. 
Once the area-specific recommendations were received, the schedule called for 
the Council to submit a comprehensive management package to the National Marine 
Fisheries Service on July 2oth. This package was to be submitted in the form of a 
framework adjustment to Amendment 5 rather than as a more cumbersome amendment 
(CFN, 1994a: 12A). 
Just days after the EMT's met their January 2oth submission deadline, the 
National Marine Fisheries Service notified the Council, and put the states on notice, that 
it would not approve a revision to the lobster plan unless comparable regulations were 
in force within state waters. The principal issue of concern to the federal agency was 
that management measures span the boundary between state and federal waters and 
effectively reduce fishing mortality. According to the Regional Administrator of 
NMFS, the management measures would have to relate to a conservation standard that 
"applies throughout the range of the stock" and is based upon the overfishing definition 
(CFN, 1995: 5B). The federal propensity to standardize the regulatory approach was 
thwarting efforts to devise management measures that accommodated variations in scale 
and complexity. What had been considered by the service as a provisional overfishing 
definition, became the de facto standard and the service was adamant that management 
measures in Amendment 6 would have to meet the 10 percent egg production definition 
established in Amendment 5. 
On this point, NMFS was adamant, however, the states and Council members 
were skeptical and the industry was outright opposed because adherence to this standard 
would translate into a 50 percent reduction in effort over 10 years in the Southern New 
England area and a 20 percent reduction over five years in the Gulf of Maine. The 
effort to modify the EMT proposals to conform with the overfishing definition standard 
proved to be extremely difficult for the Council, particularly so because each area 
proposed different qualifying criteria and effort reduction measures that were deemed 
most appropriate to local areas. Considering that each modification to the EMT 
proposals lessened the support of area lobstermen, it was not surprising that the Council 
failed to meet its deadline for submitting the comprehensive management package and 
withdrawal of the federal management plan became imminent. 
On February 23, 1996, via letter to the Council Chairman from the head of the 
National Marine Fisheries Service, the Council was informed that the agency intended 
to "withdraw Secretarial approval of the Fishery Management Plan for American 
lobster and remove its implementing regulations.. ." (Schrnitten, 1996). Ostensibly, the 
basis for this action was President Clinton's plans for further regulatory reform as part 
of his efforts to reinvent government and the consequent "elimination, consolidation, 
and/or revision of those regulations that are outdated or otherwise in need of reform." 
However, this reform effort merely provided legitimate cover for action the agency had 
already decided upon "because more appropriate mechanisms for management of this 
resource exist . . . (specifically). . . regulations to protect American lobsters in the EEZ 
. . . (to be). . . initiated through action by the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries 
Commission . . . under the authority of the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative 
Management Act." Once the ASMFC had a comprehensive management plan in place, 
the Fisheries Service would delegate primary management responsibility to the 
Commission. 
The ASMFC Lobster Board adopted a timetable for developing a comprehensive 
interstate plan with a target date of early 1997 (CFN, 1996: 2B) and commenced 
development of Amendment 3 to its lobster management plan. The Commission 
recognized the level of work that went into the development of the EMT proposals and 
was intent upon incorporating as much of their work as possible (ASMFC, 1996). The 
ASMFC proved to be good on its word and took to public hearing in the summer of 
1997 an amendment that contained many of the key elements of the original EMT 
proposals (ASMFC, 1997). The foundation of Amendment 3 is adaptive management, 
an approach similar in concept to the area management upon which the Council's 
Amendment 5 was based. Also like Amendment 5, the Commission's Amendment 3 
implements some fundamental regulations throughout the range of the resource and 
leaves to seven EMT-like Lobster Conservation Management Teams (LCMT) the 
development of effort reduction measures. 
However, by the Fall of 1997 the National Marine Fisheries Service appeared 
far less committed to distancing itself from lobster management and delegating 
management responsibly to the ASMFC. During meetings of the Commission and of 
the Council in September and October, representatives of the Service made it clear that 
the Commission's plan was no better than the Council's in addressing overfishing and 
that the Service had no intention of withdrawing the federal plan until something was 
developed to do so. This angered members of both management entities who charged 
that the federal government was holding "the states hostage when 90 percent of the 
resource is under state jurisdiction" (CFN, 1997a: 2B). Nevertheless, in late October the 
Service announced in the Federal Register its intent to examine alternatives for 
managing lobsters in the Exclusive Economic Zone as well as state waters (NMFS, 
1997). This began a game of brinkmanship, the overriding priorities for NMFS being to 
end "overfishing and restoring egg production" according to the federal Regional 
Administrator (CFN, 1997b: 5B). Adoption of the initial federal fishery management 
plan for lobster in 1983 had the effect, perhaps unintended at the time, of federalizing 
the lobster fishery and subordinating state control. However, the language in Section 
306 (b) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act suggests that a state's jurisdiction over a fishery 
is not diminished if the fishery is one that is practiced predominately within state waters 
and it was clear to the state directors, on that basis, that the American lobster fishery 
was clearly a state waters fishery. A statelfederal confrontation over jurisdiction 
supremacy thus ensued. 
The Service was demanding that trap limits be incorporated into Amendment 3. 
However, the Commission argued that to do so in areas without existing limits before 
the Conservation Management Teams had a chance to meet, would violate the intent 
and purpose of adaptive management (CFN, 1998a: 8B). Ignoring the NMFS threat, the 
ASMFC passed Amendment 3 on December 12,1998. However, the Magnuson- 
Stevens Act as amendment in October 1996 by the Sustainable Fisheries Act (Pub. L. 
104-297) provided NMFS with a trump card in that the new amendment requires the 
Secretary of Commerce to step in to end overfishing and rebuild overfished stocks 
where a Council fails to do so. As the management of lobster was still technically 
within the domain of the federal government and the New England Fishery 
Management Council, the federal agency had a legal prerogative to force an effort 
reduction via trap limits despite the fact that the fishery occurred predominately within 
state waters and that any action by the federal government would be tantamount to 
federal encroachment into state territorial waters. 
In March 1998 the National Marine Fisheries Service issued its draft 
management approach in preparation for public hearings (CFN, 1998b: 1A). The 
approach contained provisions for both the trap and non-trap fisheries, its primary 
management strategy for the trap fishery proposed to establish three fishing zones 
within which an initial trap cap would be set and then reduced annually into the year 
2003. The zones proposed were (A) from 0-30 miles, (B) from 3-30 miles, and (C) 
beyond 40 miles from shore. Between 30 and 40 miles a 10-mile buffer zone was 
proposed within which no traps could be set. Within Zones A and B the initial trap cap 
would be set at 800, and reduced 10 percent annually to a total of 480 traps per permit 
holder. In Zone C the initial cap would be 2,000 traps, reduced to 1,200 by the year 
2003. This proposal was roundly criticized by lobstermen at all thirteen hearings the 
Fisheries Service held along the eastern seaboard. Interestingly, although not 
surprisingly given the concern lobstermen had about the draconian nature of the 
proposed trap reductions, "the most common thread outside of Maine (in the 
lobsterinen's comments) was support for an increase in the minimum size" (CFN, 
1998c: 20B). An increase in the gauge was seen by many as the lesser of two evils, 
although support was expressed for the ASMFC Amendment 3 adaptive management 
approach. 
State Control Repained 
Between these public hearings and January 13, 1999, the Service relented and 
acknowledged that the majority of the lobster fishery takes place in state waters and that 
regulatory action in the EEZ, "even a total moratorium on harvesting lobsters, would 
not end overfishing of the resource without implementation of effective management 
measures by state jurisdictions." In its Federal Register solicitation of comments on its 
proposal to abandon its management approach and finally transfer management 
authority to the ASMFC, the National Marine Fisheries Service acknowledged that "it is 
not possible to meet the requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act without full 
cooperation of states with lobster fisheries, and thus a cooperative management 
partnership under ACFCMA is preferable" (NMFS, 1999a). The Deputy Assistant 
Administrator of NMFS confirmed that the agency proposed "full adoption of the 
ASMFC plan structure" (CFN, 1999: 1 A). 
On December 6 of that year the Service announced the final rule, to become 
effective in January 2000, transferring management authority fiom the Magnuson 
Stevens Act to the ASMFC via the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management 
Act (NMFS, 1999b). Seventeen years after the states unwittingly ceded preeminent 
management authority for the lobster fishery to the federal government, that authority 
had once again been regained. 
Since assuming management jurisdiction, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries 
Commission has focused upon efforts to meet the 10 percent egg production goal. 
Utilizing the adaptive management approach and the concept of conservation 
equivalency to "provide states with the flexibility to adopt alternative management 
approaches" in the management of the lobster resource (ASMFC, 2001a). The 
Commission in February 2001, approved Addendum I1 of its lobster fishery 
management plan. This measure establishes a schedule for egg production rebuilding, 
minimum size increases, and trap reductions based upon recommendations of the 
Lobster Conservation Management Teams (ASMFC, 2001 b). In the Fall of 2001, the 
Commission sent out for public hearing Addendum I11 developed by the LCMTs that, 
among other things, mandates V-notching in certain offshore areas and provide for the 
use of a maximum gauge size (ASMFC, 2001~). These two provisions had been 
exclusive to the State of Maine. They are also the provisions that led initially to 
federalization of lobster management and, in part, they are provisions that caused 
significant conflict and transaction costs between factions of the regional fishery and 
between the Maine industry and federal scientists. 
In the twenty-five year history of federal involvement in the lobster fishery, The 
management institution has shifted dramatically. The minimum size has increased as 
advocated for by many in the scientific community, gear and entry limitations have 
been imposed to rationalize socioeconomic and biological conditions in the fishery, the 
management community has conceded the conservation benefits of the V-notch and 
maximum size measures advocated for by the Maine lobster industry, a statutory 
prohibition on the importation of undersize Canadian lobster has been enacted, an 
adaptive and collaborative approach to management has been instituted that recognizes 
differences between regional sectors of the fishery, and lobstermen throughout the range 
of the resource have a formal role in the management decision-making process. 
Although still overfished relative to biological targets, the control measures presently 
being adopted are apparently relieving this condition. According to the most recent 
stock assessment, lobster stocks in the Gulf of Maine, Georges Bank, and Southern New 
England are all considered to be below the 10 percent egg per recruit reference point. 
However, in recent years recruitment, total egg production, and stock abundance have 
increased in all areas leading assessment scientists to conclude that recruitment 
overfishing has stopped (ASMFC, 2001d). Participants in the fisheries management 
bargaining process have agreed upon rules to address the collective action dilemma and 
these rules appear effective in conserving the stocks. It is thus reasonable to conclude 
that based upon these outcomes, lobster management has been successful. 
Summary 
The history of lobster management for the purposes of this thesis can be framed 
into somewhat different time periods than those identified by Acheson (1997). The first 
period is one of state-level control between 1870 and 1970 during which time most of 
the important lobster conservation measures were established. During this period the 
industry had significant influence within the legislative/state agency venue and most 
measures that were adopted resulted from distribution fights between sectors and 
factions of the industry. This is also a period during which there was little or no serious 
opposition from state biologists with a perspective on management that departed 
significantly from the majority in the industry. In fact, dominant factions of the 
industry aligned with the commissioner andlor biologists to garner legislative support 
for the adoption of several measures still in use today. Fisheries management during 
the first 130 years of the Maine lobster industry worked reasonable well because most 
of the measures emanated from the industry and information asymmetries between 
lobstermen and the scientific community were minimal. 
The second period can be characterized as one of federal control, beginning 
when the states relinquished primacy to the federal government in the mid 1980s. This 
occurred as a coincidence of interests between state agency scientists seeking to 
advance biological goals (a 3 ?4 inch minimum size) and industry policy entrepreneurs 
seeking to secure preferred management measures (V-notching and maximum size). It 
is a period characterized by significant distribution fights between the industry on a 
regional basis and the federal government. And, it is a period of high transaction costs 
both in terms of power asymmetry with respect to the manner in which the Magnuson 
Stevens Act was implemented and with respect to asymmetrical information pertaining 
to the reproductive potential of the resource and the conservation value associated with 
the V-notch and maximum size measure. During this period the complexities of 
regional scale compounded by asymmetries of power and information made it difficult 
for parties to the fishery management bargaining process to overcome the relatively 
high transaction costs and put in place effective rules that had political support. 
However, while the industry had less direct influence within the federal venue during 
this time period than it previously had at the state level, this period also saw the 
development of an area management approach that lessened the complexities of scale 
and enabled the industry to develop regional capabilities that positioned it to transition 
into the third period of lobster management. 
The third period of lobster management is one characterized by a devolution of 
management authority from the federal level back to the state level under the aegis of 
the Atlantic State Marine Fisheries Commission. It is also a period of significant 
advances in co-management and industrylgovernment collaboration at the regional level 
through the Lobster Conservation Management Teams. Asymmetries of power have 
been reduced so that management measures can once again emanate from the industry, 
issues of scale have been addressed through area management, and many information 
asymmetries have been reduced due to acceptance of the conservation benefits 
associated with management measures advocated by industry. 
Groundfish Manapement 
The contemporary management history of groundfish is far less complex, from a 
jurisdictional perspective, than is lobster because it is almost exclusively a federal 
waters fishery. However, from a biological perspective it is far more complex because 
of its multi-species nature. Prior to the enactment of the Magnuson Stevens Act in 
1976, U.S. fishermen were subject only nominally to federal involvement under the 
ineffective management of the International Commission for Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries. The regulation of fisheries, therefore, was ostensibly the exclusive 
responsibility of the states. The management of those fisheries occurring seaward of the 
territorial jurisdiction of the coastal states, such as groundfish, depended essentially 
upon the degree to which an individual state cooperated with interstate management 
measures and, through state-level landing laws and licensing provisions etc., pursued 
enforcement action. 
A Diff~cult Com~romise: The Failure of Quota-based Management 
Since the commencement of management under the Magnuson Stevens Act, 
analytical limitation coupled with the procedural complexity of the Act has often forced 
the Regional Councils to respond in a reactive nature rather than strategically. This, 
unfortunately, is the reality of many regulatory programs (Breyer, 1982). Because of the 
uncertainty caused by informational limitations, managers have often found it necessary 
to revise plans to accommodate economic exigency. Managers have been accused of 
overlooking the long range planning necessary to satisfy stock rebuilding goal for the 
sake of maximizing the fishermen's yearly catch and income and to maintain the 
Council's political stability. The early development of the Atlantic Groundfish Fishery 
Management Plan (FMP) is a case in point. The difficult compromise between 
promotion of the industry and conservation of the resource led to piecemeal 
development of guidelines incorporating trip limits, quotas and vessel allocation. In 
some respects, piecemeal development continues today. 
Due to the depressed condition of many New England groundfish stocks, the 
groundfish fishery management plan (exclusively for cod, haddock and yellowtail 
flounder at the time) was one of the first developed and approved by a regional fishery 
management council (Warner et al., 1980: 51). The plan was not technically developed 
by the New England Fishery Management Council but primarily by the National Marine 
Fisheries Service and was an extension of the quota-based management program 
were reached, the Council would establish new ones that, in turn, became the new 
harvest target (Hennessey, 1983: 8 1). Eventually there were more than 100 different 
quotas regulating the harvest of Atlantic groundfish. 
Unfortunately, serious subsidiary problems began to manifest including erosion 
of reliable commercial statistics upon which active regulation depends. According to 
the New England Regional Council, fishermen reported where and how much fish was 
caught "in such a way as to avoid a violation of the regulations rather than to convey 
accurate information. Because of limited enforcement resources and unwillingness by 
fishermen to testify against others, data evasion could not be prevented. The erosion of 
the database has skewed data important for stock analysis.. ." (NEFMC, 1981). 
Fishermen often considered the management plans too technical and as a consequence 
of widespread misreporting, they did not agree with the scientific and technical data 
upon which management plans were based. "As a result, the plans and accompanying 
regulations were not well received and supported (USGAO, 1979: 23). Hostility, 
mistrust, and poor communication among scientists, fishermen, and managers 
intensified the management failures. Hennessey and Healey (2000: 208) report that 
"(i)t was not just normal scientific uncertainty that weakened the influence of scientific 
advice in the management of the New England fishery, but scientific uncertainty 
coupled with low credibility of scientists among managers and fishers." 
Any support that may have existed was further eroded by the fishermen's 
perception of inconsistent enforcement. It was stated in a report by the General 
Accounting Office, that fishermen "allege that NMFS efforts for the most part have 
centered on Gloucester where the agency's regional headquarters is located while other 
established by the International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF). 
Eleven weeks after implementation of regulations in 1977, New England fishermen 
exceeded the entire cod quota established in the new FMP for that year. The fishery 
was subsequently closed, however, the public reaction against the closure was so 
intense that the Secretary of Commerce instituted emergency economic provisions 
which raised the quota, opened the fishery and thus relieved the political pressure. 
As the stocks improved with the removal of foreign fishing effort, the number of 
domestic vessels increased dramatically between 1977 and 1980 causing the annual 
quota to be caught more and more quickly each time it was set (NEFMC, 1993b). 
Management measures were changed almost weekly with the quotas increased five 
times in the three years following adoption of the initial FMP. This direct regulation of 
the harvester had supplanted the fisherman so that the Council had begun making 
decisions normally made by the fisherman (Hennessey, 1983: 77). Moreover, these 
yearly quotas played havoc with the market by creating gluts, price declines and idle 
fleets. 
In an attempt to alleviate these market problems, the Council instituted quarterly 
quotas designed to spread the catch more evenly throughout the year. However, the 
capacity and capability of the vessels varied to such a degree that all were not able to 
take an equal share of the resource before the quota was reached. This prompted the 
Council to further anlend its plan to allocate quotas based upon vessel class. 
Unfortunately, the inlposition of quotas encouraged fishermen to engage in intense 
fishing when the season opened. Quotas were then viewed as targets with the end result 
being that the quota would be reached more quickly than intended. As the initial quotas 
ports, such as New Bedford, which harbors large fishing fleets, receive lesser attention. 
They also indicate that smaller ports throughout the entire region receive little or no 
coverage. . . . A Department of Transportation internal audit report cited the Coast 
Guard for similar inconsistencies in its enforcement program, specifically in the 3 to 12 
mile offshore area." 
Because fisheries management schemes can only attempt to manage fishermen 
and not fish, maximum effectiveness in any management plan depends upon a high 
degree of cooperation from the industry. The continued changes in regulation, the 
ability to secure regulatory loopholes, the perception of inconsistent enforcement, and 
the time it took for the federal government to resolve violations led fishermen to 
generally become uncooperative with management regimes (Pollnac and Miller, 1978; 
Sutinen and Hennessey, 1986; Sutinen, Reiser and Gauvin, 1990). Serious violations of 
management regulations such as the use of small-mesh liners in cod-ends and fishing in 
closed area have been admitted by fishermen (Hall-Arber and Finlayson, 1997: 122). 
Reports of fishing violations during the early years of groundfish management were 
common in local papers and trade journals - "dragger fined for fishing in closed 
spawning site," "boat's catch exceeds limit by 10,000 lbs.," "Old Colony fined 
$100,000 for landing limit violations" (Pierce, 1982: see attached newspaper clips). It 
had become so common place to evade regulations that fishermen who did adhere to 
regulations were scoffed at by their competitors (Pierce, 1982: 17) and "suffered 
economic hardship, lost prestige in the eyes of other fishers, and lost their credibility as 
effective captains" (Hennessey and Healey, 2000: 196). The widespread level of 
violation and the federal government's failure to adequately enforce the management 
regulations was of such concern to the New England Fishery Management Council that 
it sent a telegram to the Secretary of Commerce urging immediate action to prevent 
further erosion of the Council's credibility and prevent further social, economic and 
biological problems within the New England fishing industry (Pierce, 1982: 16). 
Clearly fishermen were opposed to regulation of the groundfish fishery, an 
attitude Acheson (1 984: 322) documented during a 1978 survey of New England 
fishermen. However, violation was not the only means of avoiding or circumventing 
the effects of regulation. Acheson also found that fishermen innovated significantly by 
purchasing larger vessels, by investing in electronic gear to improve their fishing 
efficiency, and by increasing the amount and kind of fishing gear to improve the 
effectiveness of their fishing operation. The net effect of the industry's response to 
management constraints upon their activities (innovation and violation) has been 
twofold in that the putative benefits of the control rules have been negated and the 
transaction costs involved in managing this fishery have escalated and remain high 
today. High transaction cost coupled with the information disconnect between 
fishermen and scientists that Hennessey and Healey (2000) point to has intensified the 
fisheries management failure and has contributed to continued declines in the 
groundfish resource. 
The fact that difficulties were encountered during the implementation of the 
Atlantic Groundfish FMP is not surprising considering that the Council system was a 
new entity, that NMFS was just beginning to grasp its role under the new system and 
that for the first time in the history of the New England fishery, domestic fishermen 
were brought under a federal management regime. The net effect of quota-based 
management in the New England region was that conservation goals were not achieved 
nor were the promotional aspects of the Magnuson Act fostered. This early experience 
with quota-based management has poisoned the well such that managers today 
assiduously avoid them. Confronted today with serious resource concerns and pressed 
by the courts to respond with appropriate management tools, the New England Fishery 
Management Council continues to have difficulty with quota-based management or 
derivatives that would require the imposition of total allowable catches as part of a suite 
of management measures. 
Passive Mana~ement 
By the early 1980s, the Council had become convinced of the fallacy of the 
single species management approach that it adopted from the federal and international 
managers. It abandoned this form of management in order to concentrate on the long 
term concerns of the multi-species fishery. Stock conditions had stabilized by 1979 to 
the point where the Council felt intervention and control could be minimized. As an 
alternative, the Council instituted a passive form of management upon the fishery 
incorporating indirect controls such as minimum fish sizes, a minimum codend mesh 
size, and selective closures of spawning areas. The fishery operated with minimal 
restrictions enabling the Council time to gain a better understanding of the fishery's 
dynamics and to prepare a long-term management program (NEFMC, 198 1). However, 
stocks continued to decline. In part this was exacerbated by the boundary established 
by the International Court of Justice in October of 1984 between U.S. and Canadian 
waters in the Gulf of MaineIGeorges Bank area, referred to as the Hague line (ICJ, 
1984). This delimitation put the most productive haddock grounds, traditionally fished 
by U.S. vessels, on the Canadian sides of the line thus forcing U.S. fishermen to fish on 
other parts of Georges Bank closer to shore. By the time the New England Council 
submitted its new Northeast Multispecies FMP in late 1984, the scientific community 
had begun to express concerns about the status of the stocks. 
The 1982 Interim Groundfish Plan defined optimum yield in a very curious 
fashion. It declared that optimum would be the amount of fish harvested by U.S. 
fishermen in accordance with the indirect control measures incorporated in the plan 
(NEFMC, 198 1). In essence the Council declared that the optimum harvest would be 
whatever U.S. fishermen would be capable of taking. This was a prescription for 
calamity because fishing effort, aided in large part by federal subsidies, doubled with 
most of the increase coming from new large vessels that were much more efficient as a 
result of advances in electronic sounding and navigational instruments. In the time 
period between enactment of the Magnuson Stevens Act and adoption of the Interim 
Plan, groundfish landings from Georges Bank increased by 83 percent, Southern New 
England landings increased by 94 percent and Gulf of Maine landing more than doubled 
(U.S. Congress, 1992). 
The new fishery management plan developed during the interim years built upon 
the passive form of management operative during the intervening years and it was the 
first plan ever to use biological targets designed to prevent overfishing (NEFMC, 
1993b). Its objective was to prevent stocks from reaching minimum abundance levels 
through the imposition of more restrictive, but nevertheless indirect control measures. 
These included a 5'12 minimum mesh size for cod-ends used in certain fisheries, 
closures of spawning areas during certain times of the year, and minimum size limits for 
cod, haddock and yellowtail flounder and newly added species including witch 
flounder, American plaice, winter flounder and pollock (NF, 1985: 12-1 3; NEFMC, 
1985). The plan also established an exempted fisheries program for small mesh fishing 
in the Gulf of Maine and it created provisions for a Technical Monitoring Group (TMG) 
to periodically review the plan's effectiveness. Importantly, the plan also required that 
any vessel participating in the groundfish fishery must obtain an annual permit to do so. 
The biological targets incorporated in the plan were expressed as the maximum 
spawning potential of the resource. The spawning potential ratio is the number of eggs 
that could be produced by a fish over its lifetime as part of fished stock divided by the 
number of eggs that could be produced by the same fish from a stock that is not fished. 
Essentially, this incorporates the principle that enough fish must survive to spawn in 
order to replenish the stock at sustainable levels. The Spawning Potential Ratio (SPR) 
can also be expressed using the biomass or weight of fish that contribute to spawning as 
a substitute for the eggs produced in a fished and unfished stock. It is generally agreed 
that for most of the species in the multispecies complex, the stocks can maintain 
themselves if the spawning stock biomass is maintained at 20 percent and this is the 
target incorporated in the Multispecies FMP. In concept, if the spawning stock biomass 
falls below 20 percent, fishing mortality should be reduced. 
The Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan as implemented was a 
much less interventionist approach than the original New England groundfish FMP and 
less onerous to industry, having been modified several times during the drafting stage to 
accommodate industry's concerns (CFN, 1985: 20). The National Marine Fisheries 
Service, citing overfishing and that the new plan was deficient, originally rejected the 
new Multi-species plan (NMFS, 1986), however, ultimately backed down in the face of 
political pressure from the New England Congressional delegation. 
Iterative Management 
Since its adoption in 1986, the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management 
Plan has been amended and modified numerous times in a piecemeal and iterative effort 
to address evolving management needs in an extremely complex, large scale, intensely 
competitive, and overfished fishery. Today, the multispecies plan as amended is far 
more interventionist than was the original Atlantic Groundfish FMP and yet it lacks a 
mechanism to address the collective action dilemma existing in the fishery. 
In 1987 the first amendment to the plan, intended to ameliorate NMFS's initial 
objections, was adopted to tighten controls on the exempted fishery for silver hake and 
the existing mesh size regulations, and to expand the southern large mesh area where it 
effected yellowtail flounder. In 1989, Amendment 2 to the plan was adopted, 
eliminating the scheduled codend mesh size increase because of compliance difficulties. 
This amendment also introduced bycatch trip limits, established a new seasonal large 
mesh area on Nantucket shoals, increased some of the minimum fish sizes, and applied 
the minimum mesh size to the entire net. Also in 1989, Amendment 3 was 
implemented to establish a mechanism to enable the Council to react quickly to protect 
concentrations of juvenile fish. The Flexible Area Action System, however, proved to 
be ineffective largely due to ancillary regulatory burdens, underscoring the difficulty of 
managing natural resources on a real-time basis within the procedural and 
administrative confines of the Magnuson Stevens Fisheries Conservation and 
Management Act. In 1991, the FMP was again amended (Amendment 4) expanding the 
list of regulated species (to include silver hake, ocean pout and red hake), to adjust 
mesh size provisions further, and to establish gear modifications to reduce groundfish 
bycatch in the northern shrimp fishery (NEFMC, 1993b). 
In response to a 1989 NMFS revision to the fishery management plan guidelines 
developed under Section 301(b) of the Magnuson Stevens Act, the Council adopted as 
the overfishing definition the 20 percent maximum spawning potential (MSP) target for 
groundfish included as part of the original Multispecies FMP. The so called 602 
Guidelines required that management plans contain objective and measurable 
definitions of overfishing and recovery plans for stocks determined to be overfished 
based upon those definitions (Shelley et al., 1996: 227). Amendment 4 acknowledged 
that overfishing was occurring and that no provisions were contained in the amendment 
to eliminate that situation. The amendment proposed to address this need in a 
subsequent amendment. In response, the Conservation Law Foundation and the 
Massachusetts Audubon Society sued the Secretary of Commerce and other NMFS 
administrators for what they considered a violation of the MSFCMA's national 
standards (CLF, 1991). This action was significant and has had a profound influence 
upon the fishery management arena, ushering in a litigation movement that continues 
unabated. As a result of litigation pursued now by all players within the fishery 
management arena, the management of fisheries has, in some cases, been ceded to the 
judicial branch of government. 
In June, 1988, the Technical Monitoring Group produced an assessment of the 
effectiveness of the Northeast Multispecies plan, finding that only limited progress was 
being made towards the achievement of objectives and that the overall system was 
inadequate for dealing with resource rebuilding needs. The TMG found that this failure 
was largely due to the fact that the plan's regulations were difficult to enforce and easy 
to subvert (NEFMC, 1993b). Stock assessment reports issued subsequent to the initial 
TMG report indicated a worsening stock condition, leading the TMG to recommend 
that a 50 percent reduction in fishing mortality would be necessary to achieve the 
maximum spawning potential (MSP) goals prescribed by the plans overfishing 
definition (NEFMC, 1996). The industry did not need to have this spelled out in detail. 
It was evident to all involved in the fishery management process that a 50 percent 
reduction in fishing mortality would translate into a significant reduction in effort and, 
thus, the passive management approach embodied in the Northeast Multispecies FMP 
would have to yield to a far more interventionist approach. 
In the spring of 1991, when the Council began development of a comprehensive 
amendment (Amendment 5), the atmosphere had become poisoned with hostility. The 
industry held contempt for the CLF and the other public interest and environmental 
organizations that had discovered fisheries and had become regular participants in 
Council committee and plenary sessions. Feeling pressed between the courts as a result 
of the CLF lawsuit and the industry because of the draconian measures necessary to 
address overfishing, a siege mentality took hold of the Council. The acrimony 
intensified when in August of that year, without consulting the Council, the National 
Marine Fisheries Service entered into a consent decree with CLF establishing a 
judicially supervised scheduled for the Council to develop a plan to end overfishing, 
and if it failed to do so by September 1992, one was to be developed by the Secretary of 
Commerce. 
Developing management proscriptions to achieve biological objectives is very 
complex in the socioeconomic milieu that is a fishery. The Council clearly recognized 
this reality when in 1985 it stated that "the multi-species fishery is the natural 
adaptation of an industry faced with resource and market uncertainty. . . . (that any 
management action is problematic if it) substantially interferes with the operational 
flexibility of the fishery . . . (that) management actions will be most effective when they 
are in concert with the natural behavior of the industry. . . . (and that) the long-term 
viability of the stocks can only be realized through measures that are compatible with 
the way fishing is conducted in New England" (NEFMC, 1985: 1.2). Amendment 5 
was to indeed change the way fishing was conducted in New England and, 
consequently, it was an amendment that took three years to develop; time which the 
plaintiffs in the CLF suit and consent decree ultimately agreed to provide. 
Amendment 5: Too Little Too Late 
Amendment 5 was implemented on March 1, 1994 (NMFS, 1994a) proposing to 
reduce fishing mortality by 50 percent over five years utilizing a combination of 
measures including a reduction in the number of days that a vessel could fish (effort 
reduction program) and by imposing a moratorium on new permits (limited access 
program). In addition, Amendment 5 required permits for all vessel operators and 
dealers, established mandatory reporting of landings and effort data (in some instances 
requiring that vessels utilize electronic vessel tracking devices), established a 
possession limit of 5,000 pounds of haddock, expanded existing closed areas, made a 
number of other adjustments to control fishing induced mortality, and established 
measures to reduce the bycatch of harbor porpoise in the Gulf of Maine sink gillnet 
fishery. This amendment also included provisions for a framework adjustment system 
that would allow the Council to add or delete regulations more expeditiously in order to 
meet plan objectives. This mechanism was intended to provide a real-time means of 
addressing the dynamics of the fishery, however, its adaptiveness has been hobbled by 
the imposition of administrative and procedural constraints (Butler et al., 2001) largely 
as a result of litigation. 
The Amendment 5 permit moratorium established for the first time in its history, 
a prohibition on entry into the groundfishery. The amendment's effort reduction 
program was also a significant departure from prior management approaches. It 
stipulated that vessels either be removed from the fishery for blocks of time or that an 
individual allocation of days-at-sea (to be reduced in annual increments) be utilized at 
the owners discretion. Based upon annual harvest targets to evaluate the progress of the 
plan, the effort reduction program left those who had opted for the individual allocation 
with no more than a total of 88 days-at-sea (DAS) during which to fish for groundfish. 
Although it was not acknowledged or perhaps recognized at the time, the net effect of 
Amendment 5 was to transfer value in the fishing enterprise from the vessel, to the 
permit and ultimately to the allocation of DAS. In a fashion reminiscent of the quota- 
based management system of the previous decade, the days-at-sea allocation system 
supplanted the fisherman such that the management regime was making decisions 
normally made by the fisherman. Nevertheless, the plan did not truly address the 
overcapitalized nature of the fleet and provide a means of removing vessels. In fact, the 
qualification process enabled access to permits for anyone (vessel) who could document 
the landing of at least a pound of groundfish. It was argued at the time that this was the 
only may to ensure equity in the assignment of rights to the fishery. It was also argued 
that fishermen who received a federal groundfish permit would not be required to 
actively remain in the groundfish fishery to maintain the permit's validity. This has 
become know as the no use it no lose it principle which theoretically would encourage 
fishermen to shift effort off the groundfish resource without ultimately being penalized 
for their conservation investment. 
Amendment 6 was approved by the Council and implemented in May of 1994 to 
permanently establish measures that had been adopted by the Secretary under 
emergency to restrict the harvest of Georges Bank haddock to 500-pounds per trip 
(NMFS, 1994b). However, despite this amendment and the sweeping changes brought 
about under Amendment 5, the August 1994 stock assessment report paralleled earlier 
reports presented to the Council during the development of Amendment 5 that stocks of 
haddock, yellowtail flounder and cod were in serious decline and that the Amendment 5 
measures were inadequate to prevent a collapse of the stocks (NMFS, 1994~). At its 
September 1994 meeting, the Council voted to commence development of a new 
amendment (Amendment 7) to address the condition presented in the stock assessment 
report. By the time of its October meeting, recognizing that the condition of the stock 
was too dire to wait until completion of Amendment 7, the Council requested that the 
Secretary implement emergency rules to "slow the decline of those critically low stocks 
while it developed a comprehensive rebuilding plan" (NEFMC, 1996: 10). Emergency 
rules were implemented in December of that year closing portions of the fishing 
grounds defined as Area I, Area I1 and the Nantucket Lightship Area to all fishing 
including scallop dredging. These emergency rules were subsequently made permanent 
by the Council through the use of its new fiamework adjustment system. 
Amendment 7 was approved and the final document submitted by the Council 
on February 7, 1996. It was designed to rebuild spawning stocks of cod, yellowtail 
flounder and haddock through an acceleration of the days-at-sea effort reduction 
program, an elimination of some exemptions to the effort control program, broadened 
area closures, brought scallop vessels under the multispecies permit system, and 
provided incentives for fishermen to fish exclusively with mesh larger than that 
required. In addition, Amendment 7 established a Multispecies Monitoring Committee 
(MMC) to set target Total Allowable Catches (TACs) to help in monitoring the status of 
the fishery with respect to the fishing mortality objectives (MMC, 2000). Since that 
time, the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan has been amended 5 times, 
including Amendment 9 that revised overfishing definitions and specifications of 
optimum yield for the 12 regulated groundfish species to bring the plan into conformity 
with the Sustainable Fisheries Act. In addition, the plan has been modified a total of 35 
times through fiamework adjustments. 
During the time of this writing, the Council has been in the process of 
developing Framework 36 and a new amendment (Amendment 13) because large 
reductions in fishing mortality rates are still needed to achieve rebuilding goals for the 
five major stocks (MMC 2000). According to the July 2001 stock assessment report for 
Gulf of Maine cod, "(Qishing mortality has remained high despite recent trip limit and 
area closure management action to reduce fishing mortality . . . (to meet the target, 
fishing mortality) must be markedly reduced" (NMFS, 2001: 9). The Multispecies 
Monitoring Committee reported in November 2001 that the magnitude of the reduction 
necessary to achieve mortality targets for Gulf of Maine cod would be severe and that 
further reductions in mortality are needed for several other species in the complex 
(MMC, 2001). 
Earlier reports had indicated that stock status had been improving and, in fact, 
the Council had issued a press release stating that "(f)or the first time in a number of 
years federal fisheries management programs in New England are experiencing 
measurable and substantial success in rebuilding sustainable fisheries" (NEFMC, 
2001 b). What was being presented in the assessment report was new information that 
could portend a further reduction in effort, perhaps by as much as and additional 50 
percent, and this was extremely disheartening to all involved in the management 
process. 
During the December 2001 Council meeting, further development of Framework 
36 was suspended so that the Council could devote its time to Amendment 13. The 
basis for this decision to dispense with Framework 36 was that the measures necessary 
to reduce the condition of overfishing would be too severe to develop (administratively) 
through the expedited decision-making process of a framework action. Although not 
agreed upon by all stakeholders, the Council anticipated the need to further reduce days 
at sea by as much as 63 percent to meet targets set according to overfishing definitions. 
This would come at a huge socioeconomic cost and necessitated the use of a full 
amendment. 
The most recent and most serious development in the groundfish management 
saga occurred on December 28,2001 with a federal judicial ruling in a suit brought by 
the Conservation Law Foundation and other conservation organizations against the 
Secretary of Commerce and the National Marine Fisheries Service (CLF, 2001). The 
Court found for the plaintiffs that the federal government had violated the Sustainable 
Fisheries Act when it approved a framework adjustment (Framework 33) that lacked 
more rigorous Amendment 9 overfishing targets and because it did not adequately 
address SFA requirement to prevent bycatch. As a remedy, the conservation 
organizations have requested that the Courts impose strict time frames for coming into 
compliance with the SFA, require that fisherrnen be monitored remotely via satellite 
and directly via onboard observers, impose a quota system that would close the fishery, 
reduce the management role of the New England Fishery Management Council and 
remove it from the rule-making process, and maintain the court's jurisdiction over the 
groundfish fishery until stocks have been rebuilt (CLF, 2002). The New England 
Fishery Management Council and fishermen are not directly a party to the suit and, 
therefore, neither are entitled to participate in negotiations about the remedy to be 
selected by the Court. Several fishermen organizations have sought intervenor status, 
however, the Council does not have legal representation beyond that provided by the 
National Marine Fisheries Service. Consequently, it can not seek intervenor status and 
it will, therefore, be excluded from the new court imposed decision-making process. 
Summary 
The history of groundfish management for the purposes of this thesis can be 
framed in four time periods with the first period being all the many years prior to 
enactment of the Magnuson Stevens Act in 1976. This period stands in stark contrast to 
subsequent periods because it marks a time during which the groundfish industry was 
subject to virtually no management control, particularly that of the federal government. 
All periods after that can be characterized by varying degrees of government-centered 
top-down control upon a fiercely independent industry that was ill-prepared for the 
advent of government intervention. 
The second management period is the commencement of federal management 
and includes the years of the quota-based approach modeled upon the flawed system 
utilized at the international level and the passive years of the Interim Plan up through 
the initial adoption of the Multispecies Fishery Management Plan in 1986. During this 
period, the federal government was ill-prepared for its new role as regulator and the 
industry exercised significant influence upon the new management system through 
innovation, evasion and politics. Acheson (1 984) points out that during the period 
immediately following enactment of the Magnuson Stevens Act, the industry was sent 
"a mixed set of signals" such that the regulations adopted had the effect of producing a 
fleet with an enhanced capacity to exploit fish stocks. This period can be characterized 
as one during which the stage was set for serious institutional and resource demise. 
The third period commenced in 1987 with the first amendment to the new 
management plan and extends to December 2001 when the federal court took control of 
the fishery. This period can be characterize as one of conflict and costly distribution 
fights between industry and government during which the federal government began to 
assert significant control, with both parties to the fishery management bargaining 
process increasing the transaction costs for the other as demonstrated by the extensive 
interative modification to the management strategy. During this period, the groundfish 
stocks of the Northeast Atlantic coast suffered serious decline and the face of the New 
England fishing industry was changed forever. 
The forth period has just commenced with the Court decision in the recent 
Conservation Law Foundation suit against the federal government. Regardless of the 
specific suite of measures the Court selects as a remedy in this case, it is clear that 
further reductions in fishing effort will be required. This will come at an extreme cost 
to the industry and to the fishing dependent communities given that participation in the 
groundfish fishery, since implementation of Amendment 5 in 1994, has declined by as 
much as 50 percent in many New England ports (NEFMC, 200 1 a). 
Despite years of effort and numerous revisions to the groundfish management 
plan to accommodate exigencies in the fishery over the course of twenty-five years, 
groundfish management in New England has truly become a metaphor for management 
failure. Hennessey and Healey (2000) make the case that economic and political 
interests have driven the New England groundfish fishery to overcapitalization and 
overexploitation and that this has occurred despite decades of change in Council 
membership and in senior state and federal government officials. This suggests "that 
the problem is systemic and not related to any particular individual or philosophy 
regarding the fisheries" (2000: 208). Indeed, they have found examples of overfishing 
to be widespread and occurring around the globe. Clearly the New England groundfish 
fishery is complex in scale and subject to significant asymmetries of information and 
power generating high transaction cost that can not be easily overcome. The interaction 
of parties involved in the groundfish fishery management negotiation has caused a 
downward spiral of institutional and resource failure. 
Mahopanv Quahog Mana~ement 
The mahogany quahog fishery is an interesting case study because it is so 
comparatively new, geographically circumscribed, and managed in such a unique 
fashion as compared to other fisheries in the New England region. State regulation came 
early in the development of the mahogany quahog fishery reflecting the public health 
concerns of the Maine Department of Marine Resource. A state issued license is 
required to fish for, possess, transport or sell quahogs within the state's jurisdiction (12 
M.R.S.A.5 673 I), and the DMR monitors levels of toxin in the tissues of quahogs from 
the areas where fishing activity is concentrated (12 M.R.S.A.8 714-A). Only areas that 
have been specifically tested and found to have toxin levels below 80 micrograms per 
100 grams of quahog meat are open to fishing. This monitoring program has been 
conducted by the state which charters commercial vessels to collect samples on a 
frequent basis depending upon the season. It is also a monitoring program that has been 
supported by the industry through user fees in the form of a landings tax on each bushel 
of quahogs landed (36 M.R.S.A.8 714). This tax has since been repealed with funding 
for the monitoring program now supplied via direct legislative appropriation to the 
department. 
Fishermen have had a significant involvement over the years in helping the 
DMR determine where monitoring activity should be conducted. This has occurred 
with relative ease and minimal conflict because there have been few participants in the 
fishery and direct communication between industry and government occurs on a real- 
time basis. 
Beyond the requirements for licensing, a drag size limitation which nominally 
serves resource conservation purposes, and a rigorous public health monitoring 
program, the mahogany quahog fishery was subject to very little management. In 1990, 
however, the conditions of management changed dramatically when a mahogany 
quahog vessel fishing in federal waters off Jonesport, Maine was boarded by the U.S. 
Coast Guard. Much to the surprise of the fisherman, a summons was issued for 
violation of regulations of Amendment 8 to the Mid Atlantic Fishery Management 
Council's management plan for Surf Clams and Ocean quahogs. 
Im~osition of Federal Control 
The Mid Atlantic Fishery Management Council has had management 
jurisdiction for surf clams and ocean quahogs since the inception of the council system. 
The original management plan for these fisheries, approved in November 1977 and 
extended through December of 1979 via Amendment 1, established quarterly quotas for 
surf clams and yearly quotas for quahogs. It also instituted a moratorium in the surf 
clam fishery while a limited entry program was under development (MAFMC, 1997). 
By 1988, eight amendments to the surf clam and ocean quahog fishery management 
plan (FMP) had been approved, each time to address issues attendant to the 
management of surf clams including quota adjustments, minimum size and fishing 
areas. Amendment 8 approved in 1988 was principally intended to further address surf 
clam issues by replacing the quota management approach with an Individual 
Transferable Quota (ITQ) system. Although the yearly ocean quahog quota established 
in the original plan in 1977 had never been reached and despite the fact that there 
existed no evidence of resource depletion, the Mid Atlantic council decided to bring this 
fishery under an ITQ system as well. This decision was readily embraced by the 
industry which was, by and large, industrial scale with many of the harvesting assets 
owned directly or indirectly by the processing sector. The new ITQ system employed a 
formulae that gave participants in the fishery an initial allocation based on the vessel's 
average catch divided by 32 bushels, the number of bushels in a standard harvesting 
unit (referred to as a cage). 
During development of Amendment 8, the State of Maine through the New 
England Fishery Management Council, brought to the attention of the Mid Atlantic 
Council the presence of the Downeast mahogany quahog fishery and requested that it be 
excluded from ITQ provisions of the amendment. This was initially agreed to by the 
Mid Atlantic Fishery Management Council as being appropriate for a number of reasons 
related to the vastly different scales and complexity of operation between the two 
fisheries. Furthermore, the resource in the northern Gulf of Maine had not been 
included in the original management unit, the State of Maine closely managed the 
fishery for public health purposes, the fishery was operating within state territorial 
waters, and the market and fishing practices of the Maine fishery differed considerably 
from that of the southern fishery and thus could not appropriately be managed using the 
techniques proposed in Amendment 8. This later point was particularly relevant given 
that the basic management unit of Amendment 8, the 32 bushel cage upon which quota 
allocation was based, is too large to fit on most of the boats in the Maine fishery and 
would pose a considerable safety hazard to both vessel and crew if it were to be used. 
Despite the realities of the fishery and assurance to the contrary, in 1990 the Mid 
Atlantic council altered its position, claiming that, as National Standard 3 of the 
Magnuson Act (MSFCMA, 1976) stipulates that a species shall be managed throughout 
its range, the participants in the Maine mahogany fishery were bound by the rules 
established under the management plan amendment and would be brought under the 
ITQ system. The State of Maine opposed this interpretation which set up a conflict 
between the state and the federal government, between the New England Fishery 
Management Council and the Mid Atlantic Fishery Management Council, and between 
the Downeast mahogany quahog fishermen and their counterpart in the southern 
chowder clam fishery. 
The National Marine Fisheries Service granted experimental status in 1990 to 
the Maine fishery while an effort to resolve the problem commenced and the Mid 
Atlantic Council voted to allow the Service to develop a Secretarial Amendment 
(considered Amendment 9). This amendment proposed to establish a special 
management area North of a line drawn at 43' 50' North latitude within which the 
mahogany quahog fishery would be contained and managed pursuant to the extant 
regulatory measures of the State of Maine, principally the public health provisions. This 
approach would accommodate the difference in scale. However, the approach was 
ultimately opposed by the Mid Atlantic council because it would have set a precedent 
by subdividing the Exclusive Economic Zone. 
It would take seven years of often difficult negotiations before a solution 
acceptable to the Mid Atlantic council and the State of Maine could be reached. 
Amendment 10 which was finally approved in the summer of 1998, established several 
measures including: 1) a management zone; 2) a limited entry permit system; 3) an 
annual quota of 100,000 bushels; 4) a Maine Mahogany Quahog Advisory Panel, and; 
5) a number of harvest and landing restrictions, authorities and prohibitions. 
To even a casual observer, Amendment 10 does not appear to be particularly 
equitable given the history of the mahogany quahog fishery, yet the ultimate success in 
developing Amendment 10 is largely credited to the Maine mahogany quahog 
fishermen (Estabrook, 1998). That fishermen in Maine consider their achievement a 
success speaks volumes about the flawed biological, social and economic principles that 
undergird the Magnuson Act. The Act is designed to standardize management 
approaches over extensive geographic ranges and does not enable discrete 
accommodations to scale and complexity. Given that the realistic alternative was an 
indirect elimination of the fishery were it to have been brought fully under the burden of 
the ITQ provisions of Amendment 8, it is understandable that Maine fishermen 
ultimately worked to bring about Amendment 10 to the Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog 
Management plan. 
However, Maine fishermen were presented with a Hobson's Choice; there is no 
reasonable basis other than language in the Magnuson Act for inclusion of the Maine 
fishery in the Amendment 8 management unit. In fact, even the Mid Atlantic Fishery 
Management Council admitted that the "management tools developed during the first 
twenty years of federal management for surf clams and ocean quahogs do not fit the 
Maine fishery well" (MAFMC, 1997: 3). "The small-scale eastern Maine ocean quahog 
fishery differs profoundly from the large-scale industrial EEZ ocean quahog fishery . . ." 
(MAFMC, 1997: 12). "Amendment 8 requires that ocean quahogs be landed in 60- 
cubic-foot metal cages . . . (t)he small Maine one and two man boats can not safely 
accommodate cages on their deck" (MAFMC, 1997: 13). "During public hearings it 
became painfully obvious that the quota estimates were inappropriate.. ." (MAFMC, 
1997: 14). Furthermore, the MAFMC admitted that the fishery operates under very 
rigorous regulation of the State of Maine due to the public health issues associated with 
paralytic shellfish poisoning, that the market for the Maine mahogany quahog is 
different than that of the industrial fishery, and that even the age and growth parameters 
of the resource are vastly different. 
Nevertheless, the Mid Atlantic council, the National Marine Fisheries Service 
and the State of Maine ultimately conceded the language of National Standard 3, 
holding that a fishery must to the extent practicable be managed as a unit throughout its 
range. Rather than risk admonition for violating this provision and adopt one of the 
alternative approaches available (declaration of de minimus status or outright 
exemption) the federal management system brought the Maine mahogany quahog 
fishery under a limited entry quota-based management program that was inappropriate 
to its scale and complexity. 
The true impetus for the Mid Atlantic council's steadfast approach, however, 
had less to do with the provisions of National Standard 3 and much more to do with the 
financial realities of the value associated with shares of the ITQ. Several of the early 
negotiation sessions between the State of Maine, which I represented at the time, and 
the Mid Atlantic fishery included attorneys and bankers representing several of the large 
processing plants and chowder manufactures. These large corporations had no concern 
whatsoever about the Maine mahogany fishery in so much as the market place was 
concerned. Their real concern was of the proverbial Camel's Nose that would make its 
way under the tent of Amendment 8 were the Maine fishery to be exempted from the 
ITQ program. Were this to happen, it was argued that others with a much less 
legitimate claim to exemption would petition for and perhaps be exempted from the 
program as well. The shares of ITQ owned by these corporations had value and were 
used as collateral in the financial market place. It was reasoned and indeed vigorously 
argued that the integrity of the ITQ program must be maintained, not cynically to 
preserve the integrity of National Standard 3, but to maintain the value of ocean quahog 
shares. 
Although the management plan developed by the Mid Atlantic Fishery 
Management Council addresses biological standard as is required, Amendment 10 
merely established an additional 100,000 bushels of quota based loosely upon the 
harvest history in the Maine fishery (MAFMC, 1997) and not based upon stock 
assessment as assessment of the stock in the Maine region had not been conducted by 
either the state or the federal government. There was little need to oblige the best 
science standard of the Magnuson Stevens Act because there did not exist a concern that 
the resource would be overfished. The basis for bringing the Maine fishery into the 
management unit was not biological, but economic and principally to avoid a "potential 
dissipation of revenues due to a future increase in the number of non-ITQ entrants" 
(Federal Register, 1998: 9773). In this case, the federal officials were sympathetic to 
the special nature of the Maine fishery and had attempted to devise a mechanism to 
enable it to operate outside the Mid Atlantic Council's management plan. However, the 
Mid Atlantic Council had become enamored of the ITQ approach to management and 
its processing plant constituents were adamant that ITQ-based management be applied 
to all aspects of the quahog fishery. Forced in large measure by the language of 
National Standard 3 that a fishery be managed as a unit throughout its range 
(MSFCMA, 1976: fj 301 (a)(3)) federal officials, the State of Maine, and Maine 
fishermen ultimately relented and accepted Amendment 10. 
Summarv 
The entire history of the mahogany quahog fishery has occurred within the past 
30 years. In this the fishery is extremely unique as compared with other fisheries of the 
region. During this time, there has been one overriding issue influencing the 
management of this resource; the public health monitoring program of the state. The 
management program imposed upon the fishery during the period of federalization that 
commenced in 1990 is superfluous and belays serious flaws in the way the Magnuson 
Stevens Act is used. 
Essentially the ITQ program as applied in Maine is more a community based 
quota held by the state, and individuals in the Maine fishery are not required to 
participate on an individual basis. The reality of Amendment 10 is that it does not pose 
significant burdens upon the Maine fishery and many in the fishery feel that the 
approach has brought stability to the fishery (Porter, 2001). The resource appears to be 
robust; the most recent stock assessment has concluded that the Atlantic coast stock is 
not overfished and that overfishing is not occurring (NMFS, 2000). Furthermore, the 
number of participants in the fishery remains low. This fishery clearly demonstrates 
that where scale and complexity are low, transaction costs involved as parties negotiate 
for control rules can be more readily overcome regardless of symmetries of information 
and power. 
Despite the fact that the fishery will continue to operate essentially as before 
imposition of Amendment 8, the fishery has nevertheless been federalized through 
government fiat and subjected to an unnecessary form of management simply to 
comport with a national standard. This outcome is difficult to characterize as 
management success nor is it possible to attribute resource success to management of 
the Maine fishery. 
Chapter 7 
CONCLUSION 
Major fisheries throughout the world are subject to excessive harvest levels and 
here in New England valuable fisheries resources have been chronically overfished. 
These fisheries have been under scientific management by governmental entities for 
decades, therefore, we are witnessing not just an abuse of public property, but a failure 
of government as well. Not all management efforts have resulted in failure, however, 
and there are examples of fisheries that have been managed quite successfully. The 
central question here is what circumstances bring about success or failure. There is one 
body of literature focused on the motives and behavior of fishermen, another on the 
motives and behavior of the government, and still a third on the generation of 
institutions. However, there has been little work done to link these fields. This thesis 
contributes by adding another dimension to our understanding of the differential. 
A fishery is by definition, the interaction of fish and fishermen; its management 
is an effort to control exploitation so as to affect the biological status of a fish stock. In 
practice fisheries management concerns the regulation of human activities and it 
consequently presents a two dimensional problem. One dimension concerns fishermen 
who are in all too many cases motivated to over exploit the resource. The second 
dimension concerns how rules are generated to modify this behavior. Chapter 2 raises 
the question of responsibility, reviewing the theory of open access fisheries and the 
collective action dilemma where what is rational for the individual leads to disaster for 
society. Chapter 2 also presents the theory of transaction cost economics, describing 
significant asymmetries that exist between parties negotiating for fisheries management. 
In essence, it is argued here that fishermen are not solely responsible, they are rationally 
motivated by incentives offered by government institutions to pursue the fisheries as 
they do. Changing this behavior requires institutions that offer selective incentives to 
overcome the dilemma of collective action. 
In Chapter 3 the current fishery management program and the role of 
government is presented. This chapter describes the public policy tools typically 
utilized to manage marine fisheries, the actions and motivations of government agents, 
and why a govenment-centered approach to fishery management is not always 
successful. The government is variously perceived as monolith, as a collectivity of 
individuals, as a culture, as a collection of interest groups, and as a political 
environment. The government, because of all of these various personalities, is subject 
to an institutional inertia that is the cost of transaction within the public sector. The 
failure of government in the fishery management context has received much less 
emphasis in the fisheries related literature than have the reasons that fishermen 
overexploit the resource. Nevertheless, it deserves scrutiny considering that many 
failing fish stocks have been under some form of government-sponsored management 
for decades. 
The government can attempt to manage using command and control techniques, 
however, this approach fails to acknowledge that the behavior of fishermen stems from 
institutional incentives. Command and control has not proven to be particularly 
successful because it is lacking in positive incentives. In order to achieve positive 
results managers must acknowledge that fisheries management is a process of 
bargaining with stakeholders for the provision of public goods. Public goods in this 
context are the management plans and regulations necessary for resource conservation. 
Where all parties to the negotiation have equal or complementary information about the 
status of the resource and about the actions and motivations of others party to the 
transaction, where scale and complexity of the fishery are low and where the relative 
power position of the parties are symmetrical, management institutions can be 
developed with lower transaction costs. 
Chapter 4 presents a means of mitigating the transaction cost impacts of 
managing a large scale highly complex fishery. This approach referred to as co- 
management moves the management decision-making closer to the harvester level. In 
essence, this is a means of reducing the scale and complexity of the fishery by enabling 
a more real time transfer of information about the resource and about the actions and 
motivations of others. By delegating to a more local level a greater role in the 
management process, a sense of ownership interest in the process and in its outcome are 
offered as incentives. These selective incentives serve to provided fishermen with 
attributes of property rights that promote a sense of stewardship, thus altering the 
rational choice behavior that causes the dilemma of collective action in the fisheries. 
The co-management approach does not eliminate transaction costs, but it does provide a 
means of reducing costs such that they can be more readily overcome in the fishery 
management bargaining process. 
Chapters 5 and 6 present a broad overview of the New England fisheries and 
their physical and human ecologies to provide a context for the detailed examination of 
their management. Utilizing an extended case study method, the contemporary 
management of the Maine mahogany quahog fishery, the New England lobster fishery 
and the Northeast groundfish fishery is described. In the case of the lobster fishery 
where the extant management institution evolved over the course of more than a 
century, the temporal account is very detailed drawing attention to the jurisdictional 
shift that has occurred over the past 160 years. In the case of the groundfish fishery 
where domestic management has evolved only since the advent of the Magnuson 
Stevens Act, the temporal account is less detailed whereas focus is upon the changes 
that have occurred to the management institution. Federal management of the 
mahogany quahog is a very recent phenomenon and, consequently, its case study is 
primarily focused upon the impact of a single management action. 
Information, Scale and Power Asvmmetries 
Informational Asymmetries 
As presented in Chapter 2, among the most significant source of costs in the 
fisheries management transaction context is information asymmetry which can be a 
matter of one party to the negotiation having less information than another party as 
suggested by Williamson (1 975, 1979). This type of informational asymmetry can be 
exacerbated by complexities of scale and information transfer within large organizations 
and between organizations that are mismatched as to size. Information can also be 
asymmetrical in the way that parties to a negotiation perceive their world and how it 
operates, an informational asymmetry North (1 WOb) refers to as "instrumental 
rationality." This asymmetry of perception is particularly problematic in the fisheries 
with respect to the definition and assessment of risk, the way in which risk is perceived 
by stakeholder groups, and the response of stakeholders to the assessed risks. Simply 
put, fishermen and scientists have differing perceptions of and understandings about the 
ocean and its resources, thus their respective prescriptions for its management differ. 
Where these differences are significant and can not be resolved in the management 
process, negotiation costs can be high. Although semantically different meanings can be 
ascribed to the use of the word symmetry in relation to information-based transaction 
costs (including those of unequal amounts of information, those induced by mismatches 
of scale, and those of incongruent perceptions) for the purposes of this thesis and for 
ease of presentation, all of these information-based problems have been included and 
characterized under the rubric of symmetry. 
There are two venues of concern here with respect to informational 
asymmetries: those that occur within the fishery between competing fishermen and 
those that are science based and occur in the fishery management bargaining process. 
The fisheries are rife with informational asymmetries - such is the nature of what is in 
essence a hunterlgathererltrapper enterprise. Fishermen are in market as well as spatial 
competition with others and thus, for strategic reasons, information is to be closely 
guarded, although it is sometimes cooperatively shared and developed depending upon 
the temporal and spatial scale. Anderson (1 972: 139) has argued that the competitive 
exploitation of common property resources "tends to restrict the flow of important 
information, thereby causing apparent inefficiencies in the rational integration and use 
of costly capital equipment." However, both Anderson and later Stuster (1978) point 
out that, while the use of prevarication by fishermen tends to waste resources of capital 
and labor, in the competitive environment of the fisheries there is a rational and 
strategic basis for its use. Because prevarication abounds, there is little basis upon 
which to accurately predict the actions and motivation of others, thus the default 
behavior of fishermen is self-interested opportunism which creates transaction costs as 
predicted by Williamson. 
The most significant source of information asymmetry in the management 
context concerns 1) the status of the resource and 2) what controls fish stocks. Fishery 
managers are compelled by provisions of the Magnuson Stevens Act to define objective 
and measurable criteria to indicate a fish stock's well being, whether it is overfished or 
in the process of becoming overfished. Decision-making is to be based upon the "best 
science" so as to enable decision makers to "prevent overfishing." However, this best 
science is subject to significant rates of error and the biological stock assessments are 
generally considered imperfect thus requiring extrapolation "beyond the levels of 
precision for which the science is designed" (Hanna et al., 2000: 13 1-132). 
Because the management measures generally attempt to control catch rates and 
harvest levels, the fishing community has been skeptical of the underlying science. 
However, it is not simply that fishermen do not understand the science, but that they 
have different conceptions of the problem and scientific results do not always reflect 
what fishermen have seen on the fishing grounds. In the fishing enterprise where there 
is a "basic distrust of all information tendered there is also an unequal distribution of 
knowledge about the "ecological characteristics and associated fish particulars" 
(Anderson, 1972: 136) thus significant information asymmetries exist. This unequal 
understanding of the biological and ecological condition affects the perception of and 
response to assumptions of resource status by fishermen, other stakeholders and the 
government and is a significant source of cost in the fishery management exchange. 
The three New England fisheries examined here have fared differently with 
respect to science-based informational asymmetries. Within the mahogany quahog 
fishery, information about the action of other participants is readily available primarily 
as a result of scale. There are only 66 fishermen permitted to operate in the fishery 
(Holt, 2002) and the State of Maine's toxin monitoring program serves to narrowly 
circumscribe the geographical bounds of the fishing area. It can be argued, however, 
that informational asymmetries were maximal during the bargaining process that led to 
Amendment 8. The mahogany quahog sector of the ocean quahog fishery had no 
information about the management institution, no knowledge about the ITQ program, 
and no opportunity to participant in the bargaining process. In the mahogany quahog 
fishery, the concept of overfishing and best science is almost irrelevant and the 
attendant definitions of maximum sustainable yield and optimum yield contained within 
Amendment 10 have no real bearing insomuch as management of the fishery is 
concerned. No assessment of the stock off the Maine coast has been conducted and the 
National Marine Fisheries Service acknowledges that "the condition of the resource 
there is unknown" (NMFS, 2000). 
With respect to the lobster fishery, although it is extensive in geographic range 
and highly complex, its operational characteristics (territoriality and harbor gangs) are 
such that there is a significant amount of familiarity between participants. The 
primarily day boat trap nature of this fishery present opportunities to overcome some of 
the informational asymmetries that exist, and the current management strategy utilizes 
area-based management thus the significant inter-sector (inshore-offshore) 
informational asymmetries are somewhat mitigated. However, with respect to 
management, there is not agreement within the scientific community, let alone the 
industry, that the established overfishing definition is appropriate. Consequently, the 
negotiation for management measures that took place within the federal venue 
ultimately led the federal government to relinquish management authority for lobster to 
the ASMFC. That informational asymmetry continues to effect the commission-based 
management process, although recent action may reduce this asymmetry somewhat. 
With respect to the groundfish fishery, its geographic range is extensive and the 
consequent intra-fishery informational asymmetries are significant although there are 
some gear and other operational characteristics that tend to mitigate this. With respect to 
management, there is a significant asymmetry of information between stakeholders and 
this is particularly confounded by interpretations of law. The Council's scientific 
committee has taken the position that "the relationship between stock biomass and 
subsequent recruitment is poorly understood and it is difficult to confidently identify 
what biomass would correspond to maximum sustainable yield" (SSC, 2001). Despite 
this scientific conclusion that biological reference points are difficult to determine and 
may lack merit, the Court found in the recent Conservation Law Foundation groundfish 
lawsuit that a stock recruitment relationship does exist and thus the attendant 
overfishing reference points and control rules do have merit insomuch as the law is 
concerned. The bargaining norm under the amended Magnuson Stevens Act creates 
significant information asymmetries. The law is information dependent, however, 
inappropriately scaled to manage such a complex adaptive system as is the groundfish 
fishery. Where reality is determined by interpretation of the laws of man and not the 
laws of nature, costs can become exorbitant. 
Asymmetries of Scale 
There are two types of scale issues of concern here: those that relate to the size 
and geographical bounds of the fishery and asymmetries associated with the decision- 
making authorities of parties to the fishery management bargaining process. Scale as 
used in the latter case addresses the costs that accrue where mismatches in the decision- 
making process occur, the tenet being that complex modes of organization are 
appropriate for complex transactions; simple modes of governance suffice for simple 
transactions. To mismatch complexities of scale using a simple mode of governance to 
manage a complex transaction, for example, can lead to contractual failures. On the 
other hand, costs are incurred without gain where a complex mode of governance is 
used to manage a simple transaction. As the case studies demonstrate, both of these 
outcomes are manifest within the New England fisheries. 
Scale is important because it effects the manner in which information is 
transferred. In small scale units people can monitor each other and make rules that can 
be locally enforced. Moreover, small units can more easily come to consensus on 
issues. Perhaps most important, where small scale units fish for sedentary species, a 
sense of ownership develops. The circumstances of scale in the lobster, groundfish and 
mahogany quahog fisheries differ markedly. The mixed composition of species within 
the groundfish fishery from which cod, for example, is harvested has proven most 
vexing in protecting this resource. Management has proven to be particularly difficult 
because of the highly mobile and geographically dispersed nature of the groundfish 
fishery. The spatial scale of this fishery, the consequent fact that fishermen operate in 
virtual isolation from one another and the highly competitive nature of the fishery are 
all factors which tend to discourage a sense of ownership interest in resource 
conservation. 
In contrast to the highly dispersed nature of the groundfish fishery where 
fishermen operate over greater spans of time and space, the lobster fishery is principally 
a 'day boat' fishery in which fishermen are restricted to certain territories when fishing 
inshore. The existence of informal territorial rules (see Acheson, 1988) present 
lobstermen with a situation far different than that of their groundfishing counterparts; a 
boundary and a sense of ownership interest in the resources within that boundary. This 
is particularly true in what Acheson calls perimeter defended areas. Because local 
lobster fishing groups tend to be small with a significant degree of knowledge about the 
activities of each other, a social environment conducive to solving the collective action 
dilemma exists. 
The Maine mahogany quahog fishery is geographically very circumscribed by 
fact of resource distribution in what is the northern terminus of the species' range. 
Since its beginning, the locus of this fishery has remained within a relatively narrow 
area of well know beds of quahogs in the Downeast portion of the Maine coast. The 
state monitoring program relies upon an industry-based group to collect samples for 
toxin analysis by the state agency and, to a large extent, this sampling program dictates 
where fishing activity will be concentrated. In essence, therefore, boundaries within 
which fishing occurs are established and significant opportunities to prevent collective 
action problen~s exist. 
Scale differences have had a profound effect upon the ability of the institution of 
stewardship to evolve within these fisheries, clearly setting the lobster and mahogany 
quahog fisheries apart for the groundfish fishery. Both the lobster and quahog fisheries 
are primarily pursued within the territorial sea where the problem inherent in open 
access can be somewhat ameliorated because a territoriality serves as a proxy for 
property rights. Having a property right, even one that has no legal standing (and one 
often maintained through coercion and intimidation) has nevertheless provided a means 
of addressing the collective action dilemma. Territoriality restricts fishermen to a small 
area where they are well known and where their compliance with the laws can be 
observed. 
The lobster industry has advocated for and has been principally responsible for 
the development of a number of conservation measures (Acheson, 1997). Interestingly, 
the measures most strongly advocated for by industry over the years (the so-called V- 
notch and oversize measures) have principally been those designed to protect a strong 
spawning stock. Hall-Arber and Finlayson (1 997) have characterized this type of user 
advocacy for conservation measures as a linkage between social and ecological 
systems; a practical understanding of the connection between the community and the 
resource it depends upon. Participation in the process of making decisions relating to 
the management of the resource invests fishermen and fishing communities in the 
success of management. This linkage has enabled the lobster industry to collectively 
devise management measures where the industrylgovernment linkage was appropriately 
scaled. This condition of ownership enabled the regional fishery to overcome large 
scale highly complex impediments to negotiation through an agreement upon regional 
management areas and boundaries. 
In fact, numerous institutions in the form of rules established through a statutory 
or regulatory process and informal rules or norms of behavior have evolved to maintain 
this attitude of "property" in the lobster and to a lesser extent the quahog fishery. 
Additionally, several institutions in the form of fishermen associations have been 
established to ensure that these rights are protected. The lobster industry for example 
has a longstanding history of involvement in the management of "its" resource 
(Acheson, 1997; Acheson and Knight, 2000) and it is a natural extension of that history 
that the industry would be prepared to engage in the contemporary approach to 
management embodied in the adaptive management concept currently utilized under the 
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission. 
In contrast, the groundfishery has principally been an open ocean enterprise 
pursuing fugitive fishery resources that exist in a vast and remote space. Hall-Arber 
and Finlayson (1 997: 1 1 1) point out that in the groundfisheries of both the northeastern 
United States and Atlantic Canada, fishermen "embrace a strong egalitarian ethos that 
supports open access to fisheries resources." The legal regime in this space, until the 
advent of extended jurisdiction, has held that fishery resources are res nullius and thus 
considered to be the property of no one until actually rendered into a condition of 
possession. Prior to the enactment of the Magnuson Stevens Act and certainly prior to 
the Canadian/U.S. boundary delimitation, the New England groundfisherman operated 
over a substantial part of the Northwest Atlantic. Certainly there have been conflicts, 
but groundfishermen operating on the high seas have not considered their access to the 
resource more or less preferential than another's and thus an ownership interest in the 
resource has not developed. Because any fish left by one fisherman is subject to capture 
by another, there is no incentive to harvest with restraint. In this circumstance there is 
no individual benefit perceived through individual resource conservation investments. 
Therefore, it is rational to fish rapaciously. To do otherwise is too costly in the 
competitive open access groundfishery. Unfortunately, however, what is in the short 
run best interest of fishermen has led to the destruction of the breeding stock, poor 
recruitment, lowered catches and, consequently, business failure for many. It is the 
dilemma of collective action driving the groundfishery and the inability to erect 
property or ownership institutions and create interest in conservation outcomes that has 
led to the failure that is groundfish management. Edwards (1994: 263) has concluded 
that ". . . exclusion is essential to a common property institution. When possessing 
either de facto or de jure ownership, residual claimants are sometimes able to control 
access to and exploitation of common pool resources, thereby capitalizing on expected 
future benefits from restraint, investment, and innovation." 
Turning now to asymmetries of scale with respect to decision-making, there is 
an obvious difference in the way each case study above describes the actions and 
involven~ent of fishermen in the fishery management process. This is not just an 
artifice of the presentation, it is a reflection of the degree of formal involvement 
fishermen have in the respective management venues. Lobsterrnen have been directly 
involved in the management of the lobster fishery since the late 1800s when they began 
to work for legislation at the state level. In the 1990s they became formally involved in 
decision-making when the initial Lobster Industry Working Group was formed under 
the New England Fishery Management Council in 1991. Lobstermen today have a 
significant direct involvement in the management of the lobster fishery through the 
Lobster Conservation Management Teams of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries 
Commission and through the Lobster Zone Councils in the State of Maine. 
By contrast, groundfishermen have had no formal involvement in the process. 
To be sure, they have been actively involved in the fishery management forum -- the 
groundfish industry has exerted significant influence within the management arena. 
However, the groundfish industry operates essentially as do all other private parties 
interested in the matters at hand; through the administrative and rule-making process, 
through the courts, or through interest group politics and influence. Their direct 
participation in the decision-making process, other than in an advisory capacity, has not 
been provided in the current management institution. 
The mahogany quahog fisherrnen have been afforded even less involvement in 
the federal process than their groundfishing counterparts. They were not involved in the 
development of the Mid Atlantic Fishery Management Council's Amendment 8, nor 
were they even aware that it had been developed. Nevertheless, at the state level they 
have significant decision-making involvement in the public health monitoring program 
and thus a basis exists for a sense of ownership interest in outcomes. 
Asvmmetries of Power 
The degree to which fishermen have been involved in the fishery management 
bargaining process, while a measure of symmetry of scale with respect to decision- 
making authority, is also a measure of relative power between parties involved in the 
fishery management exchange. Power as it has been defined here is the ability to affect 
by some means the alternatives available to others party to the bargaining process 
(Knight, 1992: 41). In the case studies there is significant evidence of power 
asymmetries. For example, fishermen exert power by innovating in their fishing 
practice or by violating rules as a means of circumventing the effect of a control and, in 
so doing, undermine the putative benefits of the rule. These actions affect the 
alternatives available to the government which must either revise the rule or increase 
enforcement as a countervail. Fishermen as well as other stakeholders can affect the 
alternatives available to a government agency by seeking legislative intervention to 
press for change or to overturn agency action via statutory amendment. Of course, all 
stakeholders have available and do pursue judicial intervention to compel government 
action and, in so doing, affect available alternatives. 
The government for its part, has significant power via its legislative and rule- 
making authority. Where it has the authority to effect change via fiat, its power to 
influence alternatives is significant, especially where it has the necessary enforcement 
capability. But even where it is subject to a protracted administrative process, the 
government still wields significant power in that it controls the administrative 
apparatus. This monopoly position with respect to apparatus and control of intangible 
services is the principal-agent problem discussed in Chapter 3. It is a significant source 
of power asymmetry in the public sector and Edwards (1 994) has found examples in 
natural resource and fisheries agencies where stakeholders have been undercut so as to 
maintain agency authority. 
The asymmetrical position of power occupied by the government in the fishery 
management bargaining process tends to exacerbate other asymmetries of information 
and scale. For example, the personal interests of many within the National Marine 
Fisheries Service is responsible for the agency's original focus upon biological 
objectives and the consequent science-based thrust within the management arena today. 
Examples of the agency's insular attitude are seen in the way in which it relentlessly 
advanced its lobster overfishing definition, the manner in which it implemented the 602 
Guidelines, and that it unilaterally sought a consent decree in the CLF lawsuit without 
consulting the Council, its fishery management partner. 
As a countervail to government action, the lobster industry reacted in a number 
of ways: it sought to have management jurisdiction removed from federal purview, it 
worked vigilantly against the federal 10 percent egg per recruit overfishing definition, 
and when that effort appeared to be failing; it sought to verify the conservation value of 
measures ignored by NMFS including V-notch protection, the oversize measure, and 
escape vents. The "strong egalitarian ethos" in favor of open access reported by Hall- 
Arber and Finlayson (1 997) and the fact that the groundfish industry had been subject 
to virtually no management control by the federal government set the stage for power 
struggles between the industry and government almost immediately upon enactment of 
Magnuson Stevens. The industry was as ill-prepared for the advent of government 
intervention as the federal government was for its new role as regulator. Efforts by the 
government to exert its new power were typically met by industry's efforts to shift the 
balance of power through innovation, evasion and politics. These distributional fights 
between industry and government have been costly in terms of both fiscal and fishery 
resources. 
Each of the three fisheries examined exhibit asymmetries of power that have had 
a significant impact upon the bargaining process and the fishery management outcomes. 
The initial management approach taken by the State of Maine with respect to the 
mahogany quahog fishery reflected a primary concern about public health and little if 
any concern about the biological status of the resource. The management program that 
the fishery is now subjected to under provisions of the Mid Atlantic Fishery 
Management Council's ITQ program is inappropriate to the scale and operational 
characteristics of this fishery. It profoundly differs from the mid-Atlantic fishery it was 
designed for, a biological basis for the imposition of a quota-based limited access 
approach is non-existent, and the management mechanism foisted upon the Maine 
fishery operates such that it does not afford Maine fishermen with standing equal to that 
of fishermen in the mid-Atlantic region. The federal policy prescriptions to "manage" 
this very small and very unique fishery were based solely upon a requirement that, 
consistent with the National Standard 3, a species must be managed as a unit throughout 
its range. The Amendment 10 approach to the Maine mahogany quahog fishery was 
unnecessary and is a contrivance wholly predicated upon a desire to ensure that 
individual corporations maintain the share of privileges they acquired through the 
allocation process. In this circumstance, the balance of power was absolutely in favor 
of the federal fishery management program. 
In the lobster fishery, the primary public policy tools were passed by the Maine 
Legislature in the aftermath of distribution fights between sectors of the fishery. 
Although most laws were initially developed and advocated for by the industry to 
address economic issues, the minimum gauge size, V-notch and maximum gauge size, 
escape vent and biodegradable vent all contribute to enhancement of the biological 
objective to maintain the spawning stock biomass, although some of these measures 
have been in dispute between different sectors of the scientific community. The balance 
of power has historically been in flux between sectors of the industry, however, as the 
case study demonstrates, power has also been in flux between the state and federal 
governments. These shifts have been presaged by incentives, sometimes negative and 
at other times positive. Although the federal government maintains some power to 
influence lobster management through the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative 
Management Act, the balance of power has been shifted back towards state primacy 
under the Atlantic States Marines Fisheries Commission and, under the adaptive 
management approach, that power is significantly shared with the lobster industry 
through the Lobster Conservation Management Teams. 
In stark contrast to the lobster case study where the balance of power shifted 
towards the state and industry, the case of groundfish management is a study of 
conservation efforts spiraling downward as a result of perverse countervailing 
incentives. Federal power was exerted almost immediately upon implementation of the 
Magnuson Stevens Act and initially the industry acquiesced because the new 
management regime was worth the price of foreign exclusion fiom the fishing grounds. 
However, once the true price of federal control became evident to the industry, it sought 
to shift the balance of power in its favor through innovation, violation, and ultimately 
through congressional intervention. 
Shifts in the balance of power have occurred fiom the outset of management 
under the Magnuson Stevens Act. A report done for the Heinz Center (Hanna et al., 
2000: 88) suggests that the council system has been too "open and responsive to 
constituent pressure" and Cicin-Sain and Knecht (2000: 123) point out that the balance 
of power rested with an industry "that would come to dominate most of the councils" by 
the mid- 1980s. A report recently issued by the Marine Conservation Network (Zeman, 
2001) states that the eight regional councils have ignored "the obligation to reform 
fisheries management" and that the crisis in the fisheries caused by this has been 
"compounded by NMFS's lack of leadership." The National Marine Fisheries Service 
has indeed attempted to administer the national fishery management program in a top- 
down command and control fashion, however, as explained in Chapter 2 the command 
and control approach generally leads to failure, largely because the approach fails to 
overcome transaction costs, and thus no effective rules are developed. 
The public policy pendulum continues to swing such that now, as a result of the 
recent decision in the Conservation Law Foundation's groundfish lawsuit, the balance 
of power in the groundfish fishery management exchange clearly rests with the 
conservation community and its fishery management partner, the federal courts. 
Summation 
Lobster Case Study 
The history of lobster management is framed here somewhat differently than is 
done by Acheson (1 997), nevertheless, the salient point is that the conditions of scale 
and of information and power asymmetries have shifted between the industry and the 
state government, between the state and federal governments, and between the industry 
and the federal government over the course of this industry's 160-plus year history. 
During the first period prior to the involvement of the federal government, all of the 
important management measures currently used for lobster conservation were 
developed at the state level. The scale and complexity of the Maine fishery increased 
rapidly after its initiation in the 1840s. Acheson points out that during its early history, 
management measures largely emanated from the industry as a whole or from major 
factions of the industry aligned with state government officials. Power with respect to 
negotiating position was, therefore, relatively symmetrical. Issues of information 
asymmetry, specifically that which was related to the status of the resource, were 
minimal and there was general agreement between the scientific community and the 
industry on measures necessary for management. Most measures that were adopted 
resulted from distribution fights between sectors of the industry with policy 
entrepreneurs, both within and outside government, having significant influence in 
advancing particular measures, especially when aligned with major factions of the 
industry. 
In the early 1980s, a coincidence of interests between policy entrepreneurs 
within government seeking to advance biological goals (a 3 ?4 inch minimum size) and 
industry policy entrepreneurs seeking to secure preferred management measures (V- 
notching and maximum size) shifted primacy for lobster management, perhaps 
unwittingly, from the state level to the federal government. During this period the 
federal government was at odds with other parties involved in the negotiation for 
fishery management measures. This included the industry on a regional basis which was 
often aligned with state government policy entrepreneurs. An 18-year distribution fight 
resulted from information asymmetries with respect to the status of the resource and 
measures necessary to conserve it, and power asymmetries with respect to the manner in 
which the Magnuson Stevens Act was interpreted and the measures adopted pursuant to 
it. Scale contributed significantly to the transaction costs in that the uniform 
management measures and control rules adopted under the federal regime effected 
various sectors of the industry differently throughout the extensive geographic range of 
the industry thus making agreement difficult to achieve. The generally upward 
spiraling interaction between industry and government during the early years of the 
industry's history which resulted in the development of conservation rules, gave way 
during this period to negative countervailing incentives offered by each side of the 
negotiation. Industry had less direct influence within the federal venue at this time than 
it previously had at the state level and reacted with obstinacy and political 
gamesmanship to counter the brinkmanship strategy of the government. However, it 
was during this period that the industry developed regional capabilities that positioned it 
to transition into the third period of lobster management which has spiraled 
progressively upward since the adoption of co-management principles. 
This current period of lobster management is one characterized by a devolution 
of management authority from the federal level back to the state level under the aegis of 
the Atlantic State Marine Fisheries Commission. Many of the scale problems have been 
resolved through the use of area management and power asymmetries have been greatly 
reduced as a result of the co-management and industrylgovernment collaboration at the 
regional level through the Lobster Conservation Management Teams. To some extent 
the information asymmetries that added costs to the negotiation process under the 
Council have been lessened under the Commission, particularly so now that the Lobster 
Fishery Management Plan acknowledges the conservation value of the V-notch and 
oversize measures (ASMFC, 200 1 e). However, information asymmetries continue to 
exist with respect to the scientific basis of the overfishing definition, namely the 10 
percent egg per recruit goal. Nevertheless, the current period is one of significant 
advances towards institutional and resource success. 
Groundfish Case Study 
The history of groundfish management provides a significant counterpoint to 
that of the lobster fishery. Framed here in four time periods, its history stands in stark 
contrast to that of the lobster case study in that it was subject to virtually no 
management control, particularly by the federal government, for the first 200 years of 
United States history. Following enactment of the Magnuson Stevens Act in 1976, the 
history of groundfish management can be characterized by varying degrees of 
government-centered top-down control upon an industry that lacked a history of 
collaboration and cooperation in the development of management measures and thus 
was ill-prepared for the advent of government intervention. The early years of federal 
management including the years of quotas, the laissez faire Interim Plan, and the initial 
adoption of the Multispecies Fishery Management Plan in 1986 are characterized by 
significant distribution fights between the industry and a federal government that was 
ill-prepared for its new role as regulator. During this period, the industry increased the 
government's transaction costs through innovation, evasion and political 
gamesmanship. The net effect of early federal groundfish management was to produce 
a fleet with an enhanced capacity to exploit fish stocks, setting the stage for serious 
institutional and resource demise. 
Commencing in 1987 with the first amendment to the new management plan and 
extending to December 2001 when the federal court took control of the fishery, the next 
period of groundfish management can be characterize as one of extreme conflict and 
costly distribution fights between industry and government. Information asymmetries 
with respect to the status of the resource and about prescriptive measures concerning 
sustainability were extreme. During this period the federal government and other 
stakeholders to the fishery management bargaining process began to assert significant 
power through statutory, regulatory and judicial action that altered the opportunities 
available to the industry. The transaction costs for all sides of the fishery management 
exchange during this period escalated to a level that thwarted the development of 
effective management measures as demonstrated by the extensive interative 
modification to the management strategy. During this period, the groundfish stocks of 
the Northeast Atlantic coast suffered serious decline and the face of the New England 
fishing industry was changed greatly. 
Further reductions in fishing effort are likely during the current period in 
groundfish management that conmenced with the Court decision in the recent 
Conservation Law Foundation suit against the federal government. Regardless of the 
specific suite of measures the Court selects as a remedy in this case, further reductions 
will come at an extreme cost to the industry and to the fishing dependent communities 
where participation in the fishery has declined by as much as 50 percent in many New 
England ports since implementation of Amendment 5 in 1994 (NEFMC, 2001a). 
Despite years of effort and numerous revisions to the groundfish management plan to 
accommodate exigencies in the fishery over the course of twenty-five years, the 
institution and the resource has truly become a metaphor for management failure. 
Mahoyany Quahop Case Study 
Though certainly not as historically extensive and dramatic in complexity as are 
the case histories of the lobster and groundfish fisheries, the history of mahogany 
quahog management is particularly interesting in that it exposes serious flaws in the 
national fishery management program. This is an extremely small-scale fishery with 
fewer than 100 participants and a geographic range of less than 1000 square miles. It is 
subject to extensive control by the state for public health purposes and it operates within 
a unique market niche. The sole basis for subjecting this fishery to a complex federal 
management plan is a provision of federal law that insist that a fishery be managed as a 
unit throughout its range, regardless of practical realities that militate against a unified 
approach. 
Unlike the other fisheries examined here, there have been no discernable 
distribution fights over the resource, the control measures adopted had little to do with 
the biological condition of the resource, and the control measures did not emanate fiom 
market competitive factors between sectors of the industry. The information and power 
asymmetries with respect to the fishery management bargaining process in this case 
have been extreme as have the transaction costs imposed upon the industry. The 
participants in the fishery had no knowledge of or opportunity to participate in the 
management forum and the imposition of controls occurred via government fiat. 
Nevertheless, the fishery continues to operate essentially unchanged. 
Synthesis: Case Studies, Hypothesis, and Sub-hvpotheses 
It is my hypothesis that the relative success of fishery management can be 
explained in terms of the interaction between fishermen and the government: the 
relative power of each in the fishery management exchange; the degree information and 
perceptions about the fishery are comparable; the scale and complexity of the fishery to 
be managed; and the ability of the institutions in which they work to reduce transaction 
costs and devise rules that solve the collective action dilemma. Where this 
industrylgovernrnent interaction is fraught with high transaction costs that inhibit the 
negotiation for effective rules, a devolution of authority in the management decision- 
making process to a more local level of the fishery will provide a means of overcoming 
impediments and lead to more successful outcomes. Attendant to this principal 
hypothesis are the following four sub-hypotheses: in large scale highly complex 
fisheries where asymmetries of power and information exist, the fishery management 
bargaining process will be marked by high transaction costs that will be overcome only 
with great difficulty. In this situation, there is a high probability that the interaction 
between parties to the negotiation will spiral downward leading to an institutional 
failure. Where information about the resource is asymmetrical, but where power 
symmetries exist, it may be possible to negotiate effective resource conservation rules, 
however, transaction costs will remain high thus the bargaining process will be 
protracted. In this circumstance, transaction costs can be more easily overcome if the 
effects of scale can be reduced. In large scale fisheries where the fishing industry and 
government have similar understandings of resource status and where symmetrical 
power with respect to decision-making authority exists, transaction costs can be more 
readily overcome leading to more effective institutional outcomes. In small scale low 
complexity fisheries, transaction costs involved as parties negotiate for control rules 
will be relatively low or readily overcome regardless of symmetries of information and 
power. These hypothetical fishery management conditions are presented graphically in 
Table 1 
Table 1: Hypothetical fishery management conditions with respect to scale, power and information. 
In the contemporary lobster fishery, informational asymmetries between 
industry and government have been lessened, institutions (boundaries) have been 
available to reduce scale, and other institutions were erected (co-management) to 
minimize power asymmetries. Despite high transaction costs and a protracted 
bargaining process, effective conservation rules have been negotiated. In the large scale 
highly complex groundfish fishery, information and power asymmetries have generated 
transaction costs that have not been overcome despite years of iterative changes to the 
management institution. In the mahogany quahog fishery, initially low transaction costs 
were significantly increased due to the imposition of a flawed management approached, 
yet these costs were insufficient to alter this very small scale low complexity fishery. 
The case studies reveal information and power asymmetries in each of the three 
fisheries examined, particularly since the advent of the Magnuson Stevens Act. During 
the early history of lobster management, these asymmetries were minimal as the 
industry and agents of the state were often aligned in their understanding of the status of 
the resource and of prescriptive remedies. Following the period of federalization, the 
New England lobster fishery emerged with an enhanced management institution capable 
of addressing collective action issues and creating significant opportunities for resource 
sustainability. This, however, did not come about easily or without significant cost 
during the 18 year period that the fishery was subject to federal control. The 
management institution in the Northeast groundfish fishery, by contrast, has spiraled 
downward in response to perverse countervailing incentives, leading to chronic 
overfishing of the resource. The Maine mahogany quahog fishery is an interesting 
counterpoint in that it remains relatively stable despite a faulty management institution. 
What sets these three fisheries apart is the degree to which institutions were in place or 
erected to overcome transaction costs. 
Sub-Hpothesis 1: Data fiom the lobster fishery buttresses several hypothetical 
conditions. During the period of federal control between the mid-1 980s and late 1990s 
management of the lobster fishery exhibited conditions characteristic of a Sub- 
Hypothesis 1 fishery - both power and information pertaining to the fishery 
management bargaining process were asymmetrical and issues associated with scale and 
complexity were not remedied. Likewise, the groundfish fishery demonstrates the first 
hypothetical condition in that the management bargaining process for this large scale 
highly complex fishery has been and remains subject to asymmetries of power and 
information. Management of both the lobster fishery during the 18 years of federal 
control and the groundfish fishery since the advent of the Magnuson Stevens Act is 
marked by high transaction costs and a downward spiral in the interaction between 
negotiating partners. 
Sub-Hv~othesis 2: Contemporary management of the lobster fishery including 
the transition fiom federal control to management under the aegis of the Atlantic States 
Marine Fisheries Commission demonstrates conditions characteristic of a Sub- 
Hypothesis 2 fishery - it has been possible to negotiate effective resource conservation 
rules over time and in the face of significant informational transaction costs because 
symmetries of power have been established and the effects of scale and complexity 
have been reduced through the adaptive area management approach. 
Sub-Hypothesis 3: The early history of lobster management within the State of 
Maine demonstrates conditions characteristic of a Sub-Hypothesis 3 fishery - 
asymmetries of power and information were minimal, most management measures 
emanated from the industry and major factions of the industry were aligned with state 
government officials in efforts to establish control rules. Throughout the first 130 years 
of the Maine lobster fishery, the condition of the resource fluctuated, however, the 
management institution spiraled upward to produce management measures that sustain 
the resource today. 
Sub-Hvpothesis 4: The mahogany quahog fishery case study supports the 
fourth hypothetical condition in that the transaction costs involved as parties negotiated 
for control rules in this very small scale low complexity fishery were easily overcome 
despite the fact that significant asymmetries of information and power existed. 
This case study analysis supports the hypothesis that the relative success of 
fishery management can be explained in terms of the interaction between fishermen and 
the government. Where transaction costs become too high for these parties to overcome 
when negotiating for control rules, an alternative management mechanism is necessary. 
One alternative that holds promise would provide parties to the fishery management 
bargaining process with equitable standing through a devolution of the government's 
management authority. This co-management approach would utilize nearly 
independent nested entities to transmit the devolved authority to a more local level of 
the fishery thus enabling more efficient use of information and feedback mechanisms 
essential to overcoming the dilemma of collective action in our fisheries. 
Clearly this case study analysis is not an absolute test of my hypothesis - that 
awaits a quantitative experiment supported by statistical analysis. What this analysis 
does provide, however, is a good case for devolution of authority from the perspective 
that a more local organization will work better to conserve resources. But it does not 
make a theoretical case for why a centralized approach has not worked. Theoretical 
explanations of this nature are limited in the literature and developing a transaction cost 
framework for their explanation is beyond the scope of this thesis. This is, nevertheless, 
an important question providing opportunity for future research. 
Final Comments 
Chapter 8 proposes a new model of fisheries management, one that directly 
involves stakeholders in all aspects of fisheries management decision-making. What is 
proposed is a technical framework that will enable this to occur. However, in order for 
the stakeholders in the fisheries to become fully integrated into this new model, there 
must be a structural mechanism at the most local level to enable individuals to 
effectively participate in the process. Co-management is not structure - it is merely the 
concept of shared responsibility. What is necessary are the logistics identified by 
Pinkerton (1994a): clear boundaries, clear criteria for participation in the management 
unit, units of appropriate scale to the human resource and the ecology of the area, and a 
clear understanding of how benefits accrue. In some fisheries, these logistics exists. In 
others they are woefully lacking. 
Looking again at the fisheries focused upon here, the lobster 
industry/government interaction has been in flux over the 160 year history of this 
fishery and so too has its management. When authority for management decision- 
making was lodged at the federal level between the 1980s and the mid 1990s, the 
management institution failed. When authority was shared between the industry and 
government (de facto from 1880 through the 1970s and de jure since the late 1990s), the 
fishery management institution has more successfully overcome transaction cost 
impediments. 
Today the lobster industry is well organized and there are well delineated 
management units in place within local areas, within territorial waters, and in federal 
waters as well. There are very clear criteria for participation in local, state and regional 
management units. The scale of the human resource and the ecology of the area is 
appropriate. Finally, there is a clear understanding of how benefits will accrue, 
although all of the mechanisms necessary to achieve these benefits are not yet fully in 
place. There are a number of nearly decomposable institutions arranged in a 
hierarchical or nested fashion relative to the decision-making process. At the most local 
level there are formal and informal units (cooperatives and harbor gangs, etc.) that make 
decisions affecting their immediate area. These local units engage directly in 
management decision-making within a broader arena through lobster zone councils and 
the ballot process established as part of the zonal management approach. The intra- and 
inter-zone activities and their relation to the state-level fishery as a whole is under the 
purview of the Lobster Advisory Council which serves as a council of councils 
comprised of representatives of each zone council. Representatives of zone councils, 
the Lobster Advisory Council, industry trade organizations, and individual lobstermen 
serve as members of the Lobster Conservation Management Teams (LCMTs) 
established under the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission and, with respect to 
the State of Maine, a lobster industry representative serves as a member of the ASMFC 
policy board which functions essentially as a council of councils relative to the seven 
LCMTs. Considering the institutions in place, the collective action problem has been 
minimized in the New England lobster fishery and this fishery can be characterized as a 
co-managed. 
The Maine mahogany quahog fishery is not structurally complex. However, 
there are very clear and very narrow boundaries, clear criteria for participation in the 
management unit, units of appropriate scale to the human resource and the ecology of 
the area, and a clear understanding of how benefits accrue. Although a formal structure 
is provided for under the terms of the Mid Atlantic Council's management plan, it has 
proven to be superfluous and necessary decision-making is accomplished by 
participants in the fishery in an informal fashion. Given that this fishery has relatively 
few participants and that it currently operates under what is essentially a community- 
based quota system, the problems of collective action are not operative within this 
fishery and many attributes of co-management are present. 
The New England groundfish fishery is well organized but there are no 
delineated management units in place within local areas, within territorial waters or in 
federal waters which is part and parcel of the problem that has vexed management of 
this very complex fishery. There are no boundaries other than those of coastline, Hague 
line and closed areas. There is no clear criterion for participation in the fishery other 
than that associated with the permit system. Participants in the fishery freely operate 
over a vast area thus the scale of the human resource relative to the ecology of the area 
is inappropriate. And, most disturbingly, because of the significant number of valid but 
inactive permits issued for this fishery, the latent effort that could return to the fishery 
has made it impossible for active participants to realize how conservation benefits might 
accrue. Although there are groundfish industry participants serving on the regional 
councils and industry representatives involved in the advisory panels, there is no formal 
structure, other than industry trade organizations, through which individual fishermen 
may engage in the decision-making process. Regrettably, the only means by which 
stakeholders can engage in the decision-making process relative to this fishery is 
through the legally defined procedural process, the courts, and through political 
influence. 
The lack of appropriately scaled institutions has caused management of the 
groundfish fishery to be among the most dysfunctional in the world. To overcome the 
inherent collective action problems, a new management system is required, however, 
institution building may be difficult given exigencies of the fishery. The ability to 
contrive numerous hierarchical decision-making bodies, as is available in the lobster 
fishery for example, will be hampered by the long-standing res nullius nature of the 
fishery and the egalitarian ethos supporting open access. However, the paradigm shift 
proposed, one providing efficient and cost-effective fishery management, accountability 
and cost recovery, and devolution of authorities for fishery management decision- 
making, can help. If so, it may be possible to overcome many of the problems caused 
by the failure of the current model to allow for direct involvement of stakeholders and 
the inability of the current model to address the problem of collective action. 
At the time of this writing, opportunities for positive change in the Northeast 
groundfish management institution are possible with respect to the Conservation Law 
Foundation groundfish lawsuit. The federal judge in this case commented that the 
"disputes are so complex that the usual way for reaching a consensus on federal 
regulations will simply not work" (PPH, 2002) thus she has agreed to award intervenor 
status to thirteen groups including fishermen organizations (CCT, 2002). Plaintiffs, 
defendants and intervenors are expected to participate in an Alternative Dispute 
Resolution forum to determine whether or not they will consent to mediation. Should 
this case move towards mediation, the various stakeholders involved (conservationists, 
fishermen, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and the New England states) will 
have relatively equal standing in the negotiating process within this new fisheries 
management forum. 
It is also possible that some co-management features may be adopted as part of 
the New England Fishery Management Council's approach to groundfish management 
in light of this lawsuit. During recent full Council and Groundfish Committee 
meetings, significant discussion has taken place concerning the need to address the 
collective action dilemma through an areal management approach. Furthermore, in a 
fashion reminiscent of the lobster effort management teams, the Council has agreed that 
fishermen should be directly involved in making area-specific decisions about 
management strategies. 
Both the mediation process and developments within the council forum warrant 
careful examination as a further test of the hypothetical institutional benefits that can be 
derived where power and information is symmetrical between parties negotiating for 
fisheries management and where the effects of scale can be reduced through areal 
partitioning. 
Chapter 8 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
An Alternative Fishery Management Model 
Where symmetry with respect to public-private authorities and responsibilities 
can be achieved, the resultant industry-government interface can bring about positive 
fisheries management outcomes. Key to this approach, however, is an 
acknowledgement that fisheries management is about human behavior and not the 
management of fish stocks per se. Acknowledgement of this principle contemplates 
management activities emanating from local-level stakeholders, thus certain political 
conditions, including a degree of local control and a clear definition of local power, 
must be met in order for success to be achieved in our fisheries management endeavor. 
However, it is unreasonable to contemplate a fisheries management institution that is 
exclusively operative at the local level. Our Federalist government is a complex system 
of hierarchically linked but nearly independent entities. Our fisheries are equally 
complex and span a continuum from small scale community-based to region-wide 
industrial scale. Vesting local-level stakeholders with management responsibility and 
authority, therefore, must accommodate these complexities. Clearly it will require a 
modification of our extant management institutions. If the results of this dissertation are 
correct, then a devolution of authority from the central government to newly created 
entities is necessary to overcome the transaction cost impediments to resolving the 
dilemma of collective action in marine fisheries. Devolving this centrally-held 
authority would necessitate a polycentric system as formulated by Ostrom, Tiebout and 
Warren; one that will enable authority to be transmitted to the local level through a 
system of 'nested' enterprises. The linkages between these enterprises would form the 
basis of efficient operation, especially in the use of information, including the feedback 
mechanisms, essential to learning about and adapting to changes in a fishery. 
A model for this system of nested enterprises is the Federal Reserve System 
created with passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 19 13 following years of periodic 
financial panics, bank failures, bankruptcies and economic downturns. The System's 
initial purpose was to serve as the nation's central bank and to establish effective 
supervision of banking throughout the United States. Over time, its role has been 
expanded to include involvement with national objectives of economic growth, 
employment, price stability, and interest rate moderation. 
The System is independent in that its decisions are not subject to ratification by 
another entity of government, being best described as "independent within the 
government" (BOG, 1994). Its authority is delegated by Congress and thus it operates 
within the overall framework of the government's objectives and is subject to 
Congressional oversight. The Federal Reserve System is composed of a central entity in 
Washington, D.C., twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks and twenty-five Branches 
located throughout the nation. The Central Bank, each Reserve Bank and all Branch 
Banks are managed by separate and independent Boards of Governors/Directors, and 
each entity relies upon advisory and working committees, including three councils 
establish by statute to advise the Central Bank. Structurally, the Federal Reserve is a 
system of hierarchically linked but nearly independent entities; a public-private 
organization designed as such to ensure a broad national perspective on economic 
activity (BOG, 1994). 
A system designed to transmit devolved authority from a central government to 
local stakeholders in the management of marine fisheries exists in Australia. In 1991 the 
fisheries management arena in that country was dramatically altered, statutorily 
devolving the decision-making authority to stakeholders and moving away from the 
traditional government-centered approach towards one of co-management. The 
experience of those involved in the new approach support the premise that co- 
management can achieve multiple objectives in a complex fisheries environment 
(Willock, 1996). In fact, many attributes of the new Australian management system are 
aligned with attributes of successful multiparty systems, These systems recognize 
different interests that exist among groups of stakeholders and come about where goals 
and equitable standing are agreed upon and where the government facilitates the sharing 
of management resources, including information (Pinkerton, 1994a: 2367-2369). 
Specifically, logistical issues have been addressed and administrative institutions 
involving stakeholders have been provided, certain costs related to management 
activities have been assumed and shared by stakeholders, and certain political 
conditions, including a degree of local control and a clear definition of local power, 
have been established. 
The fisheries of Australia prior to enactment of the 1991 Act had exhibited 
many of the same problems seen in fisheries around the globe. For example, the eastern 
gemfish which had supported a significant demersal finfish fishery in the early 1970s 
suffered recruitment collapse necessitating rapid reductions in quotas causing industry 
discontent, widespread protests, and significant conflict within the management and 
enforcement arenas. Defiance and disregard for management measures and industry's 
lack of confidence in scientific assessments led to overruns of total allowable catches by 
as much as 250 percent (Willock, 1996: 9). 
Fisheries at the time were managed by a federal agency functioning primarily as 
a command and control regulatory body with decision-making authority held at the 
bureaucratic/political level and vested in a Minister of Fisheries. Penultimate authority 
was held by agency biologist upon whom the minister heavily relied. The objectives of 
the statutory authority guiding management at the time were much the same as those of 
the Magnuson Stevens Act. They were focused upon conservation, prevention of over- 
exploitation, and an achievement of optimum utilization. The 199 1 Act altered the 
conditions of management dramatically, infusing the system with objectives of efficient 
and cost effective management, accountability, and cost recovery (Willock, 1996: 2). 
This new direction in Australian fisheries management also exhibits "nested" (Ostrom 
,1990) and "nearly decomposable" (Simon, 1969; 1996) institutions that affirm 
stakeholder involvement in the decision-making process. 
Decision-making authority has been removed from the federal ministerial level 
and is now vested in a Board of Directors of the newly established Australia Fisheries 
Management Authority. This board is comprised of members appointed on the basis of 
nominations by a selection committee of both government and industry representatives. 
Nominees are chosen for their expertise in fishing or fishing related activities, fisheries 
science, resource management, or economics and business management. The Board has 
assumed the authority, once held exclusively by the minister, to establish, amend or 
revoke fishery management plans. Although the minister maintains a role in accepting 
management plans, the only two grounds upon which a plan can be rejected are failure 
on the part of the Authority to conduct adequate consultation or failure of the plan to 
comport with the Authority's corporate or operational plan (Willock, 1996: 4). 
Management advice is received by the Board from Management Advisory 
Committees and Consultative Committees established for each fishery. These 
committees are statutorily constituted, their decision-making power thus affirmed, and 
they play a central role in the management of fisheries. Because the committees serve 
as the focal point for stakeholder involvement, and as the Board is obliged to receive 
and act upon the advice of these committees, stakeholders at the local level have real 
decision-making authority. However, their participation in the decision-making process 
is not merely affirmed as a result of this administrative arrangement. Real decision- 
making authority is primarily as a result of the inclusion of cost recovery in the 
Australia Fishery Management Authority's objectives. The commercial sector pays 100 
percent of all recoverable management expenses such as logbook and licensing 
programs, the administrative costs of the management advisory committees, and other 
general management costs including enforcement. The federal government pays only 
for expenses associated with benefits derived by society in general (Willock, 1996: 3). 
The budgetary process established to support this cost recovery program has 
opened to detailed scrutiny the innermost bureaucratic mechanisms of government. 
Stakeholders now have a vested interest in the budgetary process and can see the 
relationship between fees charged and services rendered. The financial accounting 
system accurately portrays expenses and the budgetary process requires review and 
approval by the Management Advisory Committees for each fishery. Budgets, 
therefore, contain detailed projections for costs of services such as salaries, research, 
enforcement~surveillance, and licensing, etc. This transparent budgetary process has 
enabled the industry to clearly see the costs of management, including the costs of 
enforcement violations, and it has promoted more efficient and effective operation of 
the management institution. Overall, this co-management model has demonstrated an 
improvement in communication with stakeholders, better use of their expertise, and it 
has prompted their commitment to work within the fisheries management objectives. 
Stakeholders have an ownership interest in management decisions and this has enabled 
the development of strategies more aligned with the needs of managing complex 
fisheries (Willock, 1996: 1 1). 
An Alternative National Fisherv Mana~ement Promam 
The Australian fisheries approach has most often been touted in this country 
because of its extensive use of individual transferable quotas, but its co-management 
institution has largely been ignored (Cicin-Sain and Knecht, 2000: 219,273, 306). 
Transferable quotas are merely a management tool, supported by some and opposed by 
others primarily because of their potential socio-economic impacts. The management 
institution, however, can not be overlooked because it does have very real and practical 
application to fisheries management in the United States. 
The most direct approach to apply the Australian model in this country would be 
through a new legislative program, one cut from whole cloth, and not one cobbled 
together from our current model. This is to suggest repeal of Title I11 of the Magnuson 
Stevens Act and a comprehensive re-establishment of the national fishery management 
program. This approach was utilized in Australia, not just to enable the new institution, 
but to emphatically demonstrate that a paradigm shift was to take place and, with it, a 
cultural change integral to stakeholder acceptance of the shared management approach. 
Advocating such an approach in this country would be considered heretical to some. 
therefore, an approach that proposes necessary modifications of the Magnuson Stevens 
Act to enable the institution of co-management within the existing statutory structure is 
presented here. The purpose of this exercise is not to propose specific amendatory 
language, but to provide conceptual guidance as to those aspects of the Magnuson 
Stevens Act that would require modification to support an alternative national fishery 
management program. 
National Standards 
Obviously a modification of legislative objectives in support of efficient and 
cost-effective fishery management, accountability and cost recovery, and devolution of 
authorities for fishery management decision-making is necessary to this model. Thus 
objectives in the form of national standards must be articulated. These standards must 
ensure accountability through devolution of authority and expressly state that recovery 
of costs in managing the fisheries is to be achieved. The former is not provided for at 
all within the existing national standards while the latter is addressed in a contrary 
fashion. For instance, some may have assumed that the establishment of a regional 
council system was tantamount to devolution of decision-making authority. However, 
in fact of law and in the reality of its implementation, the regional councils are merely 
advisory in nature. It is true that they operate with a significant patina of authority. 
Nevertheless, in the final analysis regional fishery management councils serve merely to 
provide the Secretary of Commerce with advice. With respect to cost recovery, 
although efficiency of utilization and cost minimization are addressed in National 
Standards 5 and 7, an affirmative statement that achievement of targets in relation to 
recovery of costs is necessary. Both of these existing standards are equivocal and 
Section 304 (d) of the Magnuson Stevens Act explicitly limits cost recovery 
significantly. 
It should be acknowledged that this new model assumes that components of 
fisheries (sectors or perhaps geographic areas) may be managed differently and that 
fishermen in different components of the same fishery may have varying needs for or 
expectation of rights (access or ownership interest, etc.). As presented previously, 
certain logistical issues such as clear boundaries, clear criteria for participation in the 
management unit, units of appropriate scale to the human resource and the ecology of 
the area, and a clear understanding of how benefits accrue, must be resolved as a 
prerequisite to successful co-management. However, this would be extremely difficult 
to bring about given the National Standard 3 requirement that all fish within a stock be 
managed as a unit throughout the stock's range and the National Standard 4 proscription 
against discriminating conservation and management measures. Clearly these standards 
will need to be modified for co-management to be fully available within the context of 
fisheries managed under the Magnuson Stevens Act. 
Mana~ement Authority 
A means to devolve authority to an entity other than the Secretary of Commerce 
would be provided in this model. For the purpose of this exercise, a fisheries 
management authority is proposed, thus statutory language providing for its 
establishment, its objective and functions, powers and authorities is necessary. This 
section would address the authority's corporate structure, constitution, construction and 
rules of procedure pertaining to membership, term of office, administrative matters 
including administrative staff, and conduct of the authority's business. It is through this 
section that devolution of authority is accomplished, what the commerce secretary's 
responsibilities are, and how those responsibilities integrate with those of the new 
authority. As contemplated here, the authority's board of directors would draw its 
membership from relevant stakeholder groups (including the commercial fisheries) and 
have responsibility for setting the policy framework and ensuring that legislative 
obligations are met. The commerce secretary (in reality the fisheries service) would 
operate at arm's length from the day-to-day decision-making of fisheries management 
with this responsibility passing to the authority's managing director. Essentially, all 
responsibilities currently vested in the secretary under Title I11 of Magnuson Stevens 
would be devolved to the authority. Accountability to the public for the management of 
public trust resources, however, would continue, ultimately through the Congress, but 
primarily via the secretary's review and approval of the authority's corporate plan and 
annual operational plan. In addition, the secretary would maintain a role, albeit limited, 
in accepting final fishery management plans. 
The day-to-day decision-making of fisheries management would in this model 
be shared by the authority with management advisory committees that are, essentially, a 
variation on the existing regional fishery management council theme. As contemplated 
here, this would require few, but nevertheless significant changes in the existing Section 
302 of the Magnuson Stevens Act within which the council system is established and its 
functions, responsibilities, structure, rules of procedure, and administrative matters are 
stipulated. Importantly, the regional directors of the National Marine Fisheries Service 
for the geographic area within which councils are located would no longer have voting 
privileges as a member of the council. Instead, regional directors would be nonvoting 
members similar to representatives of other federal agencies. The debate about whether 
the regional directors (who essentially serve as representative of the Secretary of 
Commerce) should have voting privileges is longstanding, having been discussed by 
legislators and agency heads throughout the Act's early legislative history (US. 
Congress 1976; Schoning 2000). The only real authority the councils currently possess 
relative to the secretary is with respect to emergency and interim measures and only 
when it votes in unanimity for such action. In point of fact, this authority is unavailable 
because the regional director will typically cast a contrary vote so as to preserve the 
secretary's discretion. The purpose contemplated here for removing this voting 
privilege is to maintain the secretary at arm's length from the day-to-day decision 
making and thus bolster a council's decision-making authority. 
I also propose that the means of selecting and appointing members to a council 
be altered such that nominations be made by a selection committee of both government 
and stakeholder representatives from each constituent state. Similar to nominees to the 
authority, nominees to a council should be chosen by the authority for their expertise in 
fishing or fishing related activities, fisheries science, resource management, or 
economics and business management, etc. Furthermore, I propose that the existing 
language (Section 302(g)(5)) that relegates council committees to advisory status be 
amended to enable these committees and panels to assume decision-making authority 
where appropriate and thus affording stakeholders a much more direct role. These three 
levels of decision-making authority, committees linked to councils that are linked to the 
fisheries management authority are nested and nearly decomposable institutions that 
affirm stakeholder involvement in the decision-making process. 
Cost Recoverv 
Participation of stakeholders in the decision-making process, however, is not 
merely affirmed as a result of administrative arrangement and nested institutions. Real 
decision-making authority comes about when stakeholders share the burden of the costs 
of management including its budgeting and accounting. In this model, participants in 
the fishery would cover the cost of all recoverable management expenses while the 
federal government would pay only for expenses associated with benefits derived by 
society in general. The budgetary process that would be established to support this cost 
recovery program would be opened to detailed scrutiny of the innermost bureaucratic 
mechanisms of government. Stakeholders would have a vested interest in the budgetary 
process and would thus see the relationship between fees charged and services rendered. 
The financial accounting system would accurately portray expenses and the budgetary 
process would require review and approval by the various species committees and the 
regional councils. This transparent budgetary process would contain detailed projections 
for costs of services such as salaries, research, enforcement~surveillance, and licensing, 
etc. and enable the industry to clearly see the costs of management, including the costs 
of enforcement violations. 
A national fishery cost recovery program will require a new section of the 
Magnuson Stevens Act, one that articulates its purpose and establishes an account or 
fund into which monies of the authority will be deposited. This section will express the 
means by which fees and levies will be assessed and how those monies will be utilized, 
the purposes for which authority funds may be used and what services of the federal 
government are deductible. It is assumed here that existing levies such as foreign 
fishing fees, appropriate customs duties, and permit fees etc. will be deposited into this 
account, that direct appropriation by the congress may be possible, and that the 
authority would be authorized to borrow funds and have bonding authority, including 
the authority to give security over all or parts of its assets. 
Although this approach contemplates that participants in the fishery will bear 
responsibility for some of the costs associated with its management, it is not intended 
here to propose the levy or fee, the formula that would be used to derive its value, or 
how it would be assessed. Clearly, this determination will require a significant public 
policy debate and will not be arrived at easily. As demonstrated in the presentation on 
costs in Chapter 3, to offset the year 2000 budget of the National Marine Fisheries 
Service with a fee assessed against the ex-vessel value of domestic fisheries products 
landed in that year, a fee of 12 cents on every dollar received by fishermen would be 
required. Previous experience in public debate concerning fees associated with the 
fisheries convinces me that commercial and recreational fishermen would be reticent to 
accept any fee. To gain their acceptance, the public policy debate will have to be recast 
and cost recovery will have to be expressed as a part of a broader effort to bring 
stability to the fisheries, to provide users of the resource with a rational expectation of 
how their activities will be regulated, and to enable them to make strategic and rational 
choices about how best to conduct their enterprises. This can only be accomplished 
when the stakeholders are given a direct opportunity to make decisions relative to the 
management of fisheries. Given the growing obligations and changing imperatives 
relative to the federal budget, it is not reasonable to assume that federal fisheries will 
continue to be managed without cost recovery, at least not as they are currently 
managed. In the current environment, the pressure is mounting to vest greater 
command and control authority for fisheries management authority within the federal 
government. Iterative amendments to the Magnuson Stevens Act over the years, 
particularly the enactment of the Sustainable Fisheries Act, is testament to this fact. 
The Australian model upon which this proposal is built is founded upon the same values 
as is the Magnuson Stevens Act. However, unlike the Magnuson Stevens Act, the 
fisheries management system in Australia is functional. 
A~plyinp the Model in New Endand 
Thus far, this model has not addressed how it would integrate the states and, 
more specifically, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission. The role of the 
commission in this model poses a challenge, but the challenge is one of overlap. Prior 
to the enactment of the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act the 
issue of overlap with the Atlantic coast councils and the redundancy of management 
effort was less significant. Fishery management plans of the commission and 
implementation measures adopted by member states related principally to fisheries and 
fishing areas not under the council's purview. However, enactment of ACFCMA 
enabled the commission, through action of the Secretary, to exercise control over 
fisheries prosecuted within federal waters. Furthermore, some fisheries are managed 
jointly by the commission and the council while others are managed independently by 
one institution but have an impact upon the management activities of the other. This 
management complexity was evident in the lobster fishery case study. That same 
complexity exists in other fisheries such as summer flounder and northern shrimp. This 
is not to suggest that one management institution is better than the other as an 
institution, but that within the context of a new fishery management model, the overlap 
must be addressed. 
The ASMFC appears to be a much more expeditious forum within which to 
develop management plans. However, the full ASMFC fishery management process, 
including implementation of management measures, is not necessarily more expeditious 
than that conducted within the federal venue. It is true that at the federal level 
administrative and procedural requirements imposed upon the process of fishery 
management has been an impediment to the system. It is also true that the ASMFC can 
conduct its business in a far more expeditious fashion. But that is because ASMFC, as 
an institution, has fewer administrative and procedural obstacles to overcome. 
However, all management action taken pursuant to ASMFC-developed management 
plans must be implemented through the administrative andor legislative process of its 
member states. The proscriptive/prescriptive procedural requirements of some of these 
states are no less an obstacle to expeditious management action than are those at the 
federal level. Thus, in totality of plan development and implementation, ASMFC is not 
necessarily a more direct management institution. 
ASMFC was established in a much different era than was the regional council 
system. Although both institutions were established to manage fisheries resources, their 
respective focus differs as a function of the juridical breath of the territorial sea that 
defines their jurisdiction. They also differ significantly in their structure and mode of 
operation reflecting primarily their different purposes. The councils were established to 
provide advice to the national government and, although quasi-independent, councils 
are nevertheless a creature of the federal management system. The ASMFC was 
established to coordinate the management activities of the states and it is, therefore, a 
creature of that level of government. Throughout most of its history, the ASMFC was 
perceived as principally focused upon those coastal inter-jurisdictional fisheries 
considered to be of primary interest to the recreational sector. Since enactment of the 
Magnuson Stevens Act, and especially within the past 10 years, ASMFC has taken a 
more prominent position in the management of commercially important fisheries. In 
addressing the overlap that currently exists, it is not simply a matter of eliminating one 
institution and transferring its management responsibilities to the other. What is 
proposed here is a paradigm shift in the way that fisheries, all fisheries, are to be 
managed. To do so, it is most appropriate to consider that the councils will be 
constituted differently than they are currently. This also assumes that the role of the 
ASMFC will be incorporated within the hierarchy of nested nearly decomposable 
institutions of the new fishery management system. 
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